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84 


Taxation  of  Women. 


Woman  Suffrage  a  Right. 


Presented  to  this  College  Library 

BY  THE 

Massachusetts  Woman  Suffrage  Association. 


JUEIA  WARD  HOWE,  President. 

EUCY  STONE,  Chairman  Ex.  Committee. 


<S  /  ) 

Ju 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2017  with  funding  from 

University  of  Illinois  Urbana-Champaign  Alternates 


https://archive.org/details/taxationofwomeniOObowd 


Taxation  of  Women 


IN 


Massachusetts. 


BY 

WILLIAM  I.  BOWDITCH. 


“Yet  some  there  be  that  by  due  steps  aspire 
To  lay  their  just  hands  on  that  golden  key. 
That  opes  the  palace  of  eternity : 

To  such  my  errand  is.” 

CoMUS. 


**A  frequent  recurrence  to  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  Constitution  and  a 
constant  adherence  to  those  of  .  .  .  justice  .  .  .  are  absolutely  necessary  to  preserve  the 
advantages  of  liberty,  and  to  maintain  a  free  government.’  ’ 

Mass.  Declaration  of  Rights ,  Art.  18. 


CAMBRIDGE: 

PRESS  OF  JOHN  WILSON  AND  SON. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1875,  by 
WILLIAM  I.  BOWDITCH, 

In  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 


3^1*. X 
Blplt 


TAXATION  OF  WOMEN. 


The  Constitution  of  1780  was  framed  for  the  people  of  Mas¬ 
sachusetts. 

The  preamble  describes  the  body  politic  as  “  a  social  com¬ 
pact,  by  which  the  whole  people  covenants  with  each  citizen, 
and  each  citizen  with  the  whole  people,  that  all  shall  be  gov¬ 
erned  by  certain  laws  for  the  common  good.”  And  it  closes 
with  this  paragraph  :  — 

“  We,  therefore,  the  people  of  Massachusetts,  ...  do  agree 
upon,  ordain,  and  establish  the  following  Declaration  of  Rights 
and  Frame  of  Government  as  the  Constitution  of  the  Com¬ 
monwealth  of  Massachusetts.” 

The  Declaration  of  Rights  ordains  :  — 

“  Art.  4.  The  people  of  this  Commonwealth  have  the  sole 
and  exclusive  right  of  governing  themselves,”  &c. 

“  Art.  5.  All  power  residing  originally  in  the  people,  and 
being  derived  from  them,”  &c. 

“  Art.  7.  Government  is  instituted  for  the  common  good  ; 
for  the  protection,  safety,  prosperity,  and  happiness  of  the 
people ;  and  not  for  the  profit,  honor,  or  private  interest  of 
any  one  man,  family,  or  class  of  men.  Therefore  the  people 
alone  have  an  incontestable,  unalienable,  and  indefeasible 
right  to  institute  government,  and  to  reform,  alter,  or  totally 
change  the  same  when  their  protection,  safety,  prosperity,  and 
happiness  require  it.” 

/‘Art.  8.  In  order  to  prevent  those  who  are  vested  with 
authority  from  becoming  oppressors,  the  people  have  a  right, 
at  such  periods  and  in  such  manner  as  they  shall  establish  by 


4 


their  frame  of  government,  to  cause  their  public  officers  to 
return  to  private  life,  and  to  fill  up  vacant  places  by  certain 
and  regular  elections  and  appointments.” 

“Art.  19.  The  people  have  a  right,  in  an  orderly  and 
peaceable  manner,  to  assemble  to  consult  upon  the  common 
good,  give  instructions  to  their  representatives,  and  to  request 
of  the  legislative  body,  by  the  way  of  addresses,  petitions,  or 
remonstrances,  redress  of  the  wrongs  done  them,  and  of  the 
grievances  they  suffer.” 

“Art.  23.  No  subsidy,  charge,  tax,  impost,  or  duties  ought 
to  be  established,  fixed,  laid,  or  levied,  under  any  pretext 
whatsoever,  without  the  consent  of  the  people,  or  their  repre¬ 
sentatives  in  the  Legislature.” 

After  the  Declaration  of  Rights  comes  the  Frame  of  Govern¬ 
ment,  wherein  “the  people  inhabiting  the  territory  formerly 
called  the  Province  of  Massachusetts  Bay  do  hereby  solemnly 
and  mutually  agree  with  each  other  to  form  themselves  into  a 
free,  sovereign,  and  independent  body  politic,  or  state,  by  the 
name  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts.” 

More  than  one-half  the  people  were  then  females.1  But,  in 
framing  the  government  to  carry  out  the  principles  of  the 
Declaration  of  Rights,  the  right  to  vote  for  Senators  is  limited 
to  “  male  inhabitants  ”  (Chap.  I.  sec.  2,  §  2)  ;  and,  though 
professing  a  desire  to  have  in  the  House  of  Representatives 
“  a  representation  of  the  people  .  .  .  founded  upon  the  prin¬ 
ciples  of  equality”  (Chap.  I.  sec.  3,  §  1),  our  fathers  allowed 
no  one  to  vote  for  Representative  except  “  male  residents  ” 
having  a  certain  amount  of  property. 

As  only  men  framed  the  Constitution,  as  only  men  voted 
on  its  adoption,  and  as  only  men  were  thus  allowed  to  vote 

1  In  1765  there  were  4,705  more  white  females  than  males  in  the  Province. 
(State  Census  1865,  p.  288.)  In  1790  there  were  7,910  more  white  females  than 
males.  The  sex  of  the  colored  inhabitants  was  not  given.  It  seems  clear, 
therefore,  that  in  1780  there  were  more  females  than  males  among  the  people. 
This  excess  was  less  in  1800,  1810,  and  in  1840  than  it  was  in  1790 ;  but  at  all 
other  enumerations  the  excess  has  been  greater.  By  the  last  State  census  (1865) 
there  were  62,420  more  females  than  males.  This  number  has  been  reduced  to 
49,793  by  the  United  States  census  of  1870. 


5 


under  it,  it  may  possibly  be  argued  that  women  are  not  in 
eluded  even  under  the  expression  “  the  people.”  It  may  also 
be  said  that  frequently,  where  the  terms  “  individual  ”  and 
“  subject  ”  are  used,  though  these  terms  are  also  broad  enough 
to  include  women,  they  are  used  in  connection  with  words 
which  imply  men  to  be  the  individuals  or  subjects  alluded 'to. 
These  objections,  however,  have  no  real  force.  The  first  and 
noblest  article  of  the  Declaration  of  Rights  (Part  I.  art.  i), 
is  “  all  men  are  born  free  and  equal,”  & c.  At  this  time,  even 
in  Massachusetts,  hundreds  of  women  were  actually  held  in 
slavery.1  None  of  these  women  had  taken  any  part  in  the 
framing  or  adoption  of  this  Constitution.  None  were  to  vote 
under  it ;  but,  nevertheless,  Chief  Justice  Parsons,  in  deliver¬ 
ing  the  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Court  (Winchen- 
don  v.  Hatfield,  4  Mass.  Rep.  128),  said  that  “in  the  first 
action,  involving  the  right  of  the  master,  which  came  before 
the  Supreme  Judicial  Court,  after  the  establishment  of  the 
Constitution,  the  judges  declared  that,  by  virtue  of  the  first 
article  of  the  Declaration  of  Rights,  slavery  in  this  State  was 
no  more.”  The  court  did  not  hold  that  all  men,  according  to 
the  words  of  the  article,  were  free,  and  that  the  slavery  of  all 
men  was  ended  by  the  adoption  of  this  article  ;  but  that  slavery 
itself,  of  all  mankind,  women  as  well  as  men,  was  killed  by  its 

1  In  1654  there  were  2,717  negro  slaves  in  the  State  16  years  of  age  and 
upwards.  According  to  Felt,  640  more  should  be  added  for  towns  not  making 
returns,  and  1,132  for  that  portion  of  the  slave  population  under  16  years,  thus 
making  the  total  slave  population  about  4,489.  (State  Census,  1865,  p.  221.) 

In  1754,  there  were  2,570  negro  slaves  16  years  of  age  and  upwards,  not 
apparently  including  returns  from  the  counties  of  Berkshire,  Franklin,  and  Nan¬ 
tucket  (ib.  and  page  234,  table  12).  In  1765  there  were  166  colored  persons  in 
two  of  these  counties,  and  in  1790  there  were  515  in  all  three  of  them.  Disre¬ 
garding  these,  however,  and  merely  adding  the  same  per  cent  as  in  1654  to 
represent  the  slaves  under  16,  we  have  3,623  as  the  number  of  slaves  in  the 
State  in  1754.  The  slaves  had  decreased  about  one  quarter  in  the  previous 
hundred  years.  After  making  allowance  for  a  similar  decrease  prior  to  1780, 
it  would  seem  to  be  evident  that  more  than  3,000  slaves  certainly  were  found  in 
Massachusetts  at  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution.  Wendell  Phil¬ 
lips  thinks  there  could  not  have  been  less  than  4,000 ;  and  a  writer  in  the 
“Transcript”  (Feb.  2,  1875)  says  4 >377  were  freed  at  the  close  of  the  Revolu¬ 
tion. 


6 


adoption.  So  Chief  Justice  Shaw  says,  it  is  agreed  on  all 
hands  that,  if  not  abolished  before,  slavery  “was  abolished  by 
the  Declaration  of  Rights.”  (18  Pick.  Rep.  209.) 

Our  fathers  also  declared  (art.  2)  :  “No  subject  shall  be 
hurt,  molested,  or  restrained  in  his  person,  liberty,  or  estate 
for  worshipping  God  in  the  manner  and  season  most  agree¬ 
able  to  the  dictates  of  his  own  conscience.” 

Is  not  the  religious  freedom  of  the  women  of  the  State  as 
dear  to  them  as  that  of  men  ?  and  can  there  be  any  doubt 
whatever  that  it  is  as  carefully  secured  to  them  by  this  article 
as  it  is  to  men,  notwithstanding  this  use  of  the  word  “  his  ”  ? 1 

But  if,  in  behalf  of  civil  liberty,  even  the  expression  “  all 
men  ”  has  been  decided  by  the  court  to  be  broad  enough  to  in¬ 
clude  women,  and  “  his  ”  may  be  construed  to  mean  also  “  her  ” 
in  behalf  of  religious  liberty,  it  would  seem  to  be  clear  that 
the  rights  of  women  are  covered  and  protected  by  the  broader 
clauses  defining  the  rights  of  the  people  of  the  State,  and  this 
although  women  had  no  more  voice  in  the  framing  or  adoption 
of  the  Constitution  than  those  women  had  who  were  held  in 
slavery,  and  who  nevertheless  were  set  free  by  its  adoption. 
It  would  certainly  be  an  amazingly  narrow  and  forced  con¬ 
struction  of  the  word  “  people  ”  which  would  declare  that  more 
than  half  the  population  of  the  State  was  not  to  be  considered 
as  referred  to  when  the  rights  of  the  people  are  set  forth  and 
defined.2 

There  have  been  various  amendments  of  the  Constitu- 

1  In  the  construction  of  statutes,  the  following  rules  are  required  to  be 
observed,  unless  such  construction  is  inconsistent  with  the  manifest  intent  of  the 
legislature  or  repugnant  to  the  context  of  the  same  statute ;  that  is  to  say, — 

Second,  Words  importing  the  masculine  gender  may  be  applied  to  females. 
(Gen.  Stat.  c.  3,  §  7.) 

In  the  construction  of  the  fundamental  law  of  a  State,  the  rules  are  even 
more  liberal. 

2  If  there  were  any  doubt  about  the  correctness  of  this  conclusion,  I  could 
strengthen  it  almost  indefinitely.  Do  not  the  constitutional  provisions  for  secur¬ 
ing  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  and  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus ,  those  which  pro¬ 
hibit  unreasonable  searches  and  excessive  bail,  &c.,  and  those  which  uphold 
the  liberty  of  the  press,  &c.,  apply  to  women,  and  secure  their  rights  just  as 
completely  as  they  do  those  of  men  ?  and  were  they  not  intended  to  do  so  ? 


7 


tion.  By  article  3  (adopted  April  9,  1821),  “male  citizens” 
having  certain  qualifications,  and  “  no  other  person,”  can  vote 
in  the  election  of  Governor,  Lieutenant-Governor,  Senators,  and 
Representatives.  Article  16  (adopted  May  23,  1855)  provides 
for  the  choice  of  Councillors  “  by  the  inhabitants  qualified  to 
vote  for  Governor ;  ”  that  is,  by  male  citizens,  and  no  other  per¬ 
sons.  By  articles  17  and  19  (adopted  at  the  same  time)  and  the 
laws  passed  pursuant  thereto,  male  citizens  alone  can  vote  in 
the  election  of  Secretary  of  State,  Treasurer,  Auditor,  Attor¬ 
ney-General,  Sheriffs,  Registers  of  Probate,  Commissioners 
of  Insolvency,  Clerks  of  Courts,  and  District  Attorneys  (Gen. 
Stat.  c.  10).  By  article  20  (adopted  May  1,  1857),  a  voter, 
besides  being  a  male,  must  thenceforth  also  “  be  able  to  read 
the  Constitution  in  the  English  language,  and  write  his  name.” 
Articles  21  and  22  (adopted  at  the  same  time)  provide  respec¬ 
tively  for  a  House  of  Representatives  of  240  members,  to  be 
apportioned  among  the  counties,  and  for  a  Senate  of  40  mem¬ 
bers,  to  be  apportioned  among  the  districts,  according  to  the 
number  of  legal  voters  in  the  counties  and  districts  respec¬ 
tively,  equally,  as  near  as  may  be,  & c.  The  object  of  the  23d 
article  is  to  require  of  a  foreigner  two  years’  residence  after 
naturalization,  before  he  can  vote,  in  addition  to  other  qualifi- 
tions  previously  required. 

So  that  male  citizens  of  full  age,  having  certain  other  qualifi¬ 
cations,  “  and  no  other  persons,”  can,  under  the  Constitution, 
vote  for  Governor,  Lieutenant-Governor,  Councillors,  Sen¬ 
ators,  Representatives,  Secretary  of  State,  Treasurer,  Auditor, 
or  Attorney- General ;  and  under  the  laws  framed  pursuant  to 
the  Constitution,  these  same  persons,  and  no  others,  can  vote 
for  Sheriffs,  Registers  of  Probate,  Clerks  of  Courts,  and  District 
Attorneys.  When  we  reflect  that  all  the  Judges,  from  the  Chief 
Justice  down  to  the  petty  Justice  of  the  Peace,  must  be  nomi¬ 
nated  by  the  Governor  and  approved  by  the  Council,  and  the 
Judges  of  the  Supreme  Court  (without,  however,  hearing  any 
argument),  have  given  their  opinion  that  a  woman  cannot  con¬ 
stitutionally  be  appointed  to  any  judicial  office  (107  Mass.  Rep. 
604),  it  seems  clear  that  the  entire  government  of  the  State,  in 


8 


all  its  branches,  executive,  legislative,  and  judicial, — or,  in  other 
words,  that  the  entire  power  of  making,  interpreting,  and 
executing  all  the  laws  which  are  to  affect  the  persons  and 
property  of  every  woman  in  the  State  —  are  exclusively  vested 
in  male  citizens  or  their  appointees.  If  they  please  to  allow 
women  to  be  appointed  on  School  Committees,  they  may  do 
so,  —  it  is  an  act  of  grace  and  favor  ;  but  the  women  them¬ 
selves,  though  declared  capable  of  performing  the  duties  of 
the  office,  are,  nevertheless,  deemed  incapable  of  voting  for 
persons,  even  of  their  own  sex,  to  perform  such  duties. 

How  few  of  us  realize  the  injustice  of  this  condition  of 
things!  By  the  last  United  States  census  (1870),  the  total 
population  of  the  State  is  declared  to  be  1,457,351  persons 
(Population  and  Social  Statistics,  p.  3)  ;  and  of  these  only 
312,770  are  “  male  citizens”  !  (Ib.  p.  619.)  According  to  our 
Declaration  of  Rights  (art.  4),  “  the  sole  and  exclusive  right  of 
governing  themselves  ”  is  vested  in  the  people  ;  and  yet,  under 
our  laws,  more  than  three-quarters  of  the  people  are  entirely 
disfranchised,  and  have  no  voice  whatever  in  determining  who. 
shall  govern  them,  or  by  what  laws  their  rights  of  person  and 
property  shall  be  protected  !  Does  any  one  object  that  minors 
should  be  excluded,  as  no  one  contends  that  youth  of  either 
sex,  legally  incapable  of  contracting,  should  exercise  the  right 
of  suffrage?  But  this  hardly  lessens  the  injustice.  We  have 
398, 1 57  adult  males  in  the  State  (ib.  619)  ;  and  of  the  whole 
number  of  females,  426,326!  must  be  of  full  age,  making  a 
total  of  824,483  adult  people  in  the  State.  So  that  nearly 
two-thirds  of  the  adult  population  of  the  State  is  disfranchised  ; 
and  yet,  as  we  have  just  seen,  it  is  a  fundamental  idea  of  our 
government  that  the  people  — not  a  meagre  fraction  of  it  — 

1  liy  the  last  United  States  census  there  were  703,779  males  and  753,572 
females  in  the  State.  (Ib.  p.  606.)  “Up  to  the  age  of  15  the  number  of  males  in 
the  State,  at  each  given  period,  somewhat  exceeds  that  of  the  females,  except 
that  there  are  19  more  females  than  males  between  the  ages  of  3  and  4.”  (See 
General  Remarks  on  Abstract  of  the  State  Census  of  1865,  p.  287.)  Over  15 
the  females  are  either  equal  in  number  to,  or  in  excess  of,  the  males.  If,  there¬ 
fore,  of  the  whole  number  of  males  398,157  were  21  and  upwards,  we  may  safely 
infer  that  at  least  426,326  of  the  females  were  21  and  upwards. 


9 


has  the  right  to  govern  the  State!  The  candidate  of  the 
Democratic  party  who  received  the  highest  number  of  votes 
at  the  recent  election  had  hardly  more  votes  than  the  number 
of  disfranchised  male  adults  in  the  State ! 

The  organization  of  the  General  Government  is  no  more 
favorable  to  women. 

The  Senate  of  the  United  States  is  composed  of  two  mem¬ 
bers  from  each  State,  chosen  by  the  legislature  thereof  (Const, 
art.  i,  sec.  3).  So  long,  therefore,  as  these  legislatures  shall 
continue  to  be  chosen  only  by  male  citizens,  so  long  will  the 
United  States  Senate  really  represent  only  male  citizens. 

The  Senate  not  only  has  to  concur  in  all  legislation,  but 
without  its  advice  and  consent  no  treaty  can  be  made,  and  it 
passes  upon  all  nominations  for  Ambassadors,  Public  Minis¬ 
ters,  Consuls,  and  Judges  of  the  Supreme  Court.  It  controls, 
indeed,  the  appointment  of  all  other  officers  of  the  United 
States  whose  appointments  are  not  otherwise  provided  for  in 
the  Constitution. 

Though  Representatives  to  Congress  are  required  to  be 
“  chosen  by  the  people  ”  of  the  different  States,  the  electors 
must  “  have  the  qualifications  requisite  for  electors  of  the 
most  numerous  branch  of  the  State  legislature.”  (Const,  art. 
1,  sec.  2.)  Consequently,  only  male  citizens  can  vote  for  Repre¬ 
sentatives,  and  the  popular  branch  in  Congress  represents 
only  them. 

By  Act  of  Congress  (Feb.  2,  1872),  the  number  of  mem¬ 
bers  of  the  House  of  Representatives  is  fixed  at  283.  Divid¬ 
ing  the  total  population  of  ’the  States  (38,115,641,  Census, 
p.  3),  by  this  number  we  find  134,684  to  be  the  number  of 
people  (men,  women,  and  children)  sufficient  to  entitle  a  State 
to  one  Representative,  and  we  male  citizens  have  just  chosen 
the  eleven  Representatives  to  which  the  State  is  entitled.1  By 
ourselves  alone  we  should  be  able  to  choose  only  two  Repre¬ 
sentatives,  with  a  fraction  over,  and  the  remaining  nine  per- 

1  By  Act  of  Congress  (May  30,  1872),  nine  States  with  large  fractions  are 
authorized  to  choose  an  additional  Representative,  so  that  the  present  House 
contains  292  members.  (Rev.  Stat.  U.  S.  chap.  2,  sec.  20.) 

2 


10 


sons  whom  we  have  chosen  really  represent  the  politico 
power  given  to  us  by  this  fraction,  and  by  the  people  of  the 
State,  whom  we  please  to  disfranchise.  The  women  alone  are 
numerous  enough  to  entitle  us  to  send  five  Representatives, 
with  a  yet  larger  fraction  over. 

There  are  in  the  United  States,  excluding  the  Territories 
(1870),  only  8,307,305  male  citizens  (Census,  p.  619).  By 
themselves  alone  they  would  be  able  to  choose  not  over  62 
Representatives,  or  less  than  one  quarter  part  of  the  House. 
Of  the  remaining  230  members,  140.  represent  the  female 
population  of  the  States  (Census,  p.  606),  81  the  disfranchised 
males,  and  9  the  additional  Representatives  allowed  to  certain 
States  by  the  law  of  May  30,  1872,  and  about  half  of  these  9 
really  represent  the  power  given  to  the  men,  by  the  number 
of  women  in  those  States. 

The  President  is  voted  for  by  electors  chosen  by  the  sev¬ 
eral  States  in  such  manner  as  the  legislatures  thereof  may 
direct.  (Const,  art.  2,  sec.  1.)  If  these  electors  are  said  to  be 
chosen  by  the  people,  they  are,  as  in  this  State  (Gen.  Stat. 
c.  9,  §  10),  nevertheless  chosen  only  by  male  citizens.  If  they 
are  appointed  by  the  legislature,  as  the  latter  is  chosen  only 
by  male  citizens,  the  result  is  the  same.  In  case  the  electors 
fail  to  choose  a  President,  the  House  of  Representatives, 
representing  only  male  citizens,  has  power  to  fill  the  vacancy. 
(Amendment,  art.  12.)  The  President  thus  chosen  in  either 
mode  has  a  veto  upon  all  legislation,  and  wields  the  whole 
executive  power  of  the  General  Government.  He  is  Com¬ 
mander-in-chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy,  and  has  the  sole 
power  of  nominating  the  Judges  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
Ambassadors,  &c. 

So  here,  again,  the  entire  power  of  making,  interpreting,  and 
executing  all  the  laws  of  the  United  States  which  can,  by  any 
possibility,  affect  the  person  and  property  of  every  woman  in 
the  land  are  exclusively  vested  in  male  citizens  or  their  ap¬ 
pointees.  If  the  President  please  to  appoint  a  woman  to  be 
postmistress,  he  can  do  so.  It  is  an  act  of  grace  which  has 
been  gracefully  done  in  several  instances ;  but  still  it  is  a  mere 


act  of  grace  and  favor.  No  woman,  no  matter  what  her  qual¬ 
ifications  for  holding  office  may  be,  has  any  right  to  hold  any 
office  which  male  citizens  are  legally  bound  to  respect.  Who 
would  imagine  that  this  condition  of  things  could  exist  under 
a  constitution  which  professes  upon  its  face  to  be  framed  by 
“  the  people,”  and  to  be  designed  in  an  especial  manner  to 
“  establish  justice  and  insure  domestic  tranquillity,”  &c.  ?  Does 
history  teach  us  that  we  may  reasonably  hope  to  see  a  large 
disfranchised  class  receive  justice  at  the  hands  of  its  rulers  ? 
As  Republicans,  we  fully  believe  that  the  ballot  in  the  hands  of 
the  people  is  not  only  needed  to  secure  them  in  the  enjoy¬ 
ment  of  their  personal  and  political  rights,  but  it  is  also  the 
great  safety-valve  against  violence.  So  long  as  a  man  can 
vote  for  the  redress  of  his  wrongs,  and  thus  get  the  justice  he 
seeks  peacefully,  he  will  not  be  foolish  enough  to  fight  ;  but, 
as  soon  as  you  deprive  him  of  the  power  to  choose  rulers  who 
will  make  laws  for  his  protection,  he  will  be  ready,  on  any 
favorable  opportunity,  to  fight  for  his  rights.  How,  then,  can 
we  hope  to  secure  domestic  tranquillity  so  long  as  we  deprive 
nearly  two-thirds  of  the  adult  population  of  the  country  of  all 
share  in  its  government  ?  When  we  have  really  established 
justice,  then,  and  never  before,  shall  we  have  really  secured 
domestic  tranquillity. 

The  key-note  of  our  Declaration  of  Independence  is,  that 
governments  derive  “  their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of 
the  governed.”  This  great  idea,  “  the  consent  of  the  gov¬ 
erned,”  is  the  one  upon  which  the  whole  structure  of  our 
government  is  theoretically  built.  Prominent  among  the 
injuries  and  usurpations  of  the  King,  set  forth  in  the  Decla¬ 
ration,  “  all  having,”  to  use  its  words,  “  in  direct  object  the 
establishment  of  absolute  tyranny  over  these  States,”  is  the 
fact  that  he  has  approved  acts  of  Parliament,  styled  acts  of 
pretended  legislation,  “  for  imposing  taxes  on  us  without  our 
consent.” 

Congress  has  power  “  to  lay  and  collect  taxes,  duties, 
imposts,  and  excises.”  (Const,  art.  i,  sec.  8.)  Under  this 
grant  of  power  there  was  collected  from  the  people  of  the 


12 


United  States,  in  the  fiscal  year  ending  June  30,  1868,  more 
than  $160,000,000 ;  in  1869,  more  than  $  1 76,000,000 ;  in  1870, 
more  than  $191,000,000  (Report  on  Commerce,  &c.,  1870, 
p.  662) ;  in  1871,  more  than  $202,000,000;  in  1872,  more  than 
$212,000,000  ;  and  in  1873,  more  than  184,000,000  (Report, 
&c.,  1873,  p.  718).  As  the  last  census  was  taken  in  1870,  I 
will  especially  examine  the  taxation  in  1870.  In  this  year 
$191,221,768  was  collected.  (Report,  &c.,  1870,  p.  662.) 

These  great  sums  were  levied  upon  all  the  people,  women 
as  well  as  men,  and  upon  disfranchised  male  adults  as  well  as 
male  citizens.  Whoever  consumed  any  of  the  articles  from 
which  these  taxes  were  raised,  paid  his  or  her  share  of  the 
tax  in  the  enhanced  price  of  the  commodity  used.  Do  not 
the  women  of  the  country  feel  the  need  of  salt  as  much  as 
men  ?  Do  they  rely  any  less  than  men  on  the  use  of  coffee, 
tea,1  and  sugar  ?  Must  they  not  clothe  themselves  equally 
with  men  in  woollens,  cotton,  or  silk  ?  If  so,  then  in  1870  the 
women  paid  the  United  States  government  their  full  share  of 
more  than  $115,000,000  raised  from  these  sources.  Indeed, 
if  we  except  tobacco  (which  yielded  through  the  custom¬ 
houses  less  than  $4,000,000)  we  may  go  through  all  the 
prominent  articles  of  foreign  merchandise  which  entered 
into  consumption  in  the  United  States  in  that  year,  and  we 
shall  find  that  women  cannot  possibly  escape  bearing  their 
full  share  of  the  effects  of  this  indirect  but  very  effective  tax¬ 
ation. 

The  total  value  of  the  dutiable  imports  into  Massachusetts 
alone  for  the  year  ending  June  30,  1870,  was  $48,239,835. 
(Table  3,  Report,  &c.,  1870,  p.  140.)  The  average  rate  of  duty 
on  dutiable  imports  in  the  country  at  large  during  the  same 
time  was  47^  per  cent  ad  valorem.  (Report,  &c.,  ib.  p.  615.) 
So  that  the  duties  collected  in  Massachusetts  during  that  year, 
reckoning  them  at  only  47  per  cent,  exceeded  $2 1,000, 000, 2 

1  Tea  and  coffee  are  now  exempt ;  but  probably  they  will  soon  be  taxed 
again. 

2  For  the  year  ending  June  30,  1873,  $20,618,138.85,  were  collected  as  duties 
in  Massachusetts.  (Report  for  1873,  table  22,  pp.  634,  639.) 


13 


or  an  average  of  over  $14  for  each  man,  woman,  and  child, 
and  for  the  women  alone  about  $11,000,000. 

It  is  perfectly  safe  for  me  to  say,  therefore,  that  Congress 
taxes  the  women  of  Massachusetts  millions  of  dollars  every 
year.  According  to  our  Declaration  of  Independence,  they 
have  no  just  right  to  do  this,  unless  the  women  have  con¬ 
sented  to  be  thus  taxed.  Without  such  consent  the  mere  act 
of  taxation  by  itself  alone  is  conclusive  evidence  of  “  absolute 
tyranny”  on  the  part  of  Congress,  as  much  so  as  any  of  those 
acts  which  the  Continental  Congress  could  urge  against  King 
George  and  Parliament. 

When  have  the  women  given  consent  to  any  such  taxation  ? 
Never,  by  any  vote  of  their  own  !  Nobody,  indeed,  has  ever 
dreamed  of  asking  them  to  say  whether  they  consented  or 
not.  Never  by  their  representatives,  for  the  best  of  all 
reasons,  they  have  not  the  slightest  power  to  choose  repre¬ 
sentatives  to  act  for  them,  in  reference  to  this  or  any  other 
personal  or  political  rights.  The  Congress  of  1793  passed 
the  Fugitive  Slave  Bill.  In  1790,  there  were  697,681  slaves  in 
the  United  States  (Census  1870,  p.  7),  who  counted  as  418,608 
free  persons  ;  and  allowing  one  Representative  for  each  thirty 
thousand  free  persons  (Const,  art.  1,  sec.  2),  these  slaves 
gave  the  masters  at  least  1 1  more  votes  in  the  House  of 
Representatives  than  they  were  justly  entitled  to ;  and  per¬ 
haps  this  added  influence  enabled  the  slave  owners  to  secure 
the  passage  of  this  law.  In  1850,  Congress  amended  the 
Fugitive  Slave  Bill,  pointing  out  an  easy  way  in  which  the 
claimant  might  manufacture  full  and  conclusive  evidence  of 
the  facts  needed  to  make  the  recapture  of  slaves  easy.  In 
1840,  there  were  2,482,661  slaves  in  the  United  States  (Cen¬ 
sus  1870,  p.  7),  who  counted  as  1,489,596  free  persons,  and  gave 
the  masters  21  votes.  When  the  amended  Fugitive  Slave 
Bill  came  from  the  Senate,  without  having  been  printed, 
without  having  been  committed,  it  was  read  in  the  House, 
Sept.  12,  1850 ;  a  Northern  man  moved  the  previous  question, 
thereby  cutting  off  all  possibility  of  debate,  and  the  bill  was 
passed.  But  the  motion  for  the  previous  question,  which  thus 


14 


compelled  immediate  action,  was  carried  by  only  18  majority, 
the  slaves  themselves  furnishing  that  number ;  and,  to  our 
everlasting  disgrace,  one  yea  vote  came  from  Boston !  Did 
the  slaves  ever  personally  consent  to  the  passage  of  these 
fugitive  slave  laws  ?  The  idea  of  asking  such  consent  was 
never  dreamed  of.  Did  they  consent  by  the  Representatives 
whom  they  thus  assisted  their  masters  in  choosing,  and  who 
so  materially  aided  in  passing  the  law  ?  The  idea  is  absurd. 
It  is  actually,  as  well  as  legally,  true  that  the  slaves  had  no 
rights  which  white  men  were  bound  to  respect.  But  if  the 
slaves  cannot  be  considered  as  consenting  to  the  passage  of 
these  fugitive  slave  laws,  either  by  themselves  or  by  Represent¬ 
atives,  even  by  those  Representatives  who  could  only  be  chosen 
by  their  assistance,  neither  can  the  women  of  Massachusetts 
be  considered  as  consenting  to  their  taxation  by  Congress, 
either  by  themselves  or  by  Representatives,  one-half,  at  least, 
of  whom  we  male  citizens  have  been  enabled  to  choose  only 
by  their  assistance.  The  Representatives  in  Congress  have 
the  actual  power  to  legislate  for  all  persons  ;  but  they  are 
chosen  by  and  only  truly  represent  the  male  citizens  of  the 
country. 

Soon  after  the  accession  of  George  the  Third,  he  resolved 
to  introduce  a  new  colonial  system,  one  feature  of  which  was, 
that  Parliament  was,  by  its  own  act,  to  levy  on  the  Colonies 
a  revenue  towards  maintaining  their  military  establishment. 
(8  Bancroft,  p.  123.)  The  plan  was  first  unfolded  in  the 
House  of  Commons  by  Townshend  ;  but  the  execution  of  the 
design  fell  to  George  Grenville,  who,  dropping  all  other  parts 
of  the  plan,  proposed  to  confine  the  use  of  the  parliamentary 
revenue  to  the  expenses  of  the  military  establishment.  The 
colonists  interposed  with  the  argument  that,  by  the  theory 
of  the  British  government,  taxation  and  representation  are 
inseparable  correlatives  ;  and  Grenville,  admitting  the  justice 
of  their  objection,  and  that  taxation  of  the  Colonies  ought  to 
be  followed  by  a  special  colonial  representation,  passed  the 
Stamp  Act,  but  failed  to  provide  for  any  such  representation. 

When  he  was  driven  from  office,  the  new  ministers  had  the 


lS 


option  between  repealing  the  tax  as  an  act  of  justice  to  the 
Colonies  or  repealing  it  as  a  measure  of  expediency  to  Brit¬ 
ain.  The  first  was  the  choice  of  Pitt,  and  its  adoption  would 
have  ended  the  controversy ;  the  second  was  that  of  Rocking¬ 
ham.  He  abolished  the  tax,  but,  at  the  same  time,  declared 
that  the  legislative  power  of  Parliament  reached  to  the  Colonies 
in  all  cases  whatsoever.  The  Colonies  denied  this  unqualified 
authority  of  a  legislature  in  which  they  were  not  represented  ; 
and,  although  they  were  told  they  were  as  much  represented 
as  nine-tenths  of  the  people  of  Britain,  this  seemed  to  them  no 
good  reason  for  submission. 

Pursuant  to  this  declared  power  in  Parliament  thus  to  bind 
the  Colonies  in  all  cases  whatsoever,  a  law  was  proposed  by 
Townshend,  and  passed,  providing  for  the  collection  of  a  tax  on 
tea,  glass,  paper,  and  painters’  colors,  the  preamble  asserting 
that  “  it  is  expedient  that  a  revenue  should  be  raised  in  his 
majesty’s  dominions  in  America  for  defraying  the  charge  of 
the  administration  of  justice  and  support  of  civil  government, 
and  towards  further  defraying  the  expenses  of  defending  the 
said  dominions.”  (8  Bancroft,  p.  126,  &c.)  Grenville  had  pro¬ 
posed  taxes  for  the  defence  of  the  Colonies  ;  at  the  same  time 
admitting  that  even  this  taxation  should  entitle  them  to 
representation  in  Parliament.  This  preamble  of  Townshend, 
however,  promised  an  ever-increasing  American  civil  list,  in¬ 
dependent  of  American  assemblies,  to  be  disposed  of  by  min¬ 
isters,  at  their  discretion,  for  salaries,  gifts,  or  pensions,  and 
without  any  representation  in  Parliament. 

The  Colonies  were  unanimous  in  resisting  the  innovation, 
and  at  once  avoided  the  taxes  by  agreements  to  stop  imports 
from  Britain.  The  government  gave  way,  and  repealed  all 
Townshend’s  taxes,  except  on  tea.  Lord  North  maintained 
that  this  duty  was  no  innovation,  but  a  reduction  of  the  ancient 
duty  of  a  shilling  a  pound  to  one  of  threepence  only,  and  that 
the  change  of  the  place  where  the  duty  was  to  be  collected 
was  no  more  than  a  regulation  of  trade  to  prevent  smuggling 
tea  from  Holland.  The  statement,  so  far  as  the  tax  was  con¬ 
cerned,  was  unanswerable ;  but  the  sting  of  the  Tax  Act  lay 


16 


in  its  preamble.  Rockingham’s  declaratory  act  affirmed  the 
power  of  Parliament  in  all  cases  whatsoever ;  and  Towns- 
hend’s  preamble  declared  the  expediency  of  using  that  power 
to  raise  a  very  large  colonial  revenue.  Still  collision  was 
practically  averted ;  for  the  Americans,  in  their  desire  for 
peace,  gave  up  the  importation  of  tea.  No  revenue,  therefore, 
was  collected ;  and,  as  Bancroft  says  (ib.  p.  127),  “  by  resolute 
self-denial,  the  Colonies  escaped  the  mark  of  the  brand  which 
was  to  show  whose  property  they  were.” 

At  this,  the  King,  against  the  opinion  of  Lord  North,  and  of 
the  East  India  Company,  directed  that  company  itself  to  ex¬ 
port  tea  to  America,  and  there  to  pay  the  duty,  hoping  that  a 
low  price  would  tempt  the  Americans  to  buy.  But  the  colo¬ 
nists  would  not  suffer  the  tea  to  be  exposed  for  sale ;  the 
Crown  officers  yielded  to  their  unanimous  resistance  every¬ 
where  except  at  Boston ;  and  there  340  chests  of  tea  were 
thrown  overboard.1  Singularly  enough,  Mr.  Quincy  says  of 
this  act :  “  All  was  conducted  with  order  and  perfect  submis¬ 
sion  to  government.  It  was  a  bright  moonlight  evening,  and  the 
British  squadron  lay  near  ;  yet  there  was  no  interruption  from 
the  fleet  or  the  troops !  ”  (Memoir  of  Josiah  Quincy,  Jr.,  p.  1 26.) 

In  other  words,  our  fathers  denied  the  right  of  King  and 
Parliament  to  tax  them  in  any  case  whatever  without  their 
consent,  or  the  consent  of  their  Representatives.  In  their 
opinion,  it  made  no  difference  if  they  were  as  much  repre¬ 
sented  in  Parliament  as  nine-tenths  of  the  people  of  Britain. 
Because  nine-tenths  of  the  people  of  England  were  wronged 
seemed  to  them,  and  really  was,  no  reason  why  the  rights  of 
the  colonists  should  be  invaded.  Neither  did  it  make  any 
difference  for  what  purpose  the  tax  was  levied.  The  colonists 
denied  the  right  to  tax  them  even  for  their  own  military  de- 

1  I  have  condensed  my  account  of  the  taxation  of  the  Colonies  from  Mr. 
Bancroft’s  most  admirable  history  of  the  transaction,  generally  using  his  very 
words.  Supposing  the  chests  to  have  contained  100  pounds  each  (which  I  am 
advised  by  a  tea  merchant  is  a  large  estimate),  the  tax  on  this  tea,  if  paid,  would 
have  amounted  to  ^425.  In  the  year  ending  June  30,  1870,  more  than  $10,- 
000,000  was  collected  from  the  duty  on  tea  alone  (Report,  &c.,  table  17,  p.  608), 
and  more  than  $800,000  of  the  amount  was  collected  in  Boston.  (Ib.  table  3, 
P-.  I3°*) 


a7 


fence ;  much  more  strenuously  did  they  resist  any  and  all 
taxation  which  was  directly  calculated  to  place  their  judges 
and  civil  magistrates  beyond  their  own  control,  by  giving 
ministers  in  England  the  power  of  establishing  and  paying 
their  salaries.  The  colonists  preferred  to  judge  for  themselves 
whether  the  taxes  to  be  levied  here  were  or  were  not  really 
for  their  own  benefit,  and  insisted  on  the  right  to  pay  the 
salaries  of  their  own  officers.  They  could  not  even  be  bribed 
into  silently  admitting  the  principle  that  taxation  without  rep¬ 
resentation  could  ever  be  less  than  simple  tyranny.  They 
would  drink  no  tea,  the  cost  of  which  was  enhanced  by  any 
tax,  however  small,  levied  by  Parliament.  In  their  judgment, 
it  was  a  tyrannical  act  for  Parliament  to  tax  them  a  shilling  a 
pound  for  tea,  and  no  less  an  act  of  tyranny  to  tax  only  three¬ 
pence.  In  behalf  of  a  principle  so  essential  to  the  preserva¬ 
tion  of  their  liberties,  they  were  ready  to  cavil  about  the  ninth 
part  of  a  hair.1 

The  women  of  Massachusetts,  like  the  colonists  one  hundred 
years  ago,  are  taxed  every  year  by  Congress  millions  of  dol¬ 
lars,  without  either  their  consent  or  the  consent  of  their 
Representatives.  We  may  say  to  them,  as  King  George’s 
ministers  said  to  the  colonists,  You  are  as  much  represented 
in  Congress  as  the  85,387  adult  males  in  the  State  who  are  also 
disfranchised.  (Census,  p.  619.)  They  will  reply,  Because  you 
have  wronged  other  people  is  no  reason  why  you  should  tyran¬ 
nize  over  us ;  and  these  men  may,  if  they  please,  all  become 
voters,  —  we  cannot.  We  may  again  say  to  them,  We  tax 
you,  as  the  Constitution  authorizes  us  to  do,  “  for  the  common 
defence  and  general  welfare  of  the  United  States.”  (Const, 
art.  1,  sec.  8.)  They  will  reply,  We  prefer  to  judge  for  our¬ 
selves  about  what  is  or  is  not  for  the  general  welfare.  We 
utterly  deny  your  right  to  take  our  property  for  any  purposes, 

1  John  Wingate  Thornton,  in  his  very  valuable  pamphlet  on  the  Historical 
Relation  of  New  England  to  the  English  Commonwealth  (p.  51,  note),  remarks, 
"  The  colonists  said  if  Parliament  could  tax  us,  they  could  establish  the  Church 
of  England,  with  its  creeds,  titles,  and  ceremonies,  and  prohibit  all  other 
churches  as  conventicles  and  schism  shops.” 

.See  also  votes  of  Brookline  town  meeting  at  the  end  of  this  pamphlet. 

3 


i8 


unless  we  deem  it  to  be  for  the  general  welfare.  And  what 
must  we  answer  to  these  replies  ?  What  can  we  answer  ? 
Can  we  do  any  thing  more  than  admit  the  fact,  that,  whether 
we  judge  of  the  rightfulness  of  the  taxation  of  women  by  Con¬ 
gress,  by  the  principles  acted  upon  by  our  fathers  at  the  risk 
of  their  lives,  or  the  principles  which  we  have  ourselves  adopted 
in  our  fundamental  law,  every  such  act  is  one  of  simple  tyr¬ 
anny  ?  Taxation  without  representation  is  tyranny,  according 
to  the  principles  of  the  fathers  and  the  Declaration  of  Inde¬ 
pendence,  though  the  persons  taxed  be  women.  Our  fathers 
risked  death  rather  than  pay  a  tax  of  threepence  a  pound  on 
tea.  We,  their  sons,  have  taxed  the  women  of  the  land  25 
cents  for  every  pound  of  tea  they  consumed.  If  our  fathers 
were  right  in  resisting  the  attempt  to  extract  a  miserable  three¬ 
pence,  what  must  we  think  of  ourselves  ? 

It  was  possible,  by  resolute  self-denial  in  the  use  of  tea,  for 
the  colonists  to  avoid  admitting  the  right  of  Parliament  to 
tax  them.  But  the  women  of  Massachusetts  to-day  cannot 
thus  escape  the  taxation  imposed  by  Congress.  Even  water 
is  enhanced  in  its  cost  by  the  taxes  levied  on  the  iron,  tin,  or 
lead  which  enters  into  the  construction  of  the  pipes  or  pumps 
from  which  it  must  be  drawn.  Incredible  as  it  may  seem,  and 
foolish  as  it  is,  even  bread,  butter,  flour,  potatoes,  &c.,  all 
are  taxed.  It  is  difficult,  indeed,  to  find  what  is  not  taxed. 
Within  the  limits  marked  out  by  the  Constitution,  Congress, 
like  Parliament,  claims  the  right  to  tax  women  generally.  By 
no  self-denying  ordinance  can  they  possibly  escape  the  effect 
of  this  taxation.  The  colonists  could  escape  the  mark  of  the 
brand  which  served  to  show  whose  property  they  were.  But 
the  women  of  to-day  cannot  thus  escape.  It  was  a  very 
ignoble  sort  of  man  who  said  of  his  wife,  — 

“  I  will  be  master  of  what  is  mine  own : 

She  is  my  goods,  my  chattel ;  she  is  my  house, 

My  household  stuff,  my  field,  my  barn, 

My  horse,  my  ox,  my  ass,”  &c. 

This  is  not  a  mere  picture  of  the  imagination.  In  some 
parts  of  Europe  we  may  see,  even  at  this  day,  a  man  driving 


19 


his  wife  and  donkey  yoked  or  harnessed  together  ;  sometimes, 
it  is  said,  he  even  rides  in  the  cart  himself !  Many  of  us 
every  year  go  abroad,  and  fall  into  raptures  over  the  Dresden 
Madonna,  and  feel  unbounded  astonishment  at  the  barbaric 
treatment  of  the  peasant  women.  But,  nevertheless,  we  men 
in  America  practise  a  form  of  tyranny  over  our  own  women 
which  we  cannot  help  admitting  to  be  unjust,  without  repu¬ 
diating  our  own  principles,  and  which  we  cannot  help  admit¬ 
ting  to  be  mean,  unless  we  think  it  generous  to  save  our  own 
money  by  seizing  that  of  a  woman  without  her  consent.  We 
are  far  too  civilized  to  harness  our  women,  but  not  at  all  un¬ 
willing  to  imprison  them  if  they  do  not  quietly  submit  to 
our  tyranny.  (Gen.  Stat.  c.  12,  §  13.) 

It  is  barely  possible,  if  women  were  really  represented  in 
Congress,  and  could  themselves  pass  upon  the  nomination  of 
civil  and  judicial  officers,  and  vote  to  raise  or  reduce  salaries, 
that  the  government  of  the  country  would  begin  to  remember 
that  it  springs  from  the  people,  and  that  half  the  people  are 
women.  Perhaps  the  representatives  of  women  on  the  floor 
of  Congress,  at  some  future  day,  seeing  the  enormous  benefit 
resulting  from  unrestricted  free  trade  across  the  Mississippi, 
the  Ohio,  and  the  Hudson,  will  fail  to  see  why  the  same  result 
should  not  follow  from  free  trade  across  the  St.  Lawrence  ;  or, 
if  free  trade  east  and  west  across  Lake  Michigan  is  an  un¬ 
mixed  blessing,  —  not  to  five  States,  merely,  but  to  the  whole 
Union,  —  why  free  trade  north  and  south  across  Lakes  Supe¬ 
rior,  Erie,  and  Ontario  will  not  be  equally  a  blessing ;  or  why, 
indeed,  free  trade  across  the  oceans  should  not  do  more  to 
advance  the  peace,  and  therefore  the  well-being,  of  the  human 
race,  here  as  well  as  abroad,  than  all  the  standing  armies,  forts, 
arsenals,  and  custom-houses  that  have  ever  been  or  will  be 
built,  can  ever  accomplish. 

Besides  the  indirect  taxation  1  of  the  women  of  Massachu- 

1  I  have  not  alluded  to  the  taxation  of  women  through  the  internal  revenue 
department,  because  the  evidence  is  merely  cumulative,  and  the  taxes  which 
probably  bear  on  them  most  have  been  repealed. 

During  the  year  ending  June  30,  1873,  there  was  collected  in  Massachusetts, 
from  spirits,  $1,674,276.65  ;  from  tobacco,  $537,471.61 ;  from  fermented  liquors. 


20 


setts  by  the  General  Government,  —  a  taxation  which  the  very 
rich  are  obliged  to  submit  to,  and  the  very  poor  cannot  escape, 
—  all  those  who  have  a  certain  amount  of  property  are  directly 
taxed  here.  Each  year  a  state,  county,  and  town  or  city 
tax  is  levied  on  them. 

In  1871,  the  House  of  Representatives  directed  the  Tax 
Commissioner  to  ascertain  and  report  to  the  Legislature  the 
number  of  females  taxed  directly,  those  who  had  property 
taxed  to  husbands,  guardians,  or  trustees,  and  also  the  cor¬ 
poration  taxes  paid  by  them.  The  Report  (House  Document, 
No.  428)  states  that  33,961  women  were  taxed,  and  that  they 
paid  $1,927,653.1 1.  (Ib.  p.  25.)  The  whole  tax  raised  that  year 
(Aggregate  of  Polls,  Property,  Taxes,  &c.,  assessed  May,  1871, 
p.  25)  was  $22,063,946.  So  that  in  1871  the  women  paid 
more  than  one-twelfth  of  all  the  sums  raised  by  taxation  in  all 
the  towns  and  cities  of  the  Commonwealth.  Of  the  whole 
sum  thus  raised,  $782,7 53  (Aggregate,  &c.,  p.  25)  was  assessed 
upon  polls.  Deducting  this,  it  appears  that  the  women  really 
paid  very  nearly  one-eleventh  of  the  entire  tax  on  property  in 
1871.  (See  note  at  end  of  the  pamphlet.) 

In  his  preface  to  this  Report,  Charles  Adams,  Jr.,  the  tax 
commissioner,  says  (ib.  p.  1)  :  “  It  is  probable  that  the  amount 
returned  is  considerably  less  than  that  actually  held  by  the 
classes  of  persons  to  whom  the  order  relates,”  but  that  the 
total  number  of  females  holding  property  “may  be  over¬ 
stated,”  as  he  had  no  means  of  comparing  the  names  of  those 
locally  taxed  with  the  names  of  stockholders  in  corporations, 
without  a  delay  and  an  expense  considered  unnecessary  for  the 
purposes  of  the  return. 

#638, 976.51 ;  from  banks  and  bankers,  $316,095.13 ;  and  from  incomes,  $392,- 
387.45;  besides  other  amounts  from  other  sources, — the  whole  amount  being 
$3,669,950.66.  (Report  of  Comm,  of  Int.  Rev.  1873,  PP-  7 5>  80,  85,  95.) 

The  whole  amount  collected  through  this  department  in  Massachusetts 
alone  from  1863  to  r873,  both  inclusive,  was  $159,930,259.88  (ib.  145) ;  and  the 
aggregate  receipts  during  the  same  years  from  all  the  States  and  Territories 
was  $1,872,419,285.03  (ib.  153);  the  total  collections  from  taxes  on  incomes,  divi¬ 
dends,  legacies,  and  successions  alone  during  the  same  years  being  $361,573,- 
995.67  (ib.  165).  Of  this  latter  sum  women  could  not  help  paying  their  ful) 
share. 


21 


From  this  Report  it  seems  that  women  were  taxed  more  or 
less  in  every  city,  and  in  all  the  towns  except  Gay  Head  and 
Gosnold.  In  these  places  there  were  only  64  polls  (Aggre¬ 
gate,  &c.,  p.  8),  and  the  valuation  was  only  $178,770,  or  of 
the  valuation  of  the  State.  This  document,  therefore,  clearly 
proves  that  the  taxation  of  women  is,  practically  speaking, 
universal  through  the  State. 

When  I  began  my  researches  on  this  subject  I  was  not  aware 
of  the  existence  of  this  Report.  Accordingly,  having  found 
that  the  total  tax  in  1873  was  $25,153,399  (Aggregate  Polls, 
&c.,  1873,  p.  27),  I  sent  a  printed  postal  card  directed  to  the 
assessors  of  every  town  and  city 1  in  the  Commonwealth, 
desiring  information  as  to  how  much  of  this  sum  was  paid 
by  women.  I  have  received  returns  from  163  out  of  342  2 
places,  or  nearly  one-half  of  the  whole  number.  In  many 
of  the  places  the  assessors  have  given  me  the  results  of  their 
labor  gratuitously,  for  which  I  render  my  hearty  thanks  ;  I 
have,  however,  in  every  case  paid  what  has  been  asked  for  the 
time  and  labor  expended  in  getting  the  information  ;  and 
having,  in  years  gone  by,  been  an  assessor  myself,  I  am  free  to 
say  that  the  sums  charged  have  generally  seemed  to  me  to  be 
reasonable  for  the  services  rendered.  Still,  the  fact  remains 
true,  that  the  assessors  in  about  176  cities  and  towns  felt  too 

1  Except  Boston.  Here  I  employed  Mr.  George  E.  Richardson,  one  of  the 
clerks  of  the  assessors.  By  accident  he  examined  the  books  for  1874  instead 
of  1873.  This  of  course,  embraced  the  valuation  of  Charlestown,  Brighton,  and 
West  Roxbury.  The  examination  involved  great  labor  and  care  on  his  part, 
and  expense  on  mine.  My  returns  from  East  Bridgewater,  Dracut,  Deerfield, 
and  Templeton  are  also  for  1874;  but  it  hardly  seemed  worth  while  to  go  over 
the  ground  again  in  these  places  in  order  to  obtain  returns  for  1873.  The 
difference  between  the  two  years  cannot  be  material, — it  is  a  gain  of  only 
about  33,000,000  in  1,700,000,000. 

Mr.  Richardson  writes  to  me  that  his  returns  “  do  not  include  any  property 
held  by  executors  of  estates  of  females  or  property  taxed  in  name  of  heirs  (viz. 
Mary  Brown’s  heirs),  or  trustees  or  executors  under  the  will  of  females,  but 
only  includes  property  taxed  directly  to  females,  or  as  trustees  or  guardians  of 
females.”  So  that  the  sum  stated  in  my  tables  as  paid  in  Boston  must  be  much 
less  than  the  amount  really  paid  by  women;  and  this  is  half  as  much  again  as 
the  sum  stated  in  the  Report  of  1871. 

2  339  after  the  recent  annexations  to  Boston. 


22 


little  interest  in  the  matter  even  to  be  willing  to  take  the 
trouble  to  tell  me  for  what  sum  I  coulcl  get  the  information  I 
desired. 

In  the  163  places  from  which  I  have  received  returns,  the 
whole  tax  paid  was  $21,089,409,  or  more  than  four-fifths  of 
the  whole  sum  raised  in  the  State.  If  from  this  sum  we 
deduct  $526,604  paid  by  polls,  we  have  $20,562,805  as  the 
whole  tax  on  property  in  these  places.  Of  this  latter  sum, 
the  women  paid  $1,966,601,  or  .095  per  cent.  We  may,  there¬ 
fore,  from  these  returns,  and  from  those  of  1871,  consider  it 
as  clearly  proved  that  the  women  of  the  State,  taken  as  a 
whole,  pay  certainly  one-eleventh,  and  probably  one-tenth,  or 
even  more,  of  all  the  tax  on  property  in  the  State. 

Disregarding  the  21  towns  from  which  I  have  no  returns 
as  to  the  number  of  women  taxed,  I  find  that  18,775  women 
paid  $1,934,638  in  taxes,  or  an  average  of  $103  and  the  equiv¬ 
alent  of  5 1  polls  for  each  woman.  The  cities  of  Boston,  Chel¬ 
sea  and  Newton,  and  the  town  of  Brookline,  all  clustered 
together,  paid  $13  079,436,  or  more  than  one-half  the  whole 
tax  of  the  State.  Of  this  sum  ($  1 3,079,436)  8,447  women 
paid  $1,448,479,  or  a  little  more  than  one-tenth  of  the  whole 
tax,  —  being  an  average  of  $171,  and  the  equivalent  of  85 
polls  for  each  woman. 

Each  of  the  7,214  women  taxed  in  Boston  paid  an  average 
of  $  1 79,  or  the  equivalent  of  89  polls  ;  and  together  they  paid 
more  than  nine  times  as  much  as  was  paid  by  the  66,415  men 
in  the  city  who  only  paid  a  poll-tax,  and  more  than  ninety 
times  as  much  as  was  paid  by  the  7,032  poll-tax  voters  who  no 
doubt  elected  Governor  Gaston.  In  Milford,  244  women  were 
taxed,  and  1,5 13  men  paid  a  poll-tax  only  ;  and  the  women  paid 
nearly  three  times  as  much  as  the  men.  In  Cheshire,  26 
women  were  taxed,  and  they  paid  eleven  times  as  much  as 
152  of  the  men  in  town.  In  Templeton,  14  women  paid  more 
than  312  of  the  men.  In  Leominster,  13  women  paid  more 
than  628  of  the  men.  In  Barre,  12  women  paid  more  than 
249  of  the  men.  In  Westboro’,  1 1  women  paid  more  than 
505  men.  Eight  women  in  Kingston  paid  more  than  129 


23 


men ;  in  Medway,  more  than  387  men  ;  in  Needham,  more 
than  566  men ;  in  Wakefield,  more  than  600  men ;  in  Wal¬ 
tham,  more  than  1,103  men  J  and  in  Adams,  the  equivalent  of 
1,120  polls.  Seven  women  in  Dighton  paid  more  than  128 
men.  Six  women  in  Gardner  paid  more  than  100  men  ;  and  in 
Newton,  more  than  3,659  polls.  In  Hubbardston,  5  women 
paid  more  than  72  men  ;  and  in  Bellingham,  more  than  no 
men.  Four  women  in  Swanzey  paid  more  than  78  of  the  men  ; 
in  Dudley,  more  than  170  men;  in  Holden,  more  than  220 
men  ;  in  Deerfield,  more  than  295  men  ;  in  Rockport,  more 
than  301  men  ;  and  in  Spencer,  more  than  620  men.  There 
were  3  women  in  Newton  who  paid  more  tax  than  2,034  men 
in  that  city  ;  two  of  the  women  in  Northboro’  paid  as  much 
as  1 1 3  men  in  Petersham,  twice  as  much  as  67  men  ;  and 
in  Swampscott,  nearly  twice  as  much  as  274  of  the  men.  A 
single  woman  tax-payer  in  Dighton  paid  as  much  as  36  of 
the  men ;  in  Lakeville,  as  much  as  52  of  the  men ;  in 
Petersham,  50  per  cent  more  than  67  men  in  town ;  and  in 
Deerfield,  as  much  as  14 1  of  the  men ;  in  Shrewsbury,  there 
were  116  men  who  only  paid  a  poll-tax,  and  one  woman  paid 
twice  as  much  as  the  whole  of  them.  In  Newton,  one  woman 
paid  as  much  tax  as  1,424  of  the  men.  In  Brookline,  there 
were  92 1  men  who  only  paid  a  poll-tax ;  and  one  woman  in 
town  paid  more  than  three  times,  and  another  more  than 
six  times  as  much  tax  as  was  paid  by  the  whole  of  these 
921  men  !  There  are  92  scholarships  in  Harvard  College  for 
the  aid  of  poor  students  ;  the  total  income  is  about  $21,000. 
It  was  a  man  who  planned  22  of  these  scholarships,  which 
yield  more  than  one-quarter  of  the  income  derived  from  the 
whole  92  ;  but  the  money  by  which  they  were  established 
came,  in  point  of  fact,  from  a  woman  tax-payer.  No  young 
woman  of  the  State,  no  matter  how  scholarly  she  may  be,  can, 
however,  hope  to  receive  any  aid  from  the  bounty  of  this 
large-hearted  woman.  A  subscription  has  just  been  started 
for  a  new  medical  school  building  to  be  .connected  with  the 
College.  Out  of  $100,700  first  published  as  subscribed, 
$30,500  was  contributed  by  women,  and  the  largest  single 


24 


subscription  ($20,000)  was  by  a  woman  tax-payer.  May  we 
not  reasonably  hope,  therefore,  that  Harvard  College  will  yet 
open  its  doors  to  women,  when  it  is  thus  willing  to  receive 
their  money  ?  It  seems  mean  to  exclude  them  from  all  use  of 
the  educational  advantages  which  have  been  accumulating  at 
Cambridge  for  over  two  centuries,  and  at  the  same  time  to 
urge  them  to  contribute  to  increase  these  advantages.  It 
does  not  seem  to  be  impossible  to  educate  female  physicians 
in  Paris,  Zurich,  in  Boston  University,  or  in  other  places. 
Why  is  it  impossible  in  Harvard  ?  And  yet  about  all  that 
Harvard  can  now  do  for  the  higher  education  of  women  is  to 
be  willing  to  certify,  after  an  examination,  that  they  have  been 
able  to  obtain  a  good  education  elsewhere  ! 

I  have  annexed  to  this  pamphlet  eight  tables  prepared  from 
returns  made  to  me,  and  from  the  votes  at  the  last  election,  as 
stated  in  the  “Daily  Evening  Transcript”  (Nov.  4,  1874).  I 
have  also  added  two  columns  taken  from  the  Report  of  1871. 
Although  the  returns  of  the  number  of  men  who  only  paid  a 
poll-tax,  and  the  pluralities  for  Governor  at  the  last  election, 
are  not,  as  will  be  seen,  entirely  complete  in  these  tables,  they 
are  probably  sufficiently  so  for  my  purposes. 

Only  185,990  men  voted  for  Governor  last  autumn  (Official 
Vote,  “  Boston  Daily  Advertiser,”  Nov.  23, 1874) ;  147,433  men 
paid  only  a  poll-tax,  66,415  of  them  being  in  Boston  ;  and  Gov¬ 
ernor  Gaston’s  plurality  in  the  State  was  7,032  (ib.).  On  the 
principle  that  a  chain  is  only  as  strong  as  its  weakest  link,  it 
seems  clear,  therefore,  that  the  last  election  was  carried  by 
poll-tax  voters.  Indeed,  practically  speaking,  men  who  only 
pay  $2.00  tax  (and  frequently  even  this  tax  is  paid  for  them 
by  others)  make  and  unmake  the  Government.  These  147,433 
men  paid  $294,866  The  18,775  women  paid  more  than  six 
times  as  much.  It  will  doubtless  be  said  that  some  of  the 
poll-tax  payers  were  minors,  some  aliens,  and  some  perhaps 
were  disqualified  to  vote  from  inability  to  read  and  write. 
Still,  minors  will  finally  become  of  age,  aliens  may  become 
naturalized,  and  those  who  are  ignorant  may  learn  to  write 
their  names  and  to  read  the  Constitution  in  English  (a  thing 


25 


which  nine-tenths  of  the  men  who  vote  have  never  done),  and 
thus  all  these  men  have  it  in  their  power  to  become  voters  if 
they  please ;  but  none  of  the  women,  who  do  more  than  six 
times  as  much  as  these  men  towards  supporting  the  expenses 
of  government,  have  any  possible  chance  of  becoming  voters 
without  a  change  in  the  law. 

If  the  women  thus  taxed  were  allowed  to  vote,  they  are 
numerous  enough,  even  now,  to  be  of  political  importance. 
According  to  the  Report  of  1871,  the  women  tax-payers  could 
have  overcome  Governor  Gaston’s  plurality  four  times,  and 
that  of  Lieutenant-Governor  Knight  twice,  and  in  both  cases 
have  had  votes  to  spare.  They  would  not  have  wished  to  do 
so ;  but,  if  they  had  desired,  they  could  easily  enough  have 
defeated  the  election  of  the  Secretary,  the  Treasurer,  the 
Auditor,  and  the  Attorney-General,  though  each  of  these 
officers  had  over  21,000  plurality. 

If  it  be  suggested  that  the  Report  of  1871  cannot  be  im¬ 
plicitly  relied  on  as  to  the  number  of  women  taxed,  I  would 
say  that  even  my  partial  returns  show  that  they  could  have 
overcome  Governor  Gaston’s  plurality  twice,  with  4,000  votes  to 
spare  ;  and  they  could  have  thrown  away  6,000  votes  for  Lieu¬ 
tenant-Governor,  and  yet  been  able  to  defeat  Mr.  Knight.  My 
tables  embrace  four-fifths  of  the  taxation  of  the  State.  If  we 
add  only  one-fourth  to  the  number  of  the  women  on  my  tables 
(which  seems  moderate  to  represent  the  women  tax-payers  in 
about  176  towns),  we  shall  have  23,468  as  the  whole  number 
of  women  tax-payers  in  the  State,  or  more  than  sufficient  to 
have  defeated  all  the  State  officers  who  were  chosen  on  a 
general  ticket. 

Even  this  statement  does  not  show  the  whole  power  women 
tax-payers  ought  to  have.  They  are  so  scattered  through  the 
State  that  they  would  have  a  great  influence  on  the  choice  of 
Representatives.  The  vote  thrown  for  Governor  probably 
reflects  fairly  enough  the  division  of  sentiment  in  the  minds 
of  the  people  on  the  choice  of  Representatives  to  the  Legis¬ 
lature.  Assuming  this  to  be  the  fact,  the  Report  of  1871 
embraces  338  towns.  From  22  of  these  I  have  no  return  of 

4 


26 


votes  ;  but  in  158  places  the  women  were  numerous  enough  to 
have  controlled  the  election  for  Representatives  !  Is  it  again 
suggested  that  this  Report  of  1871  may  be  too  favorable  to 
women  on  this  point,  I  would  say  that  even  from  my  returns 
it  is  evident  that  they  could  have  controlled  the  election  in 
65  towns  and  cities,1  and  in  10  out  of  the  21  wards  in  Boston ! 
As  a  mere  question  of  expediency,  therefore,  is  it  wise  for  us 
to  rely,  as  we  now  do,  for  our  government  upon  the  class  of 
voters  most  easily  influenced  or  purchased,  and  neglect  those 
who  pay  more  than  one-eleventh  of  the  public  burdens,  and 
who  thus  would  have  it  in  their  power  to  exercise  a  marked 
and  beneficent  influence  on  our  politics  ?  Of  what  incalcu¬ 
lable  importance  it  would  be  for  the  welfare  of  the  State  to  be 
able  to  control  or  materially  influence  for  good  the  choice  of 
Representatives  in  such  towns  as  Waltham,  Marblehead,  Mil¬ 
ford,  Brookline,  Clinton,  Framingham,  Wakefield,  Swamp- 
scott,  &c.,  or  such  cities  as  Boston,  Chelsea,  Worcester,  Lynn, 
Salem,  Somerville,  Newton,  Taunton,  &c. ! 

There  is  another  fact  connected  with  the  taxation  of  women 
which,  being  a  man,  I  am  ashamed  to  point  out,  but  which 
yet  cannot  be  passed  over  in  silence ;  and  that  is  the  inex¬ 
pressible  meanness  of  the  thing.  We  men  save  at  least  two 
millions  of  dollars  every  year  from  our  own  burdens  by  this 
act  of  injustice. 

If,  as  we  have  seen,  the  women  no  doubt  pay  more  than 
one-eleventh  of  the  whole  tax  on  property,  every  man  of  prop¬ 
erty  in  the  State  saves  more  than  one-eleventh  of  his  taxes 
by  the  taxation  of  women.  The  cities  and  towns  in  table  8 
pay  more  than  half  the  taxes  levied  in  the  State,  and  the 
women  paid  more  than  one-ninth  of  the  whole.  So  that  one- 
half  the  men  of  property  in  the  State  save  every  year  more 

1  In  speaking  of  the  votes  of  all  the  cities  but  Boston,  I  am  obliged  to  speak 
of  the  wards  together  as  a  unit.  Probably  if  the  voters  of  the  cities  were  ana¬ 
lyzed  by  wards,  my  general  statement  in  the  text  would  have  to  be  modified. 
Thus,  in  Boston  the  plurality  for  Governor  was  8,304,  and  7,214  women  were 
taxed.  They  control  only  about  half  the  wards,  though  they  could  have  thrown 
seven-eighths  as  many  votes  as  Governor  Gaston’s  plurality  in  the  whole 
city. 


27 


than  one-ninth  of  their  taxes,  by  compelling  the  women  who 
have  no  votes  with  which  to  protect  themselves  to  pay  the 
amount.  In  Dedham,  the  men  of  property  save  more  than 
one-eighth  ;  in  Brookline,  more  than  one-seventh ;  in  Berkley 
and  Stockbridge,  more  than  one-sixth  ;  in  Cheshire,  among 
the  beautiful  Berkshire  hills,  and  in  the  wealthy  city  of  New¬ 
ton,  they  save  more  than  one-fifth  of  their  taxes  by  this  in¬ 
justice  !  The  men  of  property  in  Westfield  saved  in  one 
year  $6,000 ;  in  Pittsfield,  $7,000  ;  in  Northampton,  $10,000  ; 
in  Dedham,  $11,000;  in  Watertown,  $13,000  ;  in  Fall  River, 
$14,000  ;  in  Taunton,  $18,000  ;  in  Newburyport,  $19,000  ;  in 
Somerville,  $23,000 ;  in  Chelsea,  $25,000  ;  in  Lynn,  $30,000  ; 
in  Springfield,  $35,000;  in  Salem,  $36,000;  in  Brookline, 
$49,000;  in  Worcester,  $63,000;  in  Newton,  $77,000;  and  in 
Boston,  more  than  $1,200,000  by  this  operation ! 

One  eminent  man  in  this  neighborhood,  who  has  been  Gov¬ 
ernor,  saved  over  $900  in  this  way  in  1873.  Another,  who 
has  been  candidate  for  Governor,  saved,  in  the  same  year,  in 
this  way,  over  $1,000  in  the  taxes  on  his  property  in  two  ad¬ 
joining  places.  The  former  is  an  advocate  of  woman  suffrage  ; 
the  latter  is  believed  to  be  willing  to  give  the  suffrage  to 
women  who  own  property  now,  but  not  to  favor  extending  it 
to  those  who  merely  earn  their  living  from  day  to  day,  though 
these  latter  would  seem  to  deserve  and  need  it  most. 

In  April  next  the  people  of  Concord  and  neighboring  towns 
intend  to  unite  in  celebrating  the  fight  at  the  old  North  Bridge, 
where 

“  once  the  embattled  farmers  stood, 

And  fired  the  shot  heard  round  the  world  !  ” 

A  bronze  statue  of  a  minute-man,  of  life  size,  is  to  be  dedi¬ 
cated  with  appropriate  ceremonies  ;  and  the  Committee  of 
Arrangements  have  prepared  a  programme,  including  an  ora¬ 
tion  by  George  William  Curtis,  poems  by  Emerson,  Long¬ 
fellow,  and  Lowell,  and  a  monster  procession.  The  President 
and  his  Cabinet,  the  Governor,  Council,  and  Legislature,  the 
Corporation  and  Faculty  of  Harvard  College,  and  the  Govern¬ 
ors  of  the  New  England  States  have  been  or  are  to  1  >vited, 


28 


&c.  (Boston  “  Daily  Advertiser,”  Jan.  7,  1875.)  Why  was  it, 
according  to  those  immortal  lines,  that  the  Concord  farmers 
fired  their  shot  a  hundred  years  ago,  except  that  the  world 
might  hear  that  taxation  without  representation  was  tyranny  ? 
Was  it  merely  in  order  that  so  much  powder,  and  so  many 
cannon  and  guns  stored  in  Concord,  might  be  saved  from  de¬ 
struction  that  Paul  Revere  was  induced  to  take  his  midnight 
ride  ?  Was  it  not  rather  and  solely  because  these  same  stores 
were  intended  to  be  used  in  the  fight  against  taxation  without 
representation,  and  to  show  to  the  mother  country  that  the 
men  of  Massachusetts  were  too  high-born  to  be  propertied  ? 
Perhaps  Mr.  Curtis  may  take,  as  the  subject  for  his  oration,  the 
clause  in  our  Declaration  of  Rights  that  a  constant  adherence 
to  the  principle  of  justice  is  absolutely  necessary  to  preserve 
the  advantages  of  liberty,  and  to  maintain  a  free  government 
(art.  18) ;  and  then  proceed  to  show,  from  the  Report  of  1871, 
in  how  very  just  a  way  the  men  of  Concord,  Lexington,  and 
Acton  have  been  able  to  save  their  money  and  their  principles. 
He  can  prove  beyond  all  doubt  that  they  have  saved  enough 
to  pay  for  the  statue,  as  they  save  about  $7,000  a  year  (Rep. 
1871).  Is  it  probable  that  Mr.  Emerson,  in  his  poem,  will  call 
to  mind  the  fact  that  he  and  other  Concord  men  of  property 
and  influence  have  been  spared  every  year  about  one-fifth  of 
their  taxes,  owing  solely  to  the  fact  that  the  women  of  Con¬ 
cord  are  treated  in  the  very  same  way 

“  that  made  those  heroes  dare 
To  die,  or  leave  their  children  free  ”  ? 

We  are  inclined  to  think  neither  of  them  will  make  any  such 
allusions.  It  might  cause  confusion  on  the  faces  of  the  Com¬ 
mittee  of  Arrangements.  Nevertheless,  we  will  venture  to 
ask  Mr.  Emerson  to  recite  on  that  occasion  William  Ailing- 
ham’s  poem,  “  The  Touchstone,”  as  he  did  years  since  in 
Boston,  and  as  only  he  can  recite  it ;  and  then  let  him  try  to 
explain  to  his  audience,  if  he  can,  why  it  is  that  woman  suf¬ 
frage  is  not  now,  as  anti-slavery  used  to  be,  the  touchstone  to 
test 

“  all  things  in  the  land 
By  its  unerring  spell.” 


29 


Would  it  not  be  a  far  more  fitting  celebration  of  the  Concord 
fight  for  us  to  shape  our  lives  to-day  according  to  the  noble 
principles  of  our  fathers,  rather  than  to  call  attention  to  our 
degeneracy  by  erecting  a  monument  in  honor  of  their  nobility  ? 
But,  if  we  must  have  a  statue,  let  it  be  of  brass,  and  on  the 
stone-base  let  us  have  some  appropriate  bass-reliefs.  One 
may  illustrate  the  sale  of  Abby  Smith’s  cows,  and  the  reverse 
the  quite  likely  taking  to  jail  of  Abby  Foster,  each  for  the 
non-payment  of  taxes.  One  might  show  Josiah  Quincy,  Jr., 
denouncing  to  the  citizens  of  Boston,  from  the  gallery  of  Old 
South  Church,  the  taxation  of  men  without  representation  as 
tyranny ;  and  the  reverse  might  appropriately  enough  show 
their  townsman,  Judge  Hoar,  and  his  associates,  declaring  that 
to  tax  a  woman  who  is  disfranchised  is  in  accordance  with  an 
express  authority  conferred  by  our  Constitution ! 

Considering  the  great  disproportion  between  the  wages  paid 
to  women  and  those  paid  to  men  for  equally  good  services, 
and  taking  into  account  the  opportunities  afforded  them,  it 
seems  to  me  that  the  women  of  Massachusetts  do  their  full 
share  in  producing  the  wealth  of  the  State.  According  to  the 
census  of  1870,  the  total  product  of  the  manufactures  of  the 
State  was  $553,912,568.  (Census  1870,  Industry  and  Wealth, 
p.  528.)  The  tables  there  given  embrace  142  branches  of  in¬ 
dustry.  In  three  of  them  the  sex  of  the  operatives  is  not 
stated,  and  the  “youth”  employed  in  all  of  them  are  not 
classified.  Only  women  aged  15  and  over,  and  men  aged  16 
and  over  are  enumerated.  There  are  eight  branches,  each 
producing  over  ten  millions  of  dollars,  the  products  of  which 
amount  to  $276,257,604 ;  and  women  are  engaged  in  all,  the 
whole  number  of  women  being  52,724,  and  the  whole  number 
of  men  79,285.  More  than  twice  as  many  women  as  men  are 
engaged  in  the  manufacture  of  men’s  clothing,  and  nearly 
double  as  many  women  as  men  are  occupied  in  the  manufact¬ 
ure  of  cotton  goods  ;  and  cotton  manufactures  stand  second 
on  the  list  in  point  of  value  to  the  State  of  the  articles  pro¬ 
duced.  Over  ten  thousand  women  are  engaged  in  the  manu¬ 
facture  of  boots  and  shoes,  and  over  seven  thousand  in  making 


woollen  goods.  Eleven  women  are  even  engaged  in  some  part  of 
the  work  of  currying  leather.  Out  of  66  branches,  each  pro¬ 
ducing  over  one  and  less  than  ten  millions  of  dollars,  women 
are  engaged  in  52.  Out  of  65  branches,  each  producing  less 
than  one  million  of  dollars,  women  are  engaged  in  43  ;  the 
total  production  in  139  branches  of  industry  being  $494,- 
881,855,  and  the  producers  being  153,945  men  and  84,672 
women. 

If  the  women  of  the  State,  in  point  of  fact,  do  so  much 
towards  creating  the  wealth  of  the  State ;  if,  in  point  of  fact, 
they  own  about  one-tenth 1  of  the  property  of  the  State  ;  if  the 
law  recognizes  their  ability  to  earn,  hold,  and  convey  property  ; 
and  if  these  women  are  numerous  and  scattered  enough  to  be 
able  to  give  a  very  important  and  useful  aid,  even  now,  in  the 
proper  government  of  the  State,  —  as  a  mere  question  of  ex¬ 
pediency,  why  should  not  the  right  of  suffrage  be  granted  to 
them,  especially  if  by  so  doing  we  men  escape  the  great 
scandal  of  selling  our  principles  for  money  ?  Surely,  if  we 
give  them  the  right  to  acquire  property,  we  ought  also  to  give 
them  the  same  rights  to  protect  their  property  that  we  our¬ 
selves  enjoy  and  deem  essential.  Who  of  us  would  consider 
his  property  safe  without  the  right  of  suffrage  ?  What  would 
we  give  for  the  security  of  our  personal  rights,  if  we  wore 
deprived  of  the  ballot?  If,  in  our  judgment,  the  rights  of 
negro  men  could  only  be  secured  to  them  by  giving  them 
suffrage,  although  they  were  most  eminently  unqualified  for 
the  judicious  exercise  of  the  right ;  if  we  instinctively  feel  that 
without  suffrage  our  own  rights  could  hardly  fail  to  be  in¬ 
vaded,  —  with  what  face  can  we  assert  that  the  women  of  the 
State  have  any  sufficient  security  for  their  personal  or  prop¬ 
erty  rights,  so  long  as  they  are  deprived  of  suffrage  ?  Does 
any  one  object  that  suffrage  is  a  manly  right,  and  conferred  only 
on  those  who  are  able  to  fight?  We  deny  the  fact  altogether. 

1  So  long  as  the  Statute  of  Distributions  divides  the  property  of  every  per¬ 
son  who  dies  intestate  equally  among  his  children,  daughters  and  sons  alike, 
and  the  females,  as  they  always  have  been,  shall  continue  to  be  more  numerous 
than  the  males,  it  would  seem  to  be  clear  that  this  fraction  is  altogether  too 


3i 


On  the  contrary,  the  very  men  who  are  best  able  to  fight  are 
not  allowed  to  vote.  In  1870,  there  were  298,767  males  in  the 
State  between  18  and  45.  (Census,  Population,  &c.,  p.  619.) 
This  represents  the  fighting  power  of  the  State.  Deducting 
from  this  number  those  who  were  over  18  and  under  21,  or 
41,3 1 7, 1  leaves  257,450  as  the  number  of  males  over  21  and 
under  45.  This  number  (257,450),  therefore,  includes  all  voters 
who  are  supposed  to  be  able  to  fight,  or  who  are  liable  to  be 
even  enrolled  for  military  duty.  (Gen.  Stat.  c.  13,  §  1.) 
The  whole  number  of  male  citizens  in  the  State  being 
312,770  (Census,  &c.,  p.  619),  it  follows  that  55,320  of  the 
voters,  or  over  one-sixth,  are  altogether  exempt  from  military 
duty.  The  41,317  young  men,  though  physically  peculiarly 
fitted  for  military  duty,  are  not  allowed  to  vote,  because  they 
are  minors.  Of  the  257,450,  only  those  who  are  “able-bodied” 
are  liable  even  to  be  enrolled.  (Gen.  Stat.  c.  13,  §  1.) 
Those  who  are  enrolled  are  “  subject  to  no  active  duty, 
except  in  case  of  war,  invasion,  the  prevention  of  invasion, 
the  suppression  of  riots,  and  to  aid  civil  officers  in  the  execu¬ 
tion  of  the  laws  ;  ”  and  the  active  militia  is  not  intended  to 
exceed  5,000  officers  and  men.2  (Ib.  §  4,  14.)  So  that,  so  far 
from  the  right  of  suffrage  being  based  upon  the  supposed 
power  of  voters  to  fight,  one-sixth  of  those  who  have  the  right 
to  vote  are  not  supposed  to  be  able  to  fight  at  all ;  and  of  the 
five-sixths  only  about  are  reckoned  as  active  militia,  and 
those  of  the  who  are  able-bodied  are  only  liable  to  be 
called  out  in  a  remote  contingency.  But  even  if  it  were  true, 
as  it  is  not,  that  some  sort  of  military  service  ought  to  be 
considered  as  due  from  voters  generally,  why  cannot  women 
buy  substitutes,  as  they  were  allowed  to  do  in  the  Rebellion, 

1  Number  of  males  between  18  and  45 . 298,767 

Deduct  males  over  18  and  under  21  by  last  State  Census  (p.  3); 

i.  e.  g  of  those  between  15  and  20 . 22,112 

,,  »  20  and  30 . 19,205 

-  4I>317 

leaves  as  over  21  and  under  45  liable  to  do  military  duty  (approx.)  257,450 

2  The  active  militia  now  numbers  436  officeis  and  6,054  enlisted  men;  the 
enrolled  militia,  212,147. 


32 


or  pay  an  equivalent,  or  be  exempted  like  Quakers  or  minis¬ 
ters,  or  act  as  nurses,  or  be  employed  in  the  manufacture  or 
repair  of  clothing  ?  Or  why,  if  (as  the  last  census  proves), 
in  time  of  peace,  nearly  as  many  women  as  men  can  be  em¬ 
ployed  in  the  manufacture  of  ammunition  cartridges  (Census, 
Industry,  & c.,  p.  394),  or  one-third  as  many  in  making  tents ; 
if,  in  time  of  peace,  women  may  be  blacksmiths  or  butchers, 
or  engage  in  the  manufacture  of  cutlery,  edge-tools,  and  axes, 
or  in  the  manufacture  of  gunpowder,  fire-arms,  percussion 
caps,  &c.,  —  why,  in  the  name  of  common  sense,  cannot  their 
labor  be  utilized  in  the  same  or  some  similar  way  in  time  of 
war  ?  In  every  town  of  the  Commonwealth  a  tax  is  levied 
for  the  support  of  highways.  Down  to  1871,  this  tax  might 
be  paid  “  in  labor  and  materials  ”  or  in  “  money,”  as  the  town 
determined  (Gen.  Stat.  c.  44,  §  3  and  4;  Stat.  1871,  c.  298) ; 
but,  without  a  special  vote  that  the  tax  should  be  paid  in 
money,  whoever  was  assessed  a  highway  tax,  woman  or 
man,  was  obliged  to  work  it  out.  And  if  women  can  work 
out  a  highway  tax,  with  horse  and  cart  or  spade  and  pickaxe, 
why  cannot  she  work  for  the  government  in  time  of  war  ? 
And,  if  she  can  do  one  kind  of  work  by  deputy,  why  not  the 
other  ?  It  is  not,  however,  true  that  the  right  of  suffrage 
for  men  is  based  in  the  slightest  degree  upon  their  supposed 
ability  to  fight.  At  the  same  time,  I  admit  and  rejoice  in  the 
fact  that  one  of  the  greatest  blessings  we  expect  to  flow  from 
woman  suffrage  will  be  the  cultivation  of  the  arts  of  peace 
rather  than  war. 

But  aside  from  and  beyond  all  the  considerations  that  have 
hitherto  been  urged  against  the  direct  taxation  of  women,  we 
deny  the  right  thus  to  tax  them. 

By  the  Constitution  (part  2,  ch.  1,  art.  4)  the  General  Court 
has,  it  is  true,  power  to  impose  and  levy  proportional  and 
reasonable  assessments,  rates,  and  taxes  upon  all  the  inhab¬ 
itants  of  and  persons  resident  and  estates  lying  within  the 
said  Commonwealth ;  ”  but  the  Bill  of  Rights  (art.  23)  de¬ 
clares  that  “  no  subsidy,  charge,  tax,  impost,  or  duties  ought 
to  be  established,  fixed,  laid,  or  levied  under  any  pretext  what- 


33 

soever,  without  the  consent  of  the  people  or  their  representa¬ 
tives  in  the  Legislature.” 

Miss  Sarah  E.  Wall,  duly  qualified  to  vote  in  every  respect, 
except  sex,  was  taxed  in  Worcester,  and  refused  to  pay  her 
tax.  No  report  is  given  of  any  argument  in  the  Supreme 
Court  on  either  side.  She  appeared  for  herself,  and  W.  A. 
Williams  for  the  collector.  The  whole  opinion  of  the  Court 
is  contained  in  these  two  short  paragraphs  :  — 

“  By  the  Constitution  of  Mass.  ch.  i,  sec.  i,  art.  4,  the  Legis¬ 
lature  have  power  to  impose  taxes  upon  all  the  inhabitants  of 
and  persons  resident  and  estates  lying  within  the  said  Com¬ 
monwealth.  By  the  laws  passed  by  the  Legislature  in  pur¬ 
suance  of  this  power  and  authority,  the  defendant  is  liable  to 
taxation,  although  she  is  not  qualified  to  vote  for  the  officers 
by  whom  the  taxes  were  assessed. 

“  The  Court,  acting  under  the  Constitution,  and  bound  to 
support  it  and  maintain  its  provisions  faithfully,  cannot  declare 
null  and  void  a  statute  which  has  been  passed  by  the  Legis¬ 
lature  in  pursuance  of  an  express  authority  conferred  by  the 
Constitution.”  (Wheeler  v.  Wall,  6  Allen  Rep.  558.) 

In  other  words,  our  Supreme  Court 1  holds  that  the  taxa¬ 
tion  of  women  without  representation  is  in  accordance  with 
an  express  authority  conferred  by  our  Constitution. 

Strangely  enough,  the  Court  does  not  allude  to  the  Declara¬ 
tion  of  Rights.  But  is  it  not  clear  that  both  the  clauses  in  the 
Constitution  which  bear  on  the  question  of  taxation  should  be 
considered  together  ?  I  respectfully  submit  that  the  Legislat¬ 
ure  has  not  unlimited  power  to  tax  all  inhabitants  and  per¬ 
sons  resident  in  the  Commonwealth.  It  only  has  the  right  to 
tax  them  so  far  as  such  taxation  is  consistent  with  the  Decla¬ 
ration  of  Rights,  and  no  farther.  It  has  no  right,  “  under  any 
pretext  whatsoever,”  to  go  beyond  the  limit  marked  out  by  the 
Declaration  of  Rights  ;  and,  if  it  does  go  beyond  this  point,  it 
becomes  the  duty  of  the  Court  to  pronounce  the  statute  null 
and  void.  The  Legislature  is  as  much  bound  to  respect  the 
Declaration  of  Rights  as  any  other  part  of  our  Constitution. 

1  No  one  of  the  judges  who  made  this  decision  is  now  on  the  bench. 

S 


34 


And,  to  use  the  grand  words  of  Chief  Justice  Parker  (2  Pick. 
557),  “neither  will  any  course  of  years  or  legislative  acts  or 
judicial  decisions  sanction  any  apparent  violation  of  the  funda¬ 
mental  law  clearly  expressed  or  necessarily  understood.” 

Taking,  therefore,  the  clause  in  the  Constitution  which 
confers  the  power  to  levy  taxes,  in  connection  with  the  clause 
which  limits  the  power  to  tax,  and  construing  them  together 
as  they  should  be,  so  that  each  of  them  may  have  its  due  force 
and  operation,  the  Legislature  has  the  power  to  tax  those  in¬ 
habitants  or  persons  resident  here  who  consent  to  such  taxa¬ 
tion,  either  personally  or  through  their  representatives ;  and 
we  deny  the  constitutional  right  to  tax  anybody  else. 

The  supposed  intention  of  the  framers  of  a  written  instru¬ 
ment  has,  and,  properly  enough,  ought  to  have,  very  little 
weight  with  us  in  determining  its  meaning.  Such  meaning  is 
to  be  sought  in  the  words  used,  and  not  in  outside  evidence. 
Still,  I  confess,  at  the  outset,  it  does  seem  to  me  a  most  un¬ 
likely  thing  that  the  men  of  Massachusetts  who  were  then  in 
the  middle  of  a  hot  fight,  undertaken  in  defence  of  the  princi¬ 
ple  that  taxation  without  representation  was  tyranny,  would 
wholly  overlook  the  principle  when  undertaking  to  define  the 
rights  which  they  deemed  most  essential  to  their  own  security. 
And  yet  they  must  have,  made  this  strange  omission,  if  it  be 
true,  as  the  Court  says,  that  women  born  and  brought  up  on 
Massachusetts  soil,  and  qualified  to  vote  in  all  other  respects, 
as  Miss  Wall  was,  can  be  disfranchised,  and  at  the  same  time 
be  constitutionally  taxed. 

All  women  born  on  Massachusetts  soil  are  Massachusetts 
citizens,  and  bound  to  bear  true  faith  and  allegiance  to  the 
Commonwealth  ;  and  the  latter  is  bound  to  protect  them  in  the 
enjoyment  of  their  rights  to  life,  liberty,  and  property,  just  as 
fully  as  male  citizens  are  protected.  In  Lynch  v.  Clarke 
(1  Sandford  Ch.  584-639,  as  quoted  2  Kent  Comm.,  p.  1, 
note),  it  was  held,  “  that  the  complainant,  who  was  born  in 
New  York  of  alien  parents  during  their  temporary  sojourn 
there,  and  returned  while  an  infant,  being  the  first  year  of  her 
birth,  with  her  parents  to  their  native  country,  and  always 


35 


resided  there  afterwards,  was  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  by 
birth.  This  was  the  principle  of  the  English  common  law 
in  respect  to  all  persons  born  within  the  King’s  allegiance, 
and  was  the  law  of  the  Colonies,  and  became  the  law  of  each 
and  all  of  the  States  when  the  Declaration  of  Independence 
was  made,  and  continued  so  until  the  establishment  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States,  when  the  whole  exclusive 
jurisdiction  of  this  subject  of  citizenship  passed  to  the  United 
States,  and  the  same  principle  has  there  remained.”  When 
our  Constitution  declares  (part  I,  art.  29)  that  it  is  the  right 
of  every  citizen  to  be  tried  by  judges  as  free,  impartial,  and 
independent  as  the  lot  of  humanity  will  admit,  can  there  be 
the  slightest  doubt  that  women  are  to  be  considered  as  citi¬ 
zens,  and  entitled  to  claim  the  rights  secured  by  this  article 
just  as  much  as  men  ?  When  the  Third  Amendment  declares 
that  “  every  male  citizen,”  &c.,  who  has  paid  a  tax,  &c.,  shall  have 
the  right  to  vote,  &c.,  is  it  not  quite  as  clear  that  females  may  be 
citizens  as  that  they  are  debarred  the  right  to  vote  ?  If  only 
men  can  be  citizens,  it  is  the  height  of  absurdity  to  use  the 
expression  “  male  citizens.”  (See  also,  to  the  same  purport, 
Const.  U.  S.,  art.  2,  sec.  1;  14th  Amend,  ib.  sec.  1.) 

All  the  women  in  Massachusetts  who  are  thus  taxed  every 
year  are,  therefore,  either  citizens  by  birth,  or  they  may  be¬ 
come  citizens  by  naturalization. 

Can,  then,  citizens  be  taxed  without  their  consent  ?  Under 
the  Constitution,  “  no  tax,  &c.,  ought  to  be  levied,  &c.,  under 
any  pretext  whatsoever,  without  the  consent  of  the  people  or 
their  representatives  in  the  Legislature.”  This  consent  may 
be,  and,  as  we  shall  see,  has  been,  in  several  instances,  indi¬ 
vidually  given  by  the  person  who  is  taxed  ;  but,  for  the  mass 
of  the  people,  such  consent  can  only  be  given  in  the  way 
pointed  out  by  the  law  for  the  mass  of  the  people  to  use,  — 
that  is,  by  voting.  So  long  as  a  citizen  can  vote  in  open  town¬ 
meeting  for  or  against  his  own  taxation  ;  so  long  as  a  citizen 
of  any  city  can  vote  for  members  of  the  city  government  to 
whom  he  has,  under  the  law,  intrusted  the  power  to  levy 
taxes  on  his  estate ;  and  so  long  as  a  citizen  can  vote  for 


36 


Governor,  Senators,  and  Representatives,  to  whom,  under  the 
Constitution,  he  has  intrusted  the  power  to  lay  State  taxes,  — 
he  has  no  reasonable  ground  of  complaint.  Nor  can  he  ob¬ 
ject  to  being  taxed  by  either  of  these  bodies,  if,  thus  possessing 
the  power  by  his  vote  to  assent  or  dissent,  he  refrains  from 
exercising  the  right.1  In  all  cases,  therefore,  where  a  citizen 
has  the  right  to  vote,  no  matter  whether  he  exercises  the  right 
or  not,  he  virtually  consents  to  all  the  State,  county,  city,  and 
town  taxes  which  may  be  levied  upon  him  or  his  estate. 
When  the  Constitution  declares  that  no  tax  can  be  levied 
without  the  consent  of  the  people,  it  is  to  be  understood  as 
referring  to  the  people  who  are  thus  taxed,  and  nobody  else. 
It  was  of  no  sort  of  consequence  to  our  fathers  that  the  people 
of  England  consented  to  tax  America.  And  when  our  Con¬ 
stitution  says  that  no  tax  ought  to  be  laid  without  consent 
of  the  representatives  of  the  people,  it  is  to  be  understood  as 
referring  to  the  representatives  of  the  people  who  are  taxed, 
and  nobody  else,  —  that  is,  those  representatives  whom  the 
people  who  are  to  be  taxed  have  the  right  to  vote  for  or  against, 
and  which  representatives,  in  this  way,  become  authorized  to 
consent  to  such  taxation. 

But  the  Constitution  is  to  be  construed  in  a  reasonable 
manner.  The  consent  of  every  one  who  may  be  taxed  cannot 
possibly  be  obtained.  A  citizen  may  become  insane,  and, 
therefore,  incapable  of  contracting.  His  consent  to  being  taxed 
would  be  worth  nothing,  even  if  it  could  be  obtained ;  and  he 
surely  ought  not  to  be  allowed  to  vote.  Therefore,  although 
the  Constitution  requires  the  consent  of  every  citizen  to  his 
taxation  before  he  can  be  legally  taxed,  it  must  be  understood 
to  refer  only  to  those  who  are  recognized  by  the  law  as  capa¬ 
ble  of  giving  such  consent,  or  those  who  are  deemed  capable 
of  contracting,  of  earning,  holding,  and  conveying  the  prop¬ 
erty  which  is  to  be  taxed.  The  Constitution  does  not,  there¬ 
fore,  require  the  consent  of  minors  to  their  taxation,  because, 
being  under  the  age  of  consent,  they  may  avoid  any  contract 

1  There  were  57,356  legal  voters  in  Boston  at  the  last  election ;  29,596  of 
them  voted,  and  27,760  staid  away  from  the  polls. 


37 


they  may  make  (except  for  actual  necessaries)  when  they  come 
of  age,  no  matter  how  fair  and  honest  the  contract  may  have 
been.  Nor  does  it  require  the  consent  of  persons  under 
guardianship,  —  as  insane  or  spendthrifts,  —  for  they  have  no 
greater  power  to  contract  than  minors  possess.  But  it  does 
require  the  consent  of  every  other  citizen  in  the  way  above 
stated,  before  he  or  she  may  be  lawfully  taxed,1  except  only 
paupers  and  convicts.  A  citizen  who  is  a  pauper  has  nothing 
to  be  taxed  for,  and  is  not  allowed  to  vote.  A  citizen  who  be¬ 
comes  convict,  as  part  of  his  punishment  is  deprived  of  the 
right  of  suffrage.  An  alien  who  resides  here  knows  that  his 
property  is  liable  to  be  taxed.  Having  no  natural  right  to 
remain  here,  if  he  continues  to  remain,  by  such  act  he  con¬ 
sents  to  be  taxed,  within  the  meaning  of  the  Constitution. 

This  disposes  of  all  the  inhabitants  or  residents  who  can 
possibly  be  taxed  under  our  laws,  except  only  male  and  female 
citizens  of  full  age,  none  of  whom  are  paupers,  convict,  in¬ 
sane,  or  spendthrifts,  and  all  of  whom  have  equal  right  to 
contract,  to  acquire,  buy,  and  sell  the  property  which  is  to  be 
taxed,  or,  in  other  words,  precisely  the  same  qualifications 
for  voting,  except  merely  sex ;  and  the  larger  number  of  these 
citizens  are  women.  Everybody  else  in  the  State,  of  full  age, 
who  can  be  taxed,  either  consents  to  such  taxation,  or,  being 
legally  incapable  of  contracting,  cannot  consent,  or  is  excluded 
from  suffrage  on  grounds  entirely  disconnected  with  sex  ;  that 
is,  for  want  of  property,  or  for  ignorance,  insufficient  residence, 
or  as  a  punishment  for  crime,  &c. 

Here,  then,  are  two  classes  of  citizens,  each  possessing 
equal  qualifications  for  voting  ;  and  the  right  of  suffrage  is 
confined  to  males,  but  both  males  and  females  are  taxed. 

Can  any  such  female  citizen  who  is  thus  denied  the  right 
to  vote  be  constitutionally  taxed  ? 

In  the  opinion  of  the  Judges  of  our  Supreme  Court,  the 

1  It  does  not  seem  necessary  to  specially  consider  the  cases  of  those  citi¬ 
zens  who  are  disqualified  from  voting  in  consequence  of  insufficient  length  of 
residence  in  the  town  where  they  live,  or  those  who  cannot  read  the  Constitu¬ 
tion  under  which  they  are  to  vote. 


38 


taxation  of  a  male  citizen  must  go  hand-in-hand  with  his  right 
to  representation ;  and,  if  he  is  denied  the  right  to  vote,  he 
cannot  constitutionally  be  taxed. 

For  many  years  prior  to  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  a 
practice  had  existed  of  levying  taxes  on  unincorporated  plan¬ 
tations.  Our  Judges  gave  their  opinion  that  article  23  of  the 
Declaration  of  Rights  “  would  exempt  from  the  power  of 
taxation  by  the  General  Court  all  unincorporated  planta¬ 
tions,  unless  some  further  constitutional  provision  ”  had  been 
made. 

“  It  was,  therefore,  thought  necessary  (say  they)  either  to 
provide  some  representation  in  the  Legislature  for  the  un¬ 
incorporated  plantations  on  whom  public  taxes  had  been  or 
were  to  be  levied,  or  to  abandon  the  usage  of  taxing  them. 
To  give  them  representatives  in  the  House  would  be  incon¬ 
venient,  if  practicable.  But  to  admit  them  to  a  representation 
in  the  Senate  was  a  provision  easy  to  make,  and  the  right  to 
tax  them  would  remain.  On  this  ground  a  paragraph  was 
introduced  extending  to  two  classes  of  unincorporated  planta¬ 
tions.  (Const,  chap.  1,  sec.  2,  art.  2,  par.  3.)  One  class  com¬ 
prehends  the  plantations  who  were  assessed  to  the  support  of 
government  by  the  assessors  of  adjoining  towns.  The  inhab¬ 
itants  of  these  plantations,  having  the  necessary  qualifications 
of  age  and  estate,  were  authorized  to  meet  and  vote  for 
Senators  with  the  inhabitants  of  the  towns  by  whose  assessors 
they  were  assessed.  The  other  class  comprehends  the  plan* 
tations  who  were  empowered  to  assess  themselves.  The  in¬ 
habitants  of  these  plantations,  duly  qualified  as  to  age  and 
estate,  were  authorized  to  meet  and  vote  for  Senators  within 
their  plantations  ;  and  for  the  purpose  of  receiving,  counting, 
declaring,  and  returning  the  votes,  their  assessors  were  sub¬ 
stituted  in  the  places  both  of  the  selectmen  and  clerks  of 
towns. 

“  No  provision  was  necessary  for  plantations  on  whose  in¬ 
habitants  public  taxes  were  not  levied.”  (Letter  of  the  Judges 
to  the  Governor,  Jan.  3,  1807,  3  Mass.  Rep.  569,  570.) 

In  other  words,  our  Supreme  Court  Judges,  Parsons,  Sewall, 


39 


Thacher,  and  Parker,  declared  their  opinion  to  be  that  it  was 
contrary  to  the  Declaration  of  Rights  to  tax  inhabitants  who 
resided  on  incorporated  plantations,  unless  they  had,  at  least, 
the  right  to  vote  for  Senators  ;  and  that,  if  the  Constitution 
had  failed  to  provide  any  representation  in  the  Legislature 
for  the  people  residing  on  such  plantations,  it  would  have 
been  necessary  “  to  abandon  the  usage  of  taxing  them.” 

In  like  manner,  it  has  been  customary  for  many  years  in 
the  general  laws  to  authorize  assessors  to  exempt  from  tax¬ 
ation,  either  wholly  or  in  part,  those  persons  who,  by  reason 
of  age,  infirmity,  or  poverty,  may,  in  their  judgment,  be  unable 
to  contribute  towards  the  public  charges. 

In  1832  a  question  arose  whether  persons  who  had  been 
thus  exempted  for  two  years,  but  who  nevertheless  "  have  the 
requisite  qualifications  as  to  age  and  residence,  are  entitled  to 
vote  for  Governor,  &c.,  under  the  third  article  of  the  amend¬ 
ments  to  the  Constitution.” 

The  Judges,  in  their  reply  to  the  Senate,  said  :  “  We  are  of 
opinion  that,  when  such  exemption  has  extended  to  two  years, 
they  are  not.  We  think  it  was  the  plain  intent  of  this  clause 
of  the  amendment  of  the  Constitution  to  give  practical  force 
and  effect  to  the  maxim  that  taxation  and  representation 
should  go  together,  and  to  secure  the  right  of  electing  those 
who  are  to  administer  the  government  to  those  who,  in  fact, 
contribute  to  its  support.  It  confines  the  power,  therefore,  in 
terms  to  those  who  shall  have  paid  some  tax  assessed  within 
a  short  period  preceding  the  election,  and,  for  the  sake  of 
exactness,  fixes  that  period  to  two  years.  .  .  . 

“We  think  the  exemption  in  question  was  intended  as  a 
benefit  to  those  who,  by  reason  of  age,  &c.,  are  unable  to  con¬ 
tribute,  and  one  which,  if  they  so  elect,  they  may  waive ;  and 
in  such  case  it  would  not  be  in  the  power  of  the  assessors 
to  omit  them  in  the  assessment  or  abate  their  taxes  against 
their  consent,  with  a  view  to  affect  their  legal  franchise.” 
(1 1  Pick.  542,  543.) 

In  other  words,  in  the  opinion  of  Judges  Shaw,  Putnam, 
and  Wilde,  the  third  amendment  was  plainly  intended  to  give 


40 


power  and  effect  to  the  maxim  that  taxation  and  representa¬ 
tion  should  go  together,  and  to  secure  to  those  who  contribute 
to  the  support  of  government,  that  is,  to  tax-payers,  the  right 
to  elect  those  who  are  to  administer  the  government,  that  is, 
those  who  are  to  expend  the  sums  raised  by  taxation.  But 
do  not  women  tax-payers  fall  within  the  same  principle  ?  Do 
they  not  contribute  hundreds  of  thousands  of  dollars  every 
year  to  the  support  of  the  government  ?  Ought  they  not 
therefore  to  have  some  voice  in  determining  who  shall  admin¬ 
ister  the  government  ?  And,  if  the  Constitution  denies  them 
the  latter  right,  must  it  not  also  have  relieved  them  from  the 
burden  of  paying  taxes  ? 

It  is  perfectly  plain,  therefore,  under  these  opinions,  that 
the  only  ground  upon  which  we  are  able  constitutionally  to 
tax  a  male  citizen  is  that  he  has  the  right  to  vote,  and  having 
such  right,  whether  he  exercises  it  or  not,  he  consents  to  be 
taxed.  But  if  we  cannot  tax  a  male  citizen,  under  any  pretext 
whatsoever,  without  his  consent,  or  unless  he  has  the  right  to 
vote,  where  do  we  find  the  right  to  tax  a  female  citizen  with  ¬ 
out  her  consent,  or  unless  she  also  has  the  right  to  vote  ?  If, 
according  to  these,  opinions  of  our  judges,  we  have  not  the 
slightest  vestige  of  a  right  to  tax  one  of  the  minority  of  the 
citizens  of  the  Commonwealth  without  his  consent,  how  can 
we  have  any  greater  right  to  tax  one  of  the  majority  of  such 
citizens  without  her  consent  ?  The  Constitution  disfranchises 
women.  By  depriving  them  of  the  right  to  vote,  we  deprive 
them  of  the  right  to  assent  to  being  taxed.  Have  we  not, 
therefore,  deprived  ourselves  of  the  right  to  tax  them  ?  The 
Constitution  does  not  say  male  citizens  shall  not  be  taxed 
without  their  consent  ;  but  no  inhabitant,  that  is,  no  person, 
male  or  female,  can  be  taxed  without  his  or  her  consent,  or 
the  consent  of  his  or  her  representatives  in  the  way  pointed 
out.  If  our  Declaration  of  Rights  means  any  thing,  it  must 
mean  that  taxation  and  representation  for  adult  citizens  capa¬ 
ble  of  contracting,  whether  male  or  female,  ought  never  to  be 
separated  under  any  pretext  whatsoever.  If,  under  our  Con¬ 
stitution,  a  minority  of  the  citizens  can  deprive  the  majority 


4i 


of  the  right  of  representation,  and  still  retain  the  right  to  tax 
them,  then  our  fathers  fought  to  save  their  pockets,  and  not 
their  principles.  If  we  male  citizens  of  Massachusetts  can 
rightfully  do  this,  then  the  Declaration  of  Independence  and 
our  Bill  of  Rights  are  a  mere  tissue  of  glittering  generalities, 
and  wholly  incapable  of  any  practical  resistance  to  oppres¬ 
sion. 

That  the  right  to  tax  male  citizens  is  based  entirely  on  their 
right  to  vote,  is  also  clear  from  the  fact  that,  whenever  we 
have  deprived  them  of  the  right  to  vote  in  the  place  where 
they  reside,  we  have  also  relieved  them  from  taxation  in  such 
place. 

In  1798  we  authorized  the  United  States  to  buy  the  Arse¬ 
nal  grounds  at  Springfield,  we  retaining  only  “  a  concurrent 
jurisdiction  with  the  United  States,  & c.,  so  far  as  that  all 
State  civil  and  criminal  processes  as  may  issue  under  the 
authority  of  this  Commonwealth  against  any  person  or  per¬ 
sons  charged  with  crimes  committed  without  the  said  tract 
of  land,  may  be  executed  therein  in  the  same  way  and  man¬ 
ner  as  though  this  cession  and  consent  had  not  been  made 
and  granted.”  (Stat.  1798,  c.  13.)  In  1800  we  authorized 
the  United  States  to  buy  lands  for  the  Navy  Yard  at  Charles¬ 
town,  reserving  only  the  same  concurrent  jurisdiction,  de¬ 
signed  to  prevent  the  place  from  becoming  an  asylum  for 
criminals  and  debtors.  (Stat.  1800,  c.  26.)  Other  similar 
statutes  containing  the  same  reservation  have  been  passed. 
(Stat.  1849,  c-  45  >  Stat.  1856,  c.  100;  Stat.  1868,  c.  292, 
293  ;  Stat.  1869,  c.  458.) 

The  legal  effect  of  these  grants  has  been  before  the  Court 
several  times  (8  Mass.  Rep.  76 ;  17  Pick.  Rep.  302) ;  and  finally 
the  judges  declared  their  opinion  to  be,  that  persons  residing 
on  such  lands  do  not  thereby  acquire  any  elective  franchise 
as  inhabitants  of  the  towns  in  which  such  territory  is  situated, 
and  cannot  be  assessed  for  their  polls  and  estates  to  State, 
county,  and  town  taxes  in  such  towns.  (1  Met.  Rep.  583.) 
In  the  opinion  of  Judges  Shaw,  Putnam,  Wilde,  and  Dewey, 
therefore,  any  law  which  deprives  a  class  of  male  citizens  of 

6 


42 


the  right  to  vote  where  they  practically  reside,  necessarily 
relieves  them  from  taxation ;  or,  in  other  words,  a  male 
citizen  having  the  usual  qualifications  cannot  be  taxed  unless 
he  is  allowed  to  vote. 

•  It  may  possibly  be  urged  that  these  lands,  being  owned  by 
the  United  States,  are  subject  to  their  exclusive  jurisdiction, 
and  that  therefore  there  is  no  more  reason  why  we  should 
allow  people  living  there  to  vote,  or  continue  to  tax  them, 
than  if  they  lived  in  New  Hampshire  ;  and  the  judges,  in 
their  opinion,  say  that  such  residence  “  for  any  length  of  time 
will  not  give  such  persons  or  their  children  a  legal  inhab¬ 
itancy  in  such  towns,”  so  as  to  entitle  them  to  support  as 
paupers,  (i  Met.  Rep.  583  ;  8  Mass.  Rep.  76.) 

But  this  objection  is  without  weight.  In  no  case  have  we 
parted  with  our  whole  jurisdiction  over  these  lands.  In  no 
case  has  the  United  States  acquired  exclusive  jurisdiction. 
In  the  great  majority  of  the  cessions  that  have  been  made, 
the  State  has  reserved  an  equal  and  concurrent  jurisdiction 
for  its  process  with  that  of  the  United  States ;  and  even  in 
the  restricted  form  followed  in  reference  to  the  grounds  at 
Springfield  and  Charlestown,  the  State  reserves  some  juris¬ 
diction,  and  it  is  not  in  the  power  of  the  United  States  to 
withdraw  its  consent  to  such  joint  jurisdiction.  If  it  does, 
the  grants  become  void,  and  the  State  becomes  reinvested 
with  its  former  complete  sovereignty.  Whereas  our  State 
process  has  no  power  whatever  in  New  Hampshire,  without 
the  consent  of  the  latter  State,  and  such  consent  may  be 
withdrawn  at  any  moment.  In  point  of  fact,  men  living  in 
the  Navy  Yard  who  yet  claim  Boston  as  their  home,  and  who 
do  not  seek  to  avail  themselves  of  the  exemption  afforded  by 
the  act  of  cession,  but  on  the  contrary  consent  to  be  taxed, 
are  recognized  as  citizens  of  Boston,  and  allowed  to  vote. 
And  although  persons  domiciled  in  the  Navy  Yard  do  not 
acquire  a  settlement  so  as  to  be  entitled  to  be  supported  as 
paupers,  it  is  nevertheless  true  that  they  are  considered  as 
legally  inhabitants  of  the  State  ;  and,  if  they  die  in  the  yard, 
their  estates  are  settled  in  the  State  Probate  Court,  just  like 


43 


other  “  inhabitants  of  or  residents  in  the  county.”  1  (Gen. 
Stat.,  c.  1 1 7,  §  2.) 

There  was,  also,  another  class  of  native-born  inhabitants 
who  were  deprived  of  the  right  to  vote.  I  allude  to  the  Indian 
population  of  the  State. 

John  M.  Earle  was  appointed  Commissioner  (Stat.  1859, 
c.  266)  to  examine  into  and  report  upon  the  condition  of  the 
Indians.  He  made  his  report  to  Governor  Andrew  in  1861. 
(Senate  Document  96.)  From  this  it  appears  that  the  Chappe- 
quiddick,  Christiantown,  Gay  Head,  Marshpee,  Herring  Pond, 
Natick,  Punkapog,  Fall  River,  Hassanamisco,  and  Dudley 
Indians  (called  by  him  Plantation  Tribes,  because  they  con¬ 
stituted  distinct  communities,  who  then,  or  at  some  previous 
time,  had  either  funds  or  reservations  for  their  support)  num¬ 
bered  1,241  persons.  Besides  these  Plantation  Tribes,  he 
found  322  persons  descended  from  the  Yarmouth,  Dartmouth, 
Mamattakeeset,  Tumpum,  Deep  Bottom,  and  Middleborough 
Indians,  and  other  tribes  scattered  through  the  State,  most  of 
them  living  in  or  near  the  places  where  their  ancestors  lived, 
but  some  of  them  being  found  by  him  in  Boston,  Lynn,  Salem, 
Worcester,  Barre,  Greenfield,  Springfield,  and  other  places. 

Only  two  families  of  Natick  Indians  were  found  (Rep.,  p.  71) ; 
and  Mr.  Earle  saw  no  sufficient  reason  for  continuing  the 
guardianship.  Though  the  Punkapog  Tribe  formerly  owned 
5,000  acres  in  Norfolk  County,  none  of  this  property  then  re¬ 
mained  in  their  possession  ;  and  he  saw  no  good  reason  why 
the  rights  and  privileges  of  citizenship,  which  had  generally 
been  conceded  to  them  in  the  places  where  they  resided, 
should  not  receive  a  legal  recognition.  Twenty  families  of 
Hassanamisco  or  Grafton  Indians  were  found,  only  one  of 
them  remaining  on  the  heritage  of  their  fathers,  and  that 
family  retained  less  than  three  acres  out  of  their  former  do¬ 
main  ;  but  he  saw  no  good  reason  why  the  right  of  citizen¬ 
ship  should  not  at  once  be  granted  to  them  all. 

1  Hon.  William  A.  Richardson,  whose  jurisdiction,  as  Judge  of  Probate,  for¬ 
merly  extended  over  Charlestown,  writes  to  me  (Feb.  5,  1875),  “  I  have  no  doubt 
that  the  Probate  Records  at  Cambridge  contain  numerous  cases  of  giants  of 
administration,  &c.,  in  precisely  such  cases.” 


44 


Accordingly,  on  his  advice,  the  “  Act  concerning  the  Indians 
of  the  Commonwealth”  (Stat.  1862.  c.  184)  was  passed. 

Section  1  reads  thus :  “  All  Indians  and  descendants  of  In¬ 
dians  are  hereby  placed  on  the  same  legal  footing  as  the  other 
inhabitants  of  the  Commonwealth,  except  such  as  are  or  have 
been  supported  in  whole  or  in  part  by  the  State,  and  except 
also  those  residing  on  the  Indian  Plantations  of  the  Chappe- 
quiddick,  Christiantown,  Gay  Head,  Marshpee,  Herring  Pond, 
Fall  River,  and  Dudley  Tribes,  or  those  whose  homes  are  on 
some  one  of  said  Plantations,  and  who  are  only  temporarily 
absent  therefrom.” 

This  section  enfranchises  the  Natick,  Punkapog,and  Grafton 
Indians,  and  those  not  classed  by  Mr.  Earle  among  the  Planta¬ 
tion  Tribes,  except  paupers. 

The  law  goes  on  to  point  out  a  way  in  which  other  Indians 
may  become  citizens,  “  and,  upon  paying  a  poll-tax,”  become, 
to  all  intents  and  purposes,  citizens  of  the  State,  not  thence¬ 
forward  to  return  to  the  legal  condition  of  an  Indian. 

Seven  years  later  the  “  Act  to  enfranchise  the  Indians  of  the 
Commonwealth  (Stat.  1869,  c.  463)  was  passed.  Section  1 
provides  that  “  all  Indians  and  people  of  color  heretofore  known 
and  called  Indians  within  this  Commonwealth  are  hereby  made 
and  declared  to  be  citizens  of  the  Commonwealth,  and  entitled 
to  all  the  rights,  privileges,  and  immunities,  and  subject  to  all 
the  duties  and  liabilities,  to  which  citizens  of  this  Common¬ 
wealth  are  entitled  or  subject.” 

From  1780  (and,  indeed,  before)  down  to  the  passage  of 
these  laws,  Indians,  though  native-born  inhabitants  of  the 
State,  have  thus  been  denied  the  right  of  suffrage,  and  have 
accordingly  been  exempted  from  taxation.  (Stat.  1821,  c.  107, 
§  6  ;  Rev.  Stat.  (1836),  c.  7,  §  5  ;  Gen.  Stat.  (i860),  c.  1 1,  §  5.) 

The  right  to  vote  had  not  been  withheld  from  them  as  a 
class  because  they  were  under  guardianship.  Many  of  them 
had  never  been  under  any  form  or  kind  of  guardianship, 
either  they  or  their  ancestors  ;  but  they  had  lived  just  where 
and  how  they  pleased,  like  other  men  and  women.  Still  ndne 
of  these  native-born  men  were  allowed  to  vote  ;  and  solely  be- 


45 


cause  of  this  denial  of  suffrage,  and  for  no  other  reason  which 
can  possibly  be  assigned,  they  were  relieved  from  taxation. 
As  they  could  not  consent  to  be  taxed  either  by  voting  in 
person  or  by  representatives  to  be  voted  for,  it  was  contrary 
to  our  Declaration  of  Rights  to  tax  them  ;  and  they  never 
have  been  taxed  so  long  as  the  right  of  suffrage  has  been  with¬ 
held  from  them. 

In  many  places,  however,  they  have  been  allowed  to  vote 
before  being  legally  enfranchised  ;  but  in  every  such  case  tax¬ 
ation  and  representation  have  gone  hand  in  hand  together.  If 
they,  in  individual  cases,  consented  to  be  taxed,  they  were 
allowed  to  vote  ;  if  they  refused  to  be  taxed,  they  were  denied 
the  right  of  suffrage. 

Mr.  Earle  enumerates  180  male  Indians,  who,  like  their 
ancestors,  had  never  been  under  guardianship,  who  were 
scattered  through  31  different  places  in  the  State,  and  who 
were  allowed  to  vote  on  precisely  the  same  terms  as  other 
male  citizens.  The  Deep  Bottom  Indians,  so  called,  seem  to 
have  been  the  only  ones  who,  never  having  been  under  guard¬ 
ianship,  did  not  enjoy  the  right  of  suffrage.  Of  them,  he  found 
four  families  living  in  a  deep  valley  about  six  miles  west  of 
Edgartown,  where  their  ancestors  had  lived  at  the  first  settle¬ 
ment  of  the  island  by  the  whites.  Why  they,  also,  did  not  vote, 
he  does  not  inform  us.  He  merely  says,  “  They  are  not  con¬ 
sidered  as  entitled  to  the  rights  of  citizenship.”  (Rep.,  p.  1 16.) 

He  even  found  some  Indians  belonging  to  tribes  that  had 
always  been  under  guardianship,  who  had  acquired  the  right 
to  vote  by  consenting  to  be  taxed.  The  Chappequiddick 
Indians  occupy  the  northerly  portion  of  the  island  of  that 
name,  lying  on  the  easterly  side  of  Martha’s  Vineyard,  and 
not  more  than  an  eighth  of  a  mile  from  Edgartown.  These 
Indians  could  neither  sue  nor  be  sued,  nor  make  any  contract 
without  the  consent  of  their  guardian.  They  could  not  even 
receive  wages  for  a  voyage,  if  payment  was  forbidden  by  their 
guardians,  & c.  ;  and  yet  to  two  families  of  this  tribe  who  lived 
in  Edgartown,  though  legally  subject  to  these  disqualifications, 
the  rights  of  citizenship  were  conceded  (Rep.  19,  20),  because 


46 

they  owned  property  in  Edgartown  for  which  they  consented 
to  be  taxed. 

The  Punkapogs  were  also  under  guardianship.  Mr.  Earle 
found  that  those  of  the  tribe  (about  one-quarter  of  the  whole 
number)  who  resided  in  Canton  were  not  taxed,  and  did  not 
vote  ;  but  the  rest  of  the  tribe,  who  resided  in  other  towns,  so 
far  as  was  known,  stood  on  the  same  footing  as  other  people, 
no  reference  being  had  to  their  Indian  descent.  (Rep.,  p.  73.) 

The  Hassanamisco  or  Grafton  Indians  were  also  under 
guardianship  ;  and  yet,  nevertheless,  Mr.  Earle  found  that 
about  one-half  of  them  were  treated  as  citizens  in  the  towns 
where  they  resided. 

The  Dudley  Indians,  a  remnant  of  the  Nipmugs,  who  were 
visited  by  the  Apostle  Eliot  in  1663,  were  also  under  guardian¬ 
ship  ;  but  the  greater  portion  of  these  Indians,  scattered 
through  various  towns,  had  acquired  and  exercised  the  rights 
of  citizens  in  the  places  where  they  resided.  (Rep.,  p.  103- 
106.) 

“  Indians  not  taxed  ”  are  excluded  from  the  numbers  which 
serve  as  the  basis  for  equalizing  the  power  and  burdens  of 
the  different  States  in  the  Union,  solely  on  the  ground  that 
taxation  and  representation  should  go  together.  Although 
Indians  are  recognized  by  the  United  States  Constitution  as 
free  persons,  those  who  are  not  taxed  are,  nevertheless,  ex¬ 
cluded  from  the  enumeration  which  forms  the  basis  of  repre¬ 
sentation  in  Congress.  It  is  manifestly  unjust  that  the  taxes 
of  a  State  should  be  increased  in  consequence  of  the  existence 
of  a  class  of  free  persons  within  its  borders  who  are  not  taxed. 
It  is  equally  unjust  to  the  other  States  to  allow  one  of  them 
to  count  a  class  of  persons  whom  it  excludes  from  suffrage  in 
order  to  increase  the  number  of  its  representatives,  and  thereby 
its  political  power. 

Although,  therefore,  our  Constitution  gives  the  Legislature, 
in  express  terms,  the  power  to  tax  all  inhabitants  or  residents, 
there  have  been  two  classes  of  inhabitants  who  could  not  be 
taxed  without  infringing  on  the  Declaration  of  Rights.  We 
have  no  right  to  tax  those  who  reside  on  lands  ceded  to  the 


47 


United  States,  as  before  quoted,  and  Indians,  prior  to  the 
passage  of  the  laws  for  their  enfranchisement.  The  State  has 
seen  fit  to  deprive  these  two  classes  of  citizens  of  the  right  to 
vote ;  and,  solely  because  of  this  denial  of  the  right  to  vote,  it 
has  been  held  to  be  unlawful  to  tax  them. 

But  if  it  be  thus  contrary  to  our  Constitution  to  continue 
to  tax  male  citizens  after  depriving  them  of  the  right  to  vote, 
and  if  it  be  thus  illegal  solely  because  they  are  thus  disfran¬ 
chised,  by  what  authority  do  we  deprive  female  citizens  of  the 
right  to  vote,  and  still  continue  to  tax  them  ?  The  Declara¬ 
tion  of  Rights  applies  to  women  as  well  as  to  men.  It  was 
expressly  framed  to  protect  all  citizens,  men  and  women,  from 
unjust  taxation.  If  we  cannot  constitutionally  continue  to 
tax  male  citizens  after  depriving  them  of  the  right  to  vote, 
where  do  we  find  the  authority  to  tax  female  citizens  from 
whom  we  withhold  the  ballot  ?  We  must  find  the  right 
in  the  Constitution,  if  anywhere.  But  no  right  to  make  any 
such  distinction  can  be  found  anywhere  in  the  Constitution. 
It  rests  altogether  on  usage  and  custom.  Women  have 
always  been  disfranchised,  and  constantly  taxed  ;  but,  not¬ 
withstanding  the  constant  repetition  of  the  wrong  every  year 
for  nearly  a  century,  it  is  a  plain  infringement  on  our  Decla¬ 
ration  of  Rights. 

Doubtless  some  one  will  say,  this  is  all  very  well ;  but  our 
Supreme  Judicial  Court  has  decided  that  Miss  Wall  was  liable 
to  be  taxed.  But  all  the  Judges  who  made  that  decision  have 
left  the  bench  ;  and  whether  another  Court,  differently  consti¬ 
tuted,  will  make  the  same  decision,  remains  to  be  seen.  King 
Charles  levied  his  ship-money  on  the  inland  towns  of  England, 
in  accordance  with  the  written  opinion  of  twelve  judges  in 
favor  of  his  right,  which  opinion  is  now  on  file  in  Westminster 
Hall.  The  judges,  acting  under  the  directions  of  Lord  Keeper 
Coventry,  charged  the  grand  juries  on  the  different  circuits 
that  the  King  was  clearly  in  the  right.  But,  nevertheless, 
John  Hampden,  though  rated  only  31^.  6d.,  resisted  the  tax. 
He  contended  that  it  was  arbitrary  and  illegal,  because  it 
was  laid  without  the  consent  of  Parliament.  When  his  case 


48 


came  before  the  judges,  naturally  enough,  only  four  of  them 
were  found  willing  to  decide  in  his  favor ;  and  it  was  accord¬ 
ingly  as  clearly  held  by  the  judges  in  England  to  be  constitu¬ 
tional  for  the  King,  by  his  mere  prerogative,  to  levy  that  tax,  as 
it  has  been  held  by  our  judges  to  be  constitutional  for  Worcester 
to  tax  Miss  Wall.  But  who  now  doubts  the  illegality  of  King 
Charles’s  act  ?  In  like  manner,  I  have  the  most  undoubting 
confidence  that  some  time  or  other  we  shall  all  say,  in  the 
words  already  quoted  from  Chief  Justice  Parker,  neither  any 
course  of  years,  or  legislative  acts  or  judicial  decisions  will 
sanction  any  apparent  violation  of  the  fundamental  law,  clearly 
expressed  or  necessarily  understood  ;  and  that,  if  our  Decla¬ 
ration  of  Rights  means  any  thing,  it  means  that  no  citizens, 
male  or  female  (more  especially  the  latter,  as  being  the  major¬ 
ity),  can  be  lawfully  taxed,  under  any  pretext  whatever,  after 
we  have  deprived  them  of  the  right  to  vote  personally,  in 
town  meeting,  for  or  against  taxation,  or  the  right  to  vote  for 
representatives  who  can,  in  their  behalf,  oppose  or  favor  such 
tax  in  city  government  or  in  the  Legislature. 

It  will  hardly  be  expected  by  any  one,  that  I  should  find  in 
the  legislation  of  the  State,  any  plain  admission  that  the  ex¬ 
isting  taxation  of  women  was  contrary  to  our  Constitution ; 
and  yet  such  an  admission  seems  to  have  been  made. 

The  Constitution  makes  no  distinction  of  sex  in  reference  to 
taxation.  A  woman  who  is  worth  $20,000  is,  under  its  provi¬ 
sions,  to  be  treated  neither  better  nor  worse,  but  just  the  same 
as  a  man  worth  $20,000.  Under  our  Statutes,  $1,000  worth  of 
her  household  furniture  and  her  wearing  apparel  are  exempted 
from  taxation,  just  as  if  she  were  a  man.  (Gen.  Stat.  c.  1 1,  §  5, 
art.  6.)  If  she  should  happen  to  be  a  farmer  or  a  mechanic, 
her  farming  utensils,  and  the  tools  necessary  for  carrying  on 
her  business,  will  be  exempted  just  the  same.  (Ib.)  $2,000 

of  the  income  derived  from  her  profession,  trade,  or  employ¬ 
ment  will  be  exempted  just  the  same  as  it  is  for  a  man.  (Gen. 
Stat.  ib.  §  4;  Stat.  1873,  c.  354.)  And  if,  by  reason  of  age, 
infirmity,  and  poverty,  she  cannot,  in  the  judgment  of  the 
assessors,  contribute  fully  towards  the  public  charges,  she 


49 


may  be  exempted,  either  wholly  or  in  part,  just  the  same  as  a 
man,  in  like  circumstances,  may  be  exempted.  So  that  neither 
our  Constitution,  nor  these  general  laws  in  reference  to  tax¬ 
ation,  make  any  distinction  of  sex,  —  men  and  women  are  and 
ought  to  be  treated  alike.  Why  should  they  be  treated  dif¬ 
ferently  by  the  Statutes,  if  their  rights  under  the  Constitution 
are  equally  protected  ?  No  reason  can  possibly  be  assigned 
why  the  property  of  a  woman  should  be  treated  by  statute 
any  differently  from  that  of  a  man,  so  long  as  the  constitu¬ 
tional  rights  of  neither  are  invaded.  If  any  difference  is, 
therefore,  made  in  the  Statutes,  and  one  sex  is  protected  more 
than  the  other,  the  inference  is  unavoidable  that  some  consti¬ 
tutional  right  of  that  sex  has  been  invaded.  Now,  the  Legis¬ 
lature  has  admitted  that  women  have  been  unjustly  treated  in 
reference  to  taxation. 

In  1853,  the  Legislature  passed  “an  Act  to  exempt  the 
personal  property  of  widows  and  unmarried  females  from  tax¬ 
ation  in  certain  cases.”  (Stat.  1853,  c.  355.) 

In  1858,  the  law  was  repealed,  and  “an  Act  relating  to  the 
exemption  of  the  property  of  widows  and  unmarried  females 
from  taxation”  was  passed.  (Stat.  1858,  c.  43.)  This  law  is 
a  little  more  favorable  to  women.  This  latter  law  was  re¬ 
enacted  in  i860,  but  in  clearer  language.  The  General  Stat¬ 
utes  (c.  11,  §  5,  art.  10)  exempts  “the  property  to  the  amount 
of  $ 500  of  a  widow  or  unmarried  female,  and  of  any  female 
minor  whose  father  is  deceased,  if  her  whole  estate,  real  and 
personal,  not  otherwise  exempted  from  taxation,  does  not  ex¬ 
ceed  in  value  the  sum  of  $1,000.” 

Now,  as  the  Constitution  makes  no  distinction  between  the 
taxable  character  of  property  on  the  ground  that  in  one  case 
it  is  owned  by  an  orphan  boy,  and  in  the  other  by  an  orphan 
girl,  why  should  this  law  exempt  one  and  tax  the  other  ?  So 
long  as  the  Constitution  provides  for  the  taxation  of  the  prop¬ 
erty  of  widows,  on  precisely  the  same  terms  as  that  of  widow¬ 
ers,  and  taxes  unmarried  females  no  more  or  less,  but  just  the 
same,  as  bachelors,  why  should  this  law  exempt  females  and 
tax  the  males  ?  The  property  rights  of  men,  minors  and 

7 


50 


adults,  are  deemed  to  be  sufficiently  guarded  by  the  Consti¬ 
tution,  and  the  general  laws,  already  quoted,  passed  pursuant 
thereto.  Down  to  1853  the  property  rights  of  women,  minors 
and  adults,  were  protected  by  the  same  general  laws  as  those 
by  which  the  property  rights  of  men  were  protected.  If  there 
be,  therefore,  any  injustice  in  the  treatment  of  women  which 
called  for  the  passage  of  these  laws  relieving  them  from  tax¬ 
ation,  it  must  grow  out  of  the  failure  to  secure  to  them  theii 
rights  under  the  Constitution.  Have  they  the  same  security 
as  men  enjoy  under  the  Constitution  ?  Have  they  the  one 
great  security  which  is  pointed  out  by  the  Declaration  of 
Rights,  and  which  is  secured  to  men  ?  Most  assuredly  not ! 
The  passage  of  these  laws,  therefore,  amounts  to  a  plain  ad¬ 
mission,  on  the  part  of  the  Legislature,  that  the  property  rights 
of  women  tax-payers  under  our  Constitution  have  been  in¬ 
vaded  ;  and,  if  so,  they  have  been  invaded  in  the  only  way 
possible,  i.e.,  by  denying  them  the  right  of  suffrage.  The 
Legislature  must  have  passed  these  laws  solely  because  they 
felt  that  women,  being  deprived  of  the  ballot,  did  not  have  the 
same  power  under  the  Constitution  to  protect  their  rights  of 
property  that  men  enjoyed  ;  and  the  Legislature  was  right. 
Women  never  can  have  equal  power  with  men  to  protect  their 
property  or  personal  rights  until  they  possess  the  right  of 
suffrage. 

Does  any  one  say,  these  laws  have  been  dictated  by  a  spirit 
of  chivalry,  and  a  desire  to  help  women  in  their  struggle  for 
existence,  and  not  from  a  feeling  that  they  did  not  possess 
already  all  the  rights  our  Constitution  intended  to  give  to  every 
citizen  ?  But,  if  they  had  all  the  rights  which  the  Constitution 
gives  to  men,  women  would  no  more  need  such  paltry  assist¬ 
ance  as  these  exemption  laws  afford,  than  men  now  do.  They 
would  be  found  quite  as  capable  as  men  in  the  struggle  for 
existence,  and  would  need  no  more  exemption  from  taxation 
than  what  the  general  law  would  think  proper  to  give  to  men 
and  women  alike. 

I  am  not,  however,  obliged  to  rely  upon  any  mere  inference 
that  the  constitutional  rights  of  women  have  been  invaded 


51 


The  law  now  recognizes,  in  the  clearest  manner,  the  right  of 
women  to  vote,  as  to  one  class  of  taxes,  and  exempts  them  now 
from  all  liability  for  such  taxes,  if  the  right  of  suffrage  be 
denied  them. 

The  Constitution  recognizes  two  classes  of  taxes.  The 
Legislature  is  to  impose  taxes  for  the  support  of  government, 
&c.,  and  towns  are  to  lay  taxes  to  maintain  public  worship,  to 
support  a  minister,  and  to  maintain  public  schools,  &c.  (Const., 
parts  I,  2.)  In  other  words,  our  Constitution  recognizes  taxa¬ 
tion  for  both  civil  and  ecclesiastical  purposes.1  Can  these 
taxes  be  constitutionally  levied  upon  different  principles  ? 
The  Constitution  does  not  say  no  tax  for  civil  purposes  shall 


1  As  to  the  amount  of  the  yearly  ecclesiastical  taxes  there  are  no  reliable 
data.  By  the  United  States  Census  of  1870  (p  506),  the  church  property  in 
Massachusetts  is  valued  at  $24,488,286.  The  sittings  being  882,317,  this  would 
make  $27.75  represent  the  capital  invested  for  each  seat.  The  value  of  church 
property  in  this  State  exempt  from  taxation  last  year  was  $30,242,800. 

The  lowest  tax  per  annum  for  a  single  seat  in  the  Catholic  Church  in  my 
town,  Brookline,  is  $5.  It  is  about  three  times  as  much  in  the  meeting-house 
of  the  1st  Parish.  In  the  Episcopal  churches,  the  contributions  for  missionary 
and  church  purposes  amounted  last  year  to  $511,446.35,  or  an  average  of  $40.88 
for  each  communicant.  (Church  Almanac  for  1875,  P*  83.)  Among  the  282 
Baptist  churches  they  amounted  to  $876,960,  being  an  average  of  $19  for  each 
church-member.  The  279  Methodist  churches  contributed  for  benevolent  pur¬ 
poses  alone  $40,063  or  an  average  of  $1.32  for  each  of  the  full  members  and 
probationers.  In  473  Congregational  churches  they  contributed  $394,110.60 
(Congregational  Quarterly,  Jan.  1875,  p.  135),  or  an  average  of  $4.77  for  each 
church-member,  and  an  average  of  $5.63  for  each  church-member,  not  counting 
absentees. 

In  thfe  case  of  the  Episcopal  and  Baptist  churches,  these  sums  apparently 
include  the  actual  support  of  the  churches  from  which  the  contributions  were 
received.  But  the  Congregational  and  Methodist  churches  not  only  supported 
their  ministers,  paid  for  the  repair  of  their  buildings  and  other  church  expenses, 
but  also  contributed  more  than  $434,000  in  one  year  for  benevolent  purposes. 
This  does  not  include  the  very  large  contributions  among  the  Catholics,  Unita¬ 
rians,  Universalists,  & c.,  for  I  can  find  no  returns  on  the  subject. 

It  seems  to  me,  therefore,  highly  probable  that  the  churches  in  the  State 
tax  each  seat  at  least  $5  a  year  for  their  own  ecclesiastical  purposes.  This, 
though  only  ten  cents  a  Sunday,  would  make  $4,411,585  as  the  sum  raised  each 
year  for  ecclesiastical  purposes.  That  the  church-members  are  largely  women 
is  evident.  There  are  25,810  males  and  56,669  females,  members  in  the  Con¬ 
gregational  churches.  (Quarterly  Review,  p.  135.)  The  other  church  returns 
which  I  have  seen  make  no  distinction  of  sex. 


52 


be  laid  without  the  consent  of  the  people,  &c.,  or  that  no  tax 
for  ecclesiastical  purposes  shall  be  laid  without  such  consent 
It  simply  declares  no  tax  whatever,  for  any  purpose,  shall  be 
laid,  under  any  pretext  whatsoever,  without  such  consent.  Al¬ 
though  it  is  apparent  to  every  one  that  a  broad  distinction,  in 
fact,  exists  between  the  objects  for  which  taxes  may  be  law¬ 
fully  laid,  and  although  the  Constitution  itself  provides  for  both 
civil  and  ecclesiastical  taxes,  it  nevertheless  pays  no  heed 
whatever  to  any  such  distinction,  when  defining  the  grounds 
upon  which  all  taxation,  to  be  legal,  must  be  based.  It  simply 
lays  down  the  plain,  just  rule  that  no  tax,  for  any  purpose  or 
under  any  pretext,  can  be  legally  laid  without  the  consent  of 
the  people  or  their  representatives. 

Anciently,  only  freemen  were  allowed  to  vote,  and  none  but 
church-members  could  be  admitted  freemen.  (1631,  Colony 
Laws,  p.  11 7.)  So  strict  were  they  in  those  early  days  that  if 
a  church  had  been  gathered  without  the  approbation  of  three 
or  more  magistrates,  or  of  the  elders  of  the  neighbor  churches, 
even  its  members  were  declared  unfit  to  vote.  Those  persons 
who  refused  to  attend  upon  public  worship  as  established  by 
law  were  “  made  uncapable  of  voting  in  all  civil  assemblies 
during  their  obstinate  persisting  in  such  wicked  ways  and 
courses,”  and  until  a  certificate  was  given  of  their  reformation. 
(Ib.  p.  107.)  We  ought  not,  therefore,  to  be  surprised  at  the 
elders  for  giving  their  opinion  to  the  General  Court  that  “  any 
sin  committed  with  an  high  hand,  as  the  gathering  of  sticks 
on  the  Sabbath-day,  may  be  punished  with  death,  when  a 
lesser  punishment  might  serve  for  gathering  sticks  privily 
and  in  some  need.”  (1644,  ib.  p.  731.)  Nor  do  we  think  it 
strange  that,  in  enumerating  the  subjects  for  which  towns  may 
lay  and  assess  taxes,  we  find  it  declared  that  taxes  shall  be 
laid  (first)  “  for  the  maintenance  and  support  of  the  ministry  ;  ” 
and  after  this  came  the  appropriations  for  “  schools,  the  poor, 
and  for  defraying  of  other  necessary  charges  arising  within 
said  town.”  (1692,  ib.  p.  249.)  Our  fathers  placed  the  duty 
of  supporting  an  able,  pious,  and  Orthodox  minister  before  all 
other  town  duties.  Indeed,  it  was  expressely  made  “  the  duty 


53 


of  the  Christian  magistrate  to  take  care  the  people  be  fed  with 
wholesome  and  sound  doctrine/’  &c.  (Ib.  p.  ioi.)  So  inti¬ 
mate  was  the  union  of  Church  and  State  in  those  old  Puritan 
days,  and  so  intimate  will  it  again  become  as  soon  as  we  have 
adopted  the  Christian  amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  !  Then  the  ancient  rule,  which  required  a 
deputy  to  the  General  Court  to  be  sound  in  judgment  con¬ 
cerning  the  main  points  of  the  Christian  religion  as  they  have 
been  held  forth  and  acknowledged  by  the  generality  of  the 
Protestant  Orthodox  writers  (1654,  ib.  p.  97),  or  something 
like  it,  will'  be  again  adopted  ;  and  the  committee  which  now 
passes  upon  the  credentials  of  members  of  the  Legislature,  and 
their  civil  qualifications,  will  also  be  required  to  say  whether 
such  members  are  evangelical  or  no  ! 

Practically  speaking,  therefore,  the  town  and  parish  were 
anciently  one  and  the  same  body.  The  same  men  who  bal¬ 
loted  for  Town  Clerk,  Selectmen,  Constable,  & c.,  and  who 
voted  taxes  to  support  highways,  schools,  &c.,  also  contracted 
with  the  minister,  and  voted  taxes  for  his  support,  or  to  build 
a  meeting-house  or  parsonage  ;  and  it  was  just  as  much  a  legal 
duty  imposed  on  towns,  to  support  an  able  and  faithful  minis¬ 
ter  of  God’s  holy  word,  as  it  was  to  pay  their  Clerk,  Selectmen, 
or  Schoolmaster,  &c.  The  same  Town  Constable  who  was 
directed  to  carry  his  black  staff  in  the  execution  of  his  office, 
that  none  might  plead  ignorance,  and  who  was  ordered  “  to  take 
notice  of  common  coasters,  unprofitable  fowlers,  and  other 
idle  persons,  and  tobacco  takers,”  and  to  arrest,  without  war¬ 
rant,  Sabbath-breaking  persons  (1658,  ib.  p.  82),  was  also 
obliged  to  take  notice  of  the  tax-payers  of  the  town,  and  to 
gather  all  the  town  rates  committed  to  him  by  the  Select¬ 
men. 

Under  these  laws,  all  women  who  had  property  were  taxed 
just  the  same  as  men,  though  they  had  no  right  to  vote. 

Very  soon,  however,  religious  differences  began  ;  and  “  a 
cursed  sect  of  hereticks,  lately  risen  up  in  the  world,  called 
Quakers”  (1656,  ib.  p.  121),  began  to  dispute  the  right  of  a 
town-meeting  to  tax  them  for  the  support  of  a  hireling  priest- 


54 


hood  ;  and  they  apparently  devised  various  ways  to  elude  such 
taxation.  (Ib.  p.373.)  They  could  not  conscientiously  attend 
upon  the  public  worship  of  God,  as  established  by  law,  and 
were  therefore  deprived  of  the  right  to  vote.  (Ib.  p.  107.) 
The  contest  lasted  a  long  time ;  but,  after  some  temporary 
legislation  to  the  same  purport,  it  was  finally  enacted  (1757, 
ib.  783)  that  no  Quakers  or  Anabaptists  shall  have  their  polls 
or  estates,  real  or  personal,  taxed  towards  the  settlement  or 
support  of  such  minister  or  ministers,  nor  for  building  or  re¬ 
pairing  any  meeting-house  or  place  of  public  worship.”  In 
other  words,  as  a  Quaker  was  deprived  of  the  right  to  vote  in 
ecclesiastical  matters,  not  merely  by  scruples  of  conscience, 
but  by  express  law,  it  was  deemed  unjust  that  he  should  be 
compelled  to  pay  such  taxes. 

In  like  manner,  Episcopalians  complained  of  being  taxed  for 
the  support  of  divine  worship  in  the  manner  established  by 
law,  while  they  and  their  families  attended  worship  elsewhere. 
Whereupon  it  was  enacted  (1742,  ib.  537)  that  they  and  their 
estates  “  shall  be  taxed  to  the  support  of  the  public  worship 
of  God  with  the  other  estates  and  inhabitants  within  the 
bounds  of  any  town,  &c.,  according  to  the  laws  of  the  Prov¬ 
ince;”  but  the  Treasurer,  as  he  receiveth  any  such  tax,  is 
directed  to  pay  it  to  the  minister  of  the  church  at  which  such 
tax-payer  usually  attends  worship ;  and  “  all  such  professed 
members  of  the  Church  of  England  shall  be  entirely  excused 
from  paying  any  taxes  towards  the  settlement  of  any  minister 
or  building  any  meeting-house,  .  .  .  and  utterly  debarred 
from  voting  any  ways  concerning  such  ministers  or  meeting¬ 
houses.” 

Here,  again,  as  every  sincere  member  of  the  Church  of 
England  was  deprived  of  the  right  to  vote  on  the  settlement 
of  a  minister,  &c.,  not  only  by  his  scruples  of  conscience,  but 
by  express  law,  the  same  law  declared  it  to  be  unjust  that  he 
should  continue  to  be  taxed  for  these  objects. 

After  the  adoption  of  our  Constitution,  various  laws  were 
passed  to  carry  into  effect  its  provisions.  Towns  were  au¬ 
thorized  to  grant  and  vote  money  “  for  the  settlement,  main- 


55 


tenance,  and  support  of  the  ministry,  schools,  the  poor,  and 
other  necessary  charges  arising  within  the  same  town  ” 
(Stat.  1785,  c.  75,  §  7) ;  and  towns  were  also  liable  to  be  fined 
if  they  were  not  “  constantly  provided  with  a  public  Protestant 
teacher  of  piety,  religion,  and  morality.”  (Stat.  1799,  c.  87, 
§  2.)  The  support  of  the  ministry,  &c.,  remained  one  of  the 
objects  for  which  towns  were  expressly  authorized  to  appro¬ 
priate  money  until  1836. 

So  long  as  only  one  parish  existed  in  a  town,  this  union  of 
Church  and  State  continued,  and  was  complete.  But,  when  a 
second  religious  society  was  formed,  a  separation  took  place, 
and  the  seceding  inhabitants  became  the  Second  Parish. 
Those  who  remained  constituted  the  First  Parish,  and  be¬ 
came  entitled  to  hold  the  meeting-house,  and  other  property 
previously  held  by  the  town  for  ministerial  purposes.1 

After  any  such  separation  took  place,  a  change  became 
necessary  in  the  mode  of  voting  taxes.  The  town  would  con¬ 
tinue  of  course  to  vote  taxes  for  civil  purposes,  because  mem¬ 
bers  from  all  the  religious  societies  in  town  took  part  and 

1  As  illustrations  of  this  union  of  Church  and  State,  I  would  say  that  in 
Brookline  Town  Meeting  the  moderator  would  sometimes  address  the  voters 
present  as  “the  congregation.”  Thus,  “at  a  meeting  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 
Town  of  Brookline,  holden  on  the  20th  day  of  December,  1796,  for  the  purpose 
of  knowing  whether  the  congregation  would  concur  with  the  choice  of  the 
church  ...  of  Mr.  John  Pierce  for  a  gospel  minister  to  settle  in  this  town,” 
after  choice  of  moderator,  Mr.  Pierce  was  unanimously  chosen,  and  a  commit¬ 
tee  was  chosen  to  wait  on  him  “  with  a  copy  of  the  proceedings  of  the  church 
and  congregation,  and  invite  him  to  settle  in  this  town  and  be  our  minister.” 
Mr.  Pierce  was  the  last  minister  thus  chosen  in  town-meeting.  The  separation 
of  town  and  parish  took  place  in  1828.  Before  that  time,  for  many  years,  the 
town,  at  its  annual  meeting,  after  making  an  appropriation  for  highways,  would 
proceed  to  vote  a  round  sum  “to  pay  the  Rev.  Jno.  Pierce  his  salary  and  defray 
the  usual  expenses  of  the  town  the  current  year.” 

We  now  enjoy  in  this  State  the  most  unlimited  freedom  of  religious  belief, 
provided  only  we  do  “  not  disturb  the  public  peace  or  obstruct  others  in  their 
religious  worship.”  We  now  recognize  as  sacred  the  right  of  private  judgment 
in  matters  of  religion ;  and  yet  it  is  true  that  the  seed  which  was  planted  at 
Plymouth,  the  independence  of  churches,  logically  bound  up  in  itself,  as  Masson 
says,  the  very  principle  of  religious  liberty  which  we  now  enjoy.  (Thornton, 
p.  33,  note.)  The  Puritans  were  not  the  only  persons  in  the  world  who  have 
builded  better  than  they  knew. 


56 


voted  in  town  meetings.  But  the  different  parishes  or  relig¬ 
ious  societies  voted  their  own  taxes  for  ecclesiastical  purposes, 
each  member  voting  for  or  against  his  own  tax  in  his  own 
parish  or  society.  This  separation  between  town  and  parish 
became  finally  so  general  that  the  constitutional  effect  of  it 
was  recognized  in  the  law,  and  it  was  enacted,  — 

“  No  citizen  of  this  Commonwealth,  being  a  member  of  any 
religious  society  in  this  Commonwealth,  shall  be  assessed  or 
liable  to  pay  any  tax  for  the  support  of  public  worship  or 
other  parochial  charges,  to  any  parish,  precinct,  or  religious 
society  whatever,  other  than  to  that  of  which  he  is  a  mem  ■ 
ber.”  (Stat.  1823,  c.  106.) 

We  have  already  seen  that,  in  the  construction  of  statutes, 
words  importing  the  masculine  gender  may  be  applied  to 
females.  Women  having  always  constituted  the  majority  of 
the  citizens  of  the  State,  this  law,  which  professes  to  be 
intended  to  secure  citizens  against  unconstitutional  taxation, 
must  be  held  to  protect  female  citizens  no  less  than  males, 
notwithstanding  the  use  of  the  word  “he/’  unless  we  can  see 
that  such  a  construction  of  the  law  “  is  inconsistent  with  the 
manifest  intent  of  the  Legislature,  or  repugnant  to  the  context 
of  the  sam6  statute.”  (Gen.  Stat.  c.  3,  §  7.)  And  how  is  it 
possible  to  point  out  any  such  inconsistency  or  repugnancy  ? 
This  law,  therefore,  when  construed  on  correct  legal  princi¬ 
ples,  apparently  admits  not  only  that  female  citizens  may  be 
members  of  religious  societies,  and  entitled  to  vote  for  or 
against  ecclesiastical  taxes,  but  wholly  exempts  them  from  all 
such  taxes  imposed  by  any  town,  parish,  or  society  where  they 
are  not  allowed  to  vote. 

So  long  as  town  and  parish  continued  one,  it  is  clear  that  all 
taxes,  to  be  constitutional,  were  required  to  be  laid  with  the 
consent  of  the  people  taxed.  Each  man  voted  for  or  against 
his  town  and  parish  tax  in  town  meeting.  As  the  separation 
between  town  and  parish  gradually  took  place,  the  town  con¬ 
tinued  to  impose  taxes  for  civil  purposes ;  and  the  parish,  or 
religious  society,  claimed  the  exclusive  power  to  tax  its  own 
members  for  ecclesiastical  purposes.  But  nevertheless  all  such 


57 


taxes  of  both  kinds,  whether  laid  by  town  or  parish,  were  still 
required  to  be  laid  with  the  consent  of  the  people  taxed  ;  and 
when,  in  1823,  the  separation  of  town  and  parish  affairs  be¬ 
came  the  rule,  rather  than  the  exception,  the  Legislature, 
recognizing  as  a  fact  the  frequency  of  this  separation,  en¬ 
forced  the  constitutional  provision  that  all  taxation  must  be 
based  on  consent,  by  passing  a  law  declaring,  in  effect,  that  no 
citizen,  male  or  female,  can  be  taxed  for  ecclesiastical  pur¬ 
poses,  out  of  his  or  her  own  parish  or  society  where  he  or  she 
can  vote,  just  as  no  male  citizen  can  be  constitutionally  taxed 
for  civil  purposes,  out  of  the  town  where  he  is  allowed  to  vote. 
The  two  kinds  of  taxes  were,  it  is  true,  to  be  levied  by  two 
different  bodies  ;  but  no  change  whatever  was  made,  or 
thought  of,  in  the  constitutional  basis  of  taxation  ;  and  no  tax 
can  now  be  laid  by  either  town  or  parish  without  consent.1 

The  clause  in  our  Constitution  requiring  towns,  &c.,  to  sup¬ 
port  public  worship,  &c.  (art.  3),  was  repealed  in  1833,  and  the 
eleventh  amendment  was  adopted.  This  gave  the  finishing 
touch  to  the  separation  between  town  and  parish,  and  gives 
to  “  the  several  religious  societies  of  this  Commonwealth,  &c., 
the  right  to  elect  their  pastors,  to  contract  with  them  for  their 
support,  to  raise  money  for  erecting  and  repairing  houses  for 
public  worship,  for  the  maintenance  of  religious  instruction, 
&c. ;  ”  but  all  members  may  dissolve  their  connection  with  the 
society  by  a  written  notice,  “  and  thenceforth  shall  not  be  lia¬ 
ble  for  any  grant  or  contract,”  &c.  As  this  amendment  speaks 
only  of  “  persons  ”  and  “  members  ”  of  religious  societies,  and 
makes  use  of  no  words  importing  the  masculine  gender,  there 
would  seem  to  be  no  room  for  doubt  that  under  it  women  may 
become  members  of  a  religious  society,  and  have  and  enjoy 
the  same  rights  of  voting  that  men  enjoy. 

Under  this  amendment  it  was  enacted  (Stat.  1834,  c.  183), — 

Sect.  2.  “No  person  shall  hereafter  become  or  be  made 
a  member  of  any  parish  or  religious  society,  so  as  to  be  liable 
to  be  taxed  therein  for  the  support  of  public  worship  or  for 

1  The  taxation  of  non-resident  owners  of  real  estate  is  based  on  the  consent 
growing  out  of  voluntary  ownership. 


8 


58 


other  parish  charges,  without  his  express  consent  for  that  pur¬ 
pose  first  had  and  obtained  ;”  and 

Sect.  8.  “No  citizen  shall  be  assessed  or  liable  to  pay  any 
tax  for  the  support  of  public  worship  or  other  parish  charges, 
to  any  parish  or  religious  society  whatever,  other  than  to  that 
of  which  he  is  a  member.” 

If,  as  we  have  seen,  the  law  of  1823  extends  to  women, 
and  admits  and  protects  their  rights  to  become  members  of 
religious  societies,  it  would  seem  to  be  clear  that  this  law 
must  also  receive  the  same  interpretation.  More  especially 
must  this  be  the  case  when  we  consider  this  law  as  designed 
to  give  practical  effect  to  the  amendment,  which  unquestion¬ 
ably  extends  to  women. 

In  1836  the  Statutes  were  revised  by  the  late  Charles  Jack- 
son  and  others.  They  reported  (c.  15,  §  12)  that  towns  were 
authorized  to  vote  money  “  for  the  settlement,  maintenance, 
and  support  of  the  ministry,”  &c.  But  the  Legislature,  in 
passing  the  Revised  Statutes,  struck  out  this  clause.  (Rev. 
Stat.,  c.  15,  §  12 ;  see  also  Gen.  Stat.  c.  18,  §  10.) 

So  that  as  early  as  1823  the  separation  of  town  and  parish 
had  become  quite  general.  In  1836,  it  was,  practically  speak¬ 
ing,  complete  ;  and  from  that  time  the  right  to  levy  taxes  for 
ecclesiastical  purposes  has  been  confined  to  parish  and  relig¬ 
ious  societies  as  such,  and  these  societies  have  only  been  able 
to  tax  their  own  members  or  those  who  had  the  right  to  vote 
for  or  against  such  taxation.  Not  only  has  the  citizen,  male 
or  female,  this  protection  against  unjust  taxation  for  ecclesi¬ 
astical  purposes  ;  but  any  one  who  is  dissatisfied  may  with¬ 
draw  from  a  religious  society  at  any  time,  by  giving  written 
notice  to  that  effect,  and  by  thus  ceasing  to  be  a  voter  he  or 
she  will  be  relieved  from  all  taxation. 

It  would  seem  to  be  clear,  therefore,  that  probably  as  early 
as  1823,  but  at  all  events  since  1836,  no  woman  could  be  taxed 
for  any  ecclesiastical  purpose,  unless  she  also  had  the  right  to 
vote  for  or  against  such  taxation,  or  unless  she  had  consented 
to  be  taxed  by  not  exercising  her  right  to  withdraw  from  the 
society  imposing  the  tax.  But,  as  if  to  make  this  precise 


59 


point  (according  to  the  old  phrase)  “  certain  to  a  certain  in¬ 
tent  in  particular,”  an  act  to  extend  membership  of  parishes 
and  religious  societies  to  women,  &c.,  was  passed.  (Stat.  1869, 
c.  346.)  The  first  section  of  this  act  reads,  “  Any  parish  or 
religious  society  may  admit  to  membership  women,  who  shall 
have  all  the  rights  and  privileges  of  men.”  This  law  recog¬ 
nizes  the  legality  of  the  previously  existing  custom,  and  we 
have  now  women  on  our  parish  committees,  and  women  are  also 
settled  as  ministers ;  but  long  before  the  passage  of  this  law 
the  right  of  women  to  become  members  of  religious  societies 
had  been  recognized,  and  as  such  members  they  have  had  the 
right  to  vote,  even  if,  from  social  or  other  reasons,  they  have 
commonly  refrained  from  exercising  such  right. 

However  this  may  have  been,  beyond  all  doubt  it  is  now 
contrary  to  our  Constitution,  to  tax  a  woman  for  ecclesiastical 
purposes  without  her  consent,  or  unless  she  has  the  right  to 
vote  for  or  against  such  taxation.  It  is  equally  beyond  ail 
doubt  that,  in  defining  what  shall  constitute  a  legal  basis  for 
taxation,  our  Constitution  makes  no  sort  of  distinction  be¬ 
tween  civil  and  ecclesiastical  taxes,  but  requires  them  all  to 
be  based  upon  consent.  If,  therefore,  a  female  citizen  cannot 
be  constitutionally  taxed  for  ecclesiastical  purposes,  unless 
she  has  the  right  of  suffrage  in  reference  to  such  tax,  neither 
can  she  be  constitutionally  taxed  for  civil  purposes  unless  she 
has  the  right  of  suffrage  in  reference  to  such  tax.  We  have 
no  right  to  make  any  distinction  which  the  Constitution  does 
not  point  out.  If  we  cannot,  constitutionally,  take  a  single 
dollar  from  a  woman  for  a  religious  tax,  unless  she  has  the 
right  to  vote  for  or  against  it,  we  cannot,  constitutionally,  tax 
the  women  of  the  State  hundreds  of  thousands  of  dollars 
every  year,  for  civil  purposes,  unless  they  also  have  the  right 
to  vote  for  or  against  such  taxation.  We  have  seen  fit  to  lay 
down  in  our  Constitution  one  principle,  and  only  one,  by 
which  to  determine  the  rightfulness  of  taxation  in  every  case. 
If  a  tax  be  laid  either  by  State,  city,  town,  or  parish  within  its 
appropriate  sphere,  with  the  consent  of  the  people  who  are 
taxed,  it  is  constitutional ;  and  it  is  of  no  sort  of  consequence 


6o 


whether  the  tax  be  for  civil  or  ecclesiastical  purposes.  But 
if,  on  the  contrary,  either  the  State,  city,  town,  or  parish 
undertakes  to  lay  taxes,  even  within  its  appropriate  sphere, 
without  such  consent,  no  matter  whether  the  tax  be  for  civil 
or  ecclesiastical  purposes,  the  tax  is  void ;  and  our  courts,  that 
are  all  sworn  to  support  the  Constitution,  are  bound  to  de¬ 
clare  such  taxation  to  be  void,  as  being  an  infringement  of 
the  Declaration  of  Rights. 

It  may  possibly  be  urged  as  “  each  individual  of  the  society 
has  a  right  to  be  protected  by  it  in  the  enjoyment  of  his 
life,  liberty,  and  property  according  to  standing  laws,  and 
he  is  obliged  consequently  to  contribute  his  share  to  the 
expense  of  the  protection  ”  (Declaration  of  Rights,  art.  io), 
that  whoever  is  thus  protected  may  be  taxed,  whether  a  voter 
or  not ;  in  other  words,  that  taxation  and  protection — not  tax¬ 
ation  and  representation  —  go  together.  And  it  is  true  that 
aliens  who  are  not  allowed  to  vote  are,  nevertheless,  some¬ 
times  said  to  be  taxed  on  the  ground  of  this  very  protection 
which  they  receive.  (Opinion  of  the  Judges,  Feb.  15,  18 11, 
7  Mass.  523.) 

The  King  and  Parliament  also  proposed  to  tax  the  colonists 
for  their  own  protection  ;  but  the  colonists  wholly  failed  to  see 
that  this  made  any  difference,  or  that  the  tax  was  any  less 
tyrannical  in  consequence.  They  preferred  to  determine  for 
themselves  exactly  how,  when,  and  where  such  protection 
should  be  exerted.  May  not  our  women,  properly  enough, 
claim  the  same  right  to  determine  what  protection  they  need, 
and  are  willing  to  pay  for  ? 

If  it  be  argued  that  because  aliens,  having  no  right  to  vote, 
may  rightfully  be  taxed,  therefore  native-born  women  who  are 
disfranchised  may  also  be  taxed,  the  argument  is  worthless, 
unless  we  are  also  willing  to  admit  that  under  our  Constitution 
the  property  rights  of  more  than  half  the  citizens  of  the  Com¬ 
monwealth  are  no  greater  than  if  they  were  aliens  !  Who  is 
ready  to  make  this  admission  ?  It  may  very  likely  be  true 
that  women,  in  point  of  fact,  enjoy  no  more  property  rights 
than  are  accorded  to  aliens  ;  but  it  is  very  far  from  being  true 


6i 


that  they  ought  to  have  no  greater  rights  than  aliens  under  our 
fundamental  law,  and  equally  untrue  that  they  are  in  the 
actual  enjoyment  of  all  the  rights  to  which  they  are  entitled, 
by  virtue  of  that  law. 

The  all-sufficient  answer  to  this  objection,  however,  is  found 
in  the  very  same  paragraph  of  the  Declaration  of  Rights, 
which  goes  on  to  provide,  “  But  no  part  of  the  property  of  any 
individual  can,  with  justice,  be  taken  from  him  or  applied  to 
public  uses  without  his  own  consent,  or  that  of  the  repre¬ 
sentative  body  of  the  people,”  or  without  providing  a  “  reason¬ 
able  compensation  ”  in  dollars  and  cents,  for  the  property  so 
taken.  (Declaration  of  Rights,  art.  x.) 

Until  1852  aliens  could  not  own  real  estate  in  the  Com¬ 
monwealth.  Now,  they  can  do  so  (Gen.  Stat.  c.  90,  §  38)  ; 
and  no  real  estate  can  be  taken  even  from  an  alien,  for  pub¬ 
lic  uses,  unless  the  law  which  gives  the  right  to  take  it,  also 
provides  a  way  by  which  he  can  obtain  reasonable  compensa¬ 
tion.  But  the  citizen  is  protected  in  his  rights,  not  only  by 
this  provision  requiring  compensation,  but  also  by  the  other 
provision  in  the  same  paragraph,  which  declares  that  no  part 
of  his  property  can  with  justice  be  taken  from  him,  even  for 
public  uses,  without  his  consent,  or  the  consent  of  the  repre¬ 
sentatives  of  the  people,  which  representatives  he  has  had  a 
voice  in  electing.  As  a  matter  of  grace  and  favor,  we  allow 
aliens  to  reside  here  and  accumulate  property,  provided  they 
submit  to  taxation  ;  and,  by  so  residing,  they  consent  to  be 
taxed.  As  a  matter  of  right,  a  majority  of  the  people  of  the 
State,  being  women,  live  where  God  has  placed  them,  and 
claim  that  under  our  fundamental  law  no  part  of  their  prop¬ 
erty  can  be  taken  from  them  without  their  consent,  even  if 
compensation  be  provided  for  it,  or  even  for  the  purpose  ot 
paying  the  expense  of  protecting  them  by  standing  laws. 

With  this  I  finish  my  statement  about  the  taxation  of 
women  in  Massachusetts.  I  have  honestly  endeavored  to 
state  the  case  fairly,  and  without  exaggeration.  The  simple 
truth  seems  amply  sufficient  to  cause  any  just-minded  man  to 
blush  for  our  short-comings.  The  facts  alone  ought  to  be 


62 


enough  to  arouse  our  sympathy,  and  incite  us  to  earnest  effort 
to  remedy  the  great  wrong.  I  have  proved  that  the  women 
of  the  State  are  compelled  every  year  to  pay  millions  of  dollars 
in  the  way  of  taxes.  I  have  proved  that  all  taxes  which  are 
collected  from  them,  under  authority  of  Congress,  are  laid 
contrary  to  the  principles  for  which  our  fathers  fought,  and 
contrary  to  the  principles  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence  ; 
and  I  hope  my  readers  will  think  I  have  succeeded  in  show¬ 
ing  that  the  direct  taxation  of  women  under  our  State  law,  is 
not  only  contrary  to  these  same  principles,  but  is  also  an  in¬ 
fringement  of  our  Declaration  of  Rights.  And  may  the  day 
soon  come  when  all  of  us  shall  be  ready  to  admit  that  taxation 
without  representation  is  tyranny,  and  nothing  but  tyranny, 
even  if  the  persons  taxed  be  women,  and  act  accordingly  ! 


BROOKLINE  TOWN  VOTES. 


“Decem’r  ye  28th  1772  At  a  meeting  of  the  Freeholders  &  otner 
Inhabitants  of  ye  town  of  Brooklyn  on  adjournment  from  ye  1  ith 
Decem’r  to  ye  28th  following  &  then  met. 

William  Hyslop,  Esq’r,  Chosen  Moderator. 

The  Following  Votes  were  pased  by  the  Town  unanimously  at  as 
full  a  meeting  as  Usual  Viz.  .  .  . 

3d.  Voted  The  Raising  a  Revennue  within  this  Province  by  an  as¬ 
sumed  Power  in  the  Brittishe  House  of  Commons,  to  give  and  grant  our 
Money  without  our  Consent  &  appropriating  the  Money  so  Raised  for 
the  Support  of  the  Government  of  the  Province  and  the  Payment  of  the 
charges  of  the  Administration  of  Justice  therein  so  repugnant  to  the  first 
Principles  of  a  free  Constitution  and  the  obvious  meaning  &  Spirit  of  the 
Royal  Charter  of  this  Province. 

4th.  Voted  that  an  Establishment  for  the  Support  of  the  Govonor  of 
the  Province,  and  the  Judges  of  the  Superior  Court,  &c.  (if  the  latter  be 
already  made  as  we  have  Just  reason  to  apprehend)  to  be  paid  out  the 
Monies  raised  as  aforesaid,  independent  of  the  free  Gifts  and  Grants  of 
the  Commons  of  this  Province  are  in  the  Opinion  of  this  Town  leading 
and  alarming  Steps  towards  rendering  the  whole  executive  Power  inde¬ 
pendent,  of  the  People,  and  setting  up  an  despotic  Government  in  the 
Province. 

At  a  Meeting  of  the  Inhabitants  of  the  Town  of  Brooklyn  from 
Friday,  the  26th,  To  Monday  the  29th  of  Nov’r  (1773)  To  consider 
what  was  propper  for  this  Town  to  do,  relative  to  the  large  Quan¬ 
tity’s  of  Tea  belonging  to  the  India  Company,  hourly  expected  to 
arrive  in  this  Province,  Subject  to  any  American  Duty. 

it.  The  Town  came  unanimously  into  the  following  Resolves  Viz. 
That  the  Act  of  the  British  Parliament  imposing  a  Duty  on  Tea,  payable 
in  America,  for  the  Express  purpose  of  raising  a  Revenue,  is  unconstitu- 


64 

tional,  has  a  direct  Tendency  to  bring  the  Americans  into  Slavery,  and  is 
therefore  an  Intolerable  Grievance. 

2d.  That  this  Grievance  which  has  been  so  Justly  complained  of  by  the 
Americans,  so  far  from  being  redressed,  is  greatly  aggravated  by  another 
Act,  passed  in  the  last  Sessions  of  Parliament,  for  Benifit  and  Relief  of 
the  India  Company,  permitting  them  to  Export  their  Teas  to  America  or 
Forring  Parts,  free  of  all  custom  and  Dutyes  usually  paid  in  Great  Britian, 
but  Subject  to  the  Duty  payable  in  America ;  thus  have  the  Parliament 
discovered  the  most  glaring  Partiality  in  making  one  &  the  Same  Act  to 
operrate  for  the  Ease  &  Convenience  of  a  Few  of  the  most  opulent  Sub¬ 
jects  in  Britian,  on  the  one  hand,  and  for  the  Oppressions  of  Millions  of 
Freeborn  &  moast  loyal  Inhabitants  of  America,  on  the  other. 

3d.  That  the  last  mentioned  Act  can  be  considered  no  otherwise  than 
as  Subtle  Plan  of  the  Ministry  to  ensnare  and  enslave  the  Americans, 
and  that  whoever  shall  be  instrumental  in  carrying  the  Same  into  Exe¬ 
cution,  is  in  the  Judgment  of  this  Towne,  an  inevitable  Enemy  to  this 
Country.” 


65 


*  In  towns  marked  thus  in  these  tables,  either  a  highway  tax  was  assessed  in 
addition  to  the  poll,  or  else  the  poll-tax  was  more  than  $2. 

t  In  places  marked  thus  in  these  tables,  the  returns  are  for  the  year  1874  instead 
of  1873. 


Table  I.  Of  Places  where  the  Women  pay  or  less  of  the  Taxes. 


Towns. 

1871. 

1 

1873. 

1874. 

Number  of 
Women. 

Paid  by  them. 

Whole  Tax. 

Women  taxed. 

Paid  by  them. 

Equal  in  Polls. 

Men  who  pay 
only 

a  Poll-tax. 

Amount. 

Plurality  for 

Governor. 

Montague  .  • 

is 

$756 

$30,146 

$212 

106 

42 

Peru  .... 

6 

i33 

2,875 

.  •  . 

18 

9 

27 

*  Worthington  . 

3 

20 

4,599 

s 

42 

21 

36 

$72 

23 

$37,620 

5 

$272 

136 

36 

$72 

92 

Table  II.  Of  Places  where  the  Women  pay  from  to  y^j-  of  the  Taxes. 


Towns. 

1871. 

1873. 

1874. 

Number  of 
Women. 

Paid  by  them 

Whole  Tax. 

Women  taxed. 

Paid  by  them. 

Equal  in  Polls. 

Men  who  pay 
only 

a  Poll-tax. 

Amount. 

Plurality  for 
Governor. 

Holyoke  ... 

83 

$1,568 

$139,530 

112 

$2,705 

i,352 

2,436 

$4,872 

737 

Middlcfield  .  . 

3 

51 

6,431 

5 

121 

60 

67 

134 

38 

Monroe  .  .  . 

3 

9 

1,868 

3 

36 

18 

4 

8 

3 

Montgomery  .  . 

3 

54 

2,353 

4 

46 

23 

!7 

34 

10 

Yarmouth .  .  . 

86 

1,280 

17,479 

311 

i55 

60 

$167,661 

124 

$3,219 

1,609 

|  2,524 

$5,048 

848 

9 


66 


Table  III.  Of  Places  where  the  Women  pay  from  fa  to  fa  of  the  Taxes. 


Towns. 

1871. 

1873. 

1874. 

Women  taxed. 

Paid  by  them. 

Whole  Tax. 

Women  taxed. 

Paid  by  them. 

Equal  in  Polls. 

Men  who  pay 

only 

a  Poll-tax. 

Amount. 

Plurality  for 

Governor. 

Boylston  .  .  . 

-9 

$264 

$7,614 

10 

$160 

80 

71 

$142 

54 

Fall  River  .  . 

324 

16,4x8 

636,452 

284 

14,257 

7,128 

7,543 

15,086 

642 

Franklin  .  .  . 

68 

I>I3S 

31,285 

60 

788 

394 

•  .  •  • 

26 

*  Hardwick  .  . 

21 

428 

I9>371 

.  •  . 

45° 

225 

14 

Leyden  .  .  . 

6 

231 

5,281 

6 

107 

53 

17 

34 

7 

*  Lincoln  .  .  . 

33 

561 

11,588 

12 

270 

135 

82 

164 

47 

Provincetown  . 

50 

859 

38,876 

4i 

819 

409 

4i5 

830 

177 

Williamstown  . 

36 

606 

22,612 

.  .  . 

488 

244 

58 

$773>°79 

413 

$17,339 

8,669 

8,128 

$16,256 

1,025 

Table  IV.  Of  Places  where  the  Women  pay  from  fa  to  fa  of  the  Taxes. 


Towns. 

1871. 

1873. 

1874. 

Women  taxed. 

Paid  by  them. 

Whole  Tax. 

Women  taxed. 

Paid  by  them. 

Equal  in  Polls. 

Men  who  pay 
only 

a  Poll-tax. 

Amount. 

Plurality  for 
Governor. 

Adams  .  .  . 

83 

$2,599 

$176,644 

108 

$5,425 

2,712 

230 

Canton  .  .  . 

81 

2,355 

27,842 

7°4 

352 

91 

Carver  .  .  . 

24 

222 

5,259 

30 

163 

81 

73 

$146 

*  Charlemont  .  . 

13 

429 

9,121 

16 

263 

131 

45 

90 

124 

Dover  .... 

13 

262 

7,075 

13 

186 

93 

46 

92 

10 

t  Dracut  .  .  . 

45 

623 

20,922 

33 

661 

330 

184 

368 

35 

Eastham  .  .  . 

12 

3i4 

5,841 

12 

149 

74 

22 

44 

*  Gardner  .  .  . 

4i 

713 

40,084 

62 

973 

486 

513 

1,026 

106 

Gill . 

15 

224 

5,987 

15 

163 

81 

48 

96 

2 

*  Hinsdale  .  .  . 

22 

747 

i5,034 

47i 

235 

11 

Holland  .  .  . 

3 

33 

2,809 

3 

86 

43 

84 

168 

20 

Huntington  .  . 

20 

419 

9,381 

21 

253 

126 

5 

Lenox  .... 

5° 

1,631 

19,786 

23 

561 

280 

109 

218 

89 

Leverett  .  .  . 

13 

218 

6,845 

XI 

201 

100 

47 

94 

22 

Maynard .  .  . 

14,832 

.  .  . 

389 

194 

3 

Newbury .  .  . 

57 

1,521 

11,886 

20 

318 

159 

95 

190 

73 

Norfolk  .  .  . 

16 

360 

6,475 

22 

218 

109 

128 

256 

12 

Palmer  .  .  . 

5i 

1,217 

25,5i4 

40 

787 

393 

470 

940 

27 

Sandwich ... 

105 

2,137 

21,163 

42 

616 

308 

271 

542 

80 

Southampton  . 

20 

396 

7,767 

16 

231 

115 

63 

126 

45 

Wales.  .  .  . 

14 

250 

5,609 

10 

161 

80 

102 

204 

52 

$445,876 

497 

$12,979 

6,489 

2,300 

$4,600 

1,037 

Table  V. 


Of  Places  where  the  Women  pay  from  fa  to  fa  of  the  Taxes. 


1871. 

1873. 

1874. 

Towns. 

Women  taxed- 

Paid  by  them. 

Whole  Tax. 

Women  taxed. 

Paid  by  them. 

Equal  in  Polls. 

Men  who  pay 

only 

a  Poll-tax. 

Amount. 

Plurality  for 

Governor 

*  Ashland  .  .  • 

46 

$1,024 

$25,960 

32 

$1,270 

635 

379 

$758 

19 

Belchertown .  . 

53 

882 

T9»237 

3i 

705 

352 

*43 

286 

206 

*  Bolton .... 

32 

476 

8,993 

19 

338 

169 

83 

166 

8 

Brewster  .  .  • 

26 

1,138 

10, 198 

i5 

435 

217 

46 

92 

Chatham .  .  . 

47 

601 

12,505 

54 

631 

3i5 

107 

214 

Clinton  .  •  . 

61 

2,280 

78,828 

90 

3,072 

i,53b 

894 

1,788 

69 

Dighton  •  •  . 

55 

703 

11,815 

56 

550 

275 

128 

256 

98 

*  Douglas  .  .  . 

5° 

1,326 

15,557 

548 

274 

.  .  .  . 

69 

*  Dudley  .  .  . 

49 

1,072 

I9,i95 

29 

869 

434 

367 

734 

105 

t  East  Bridge-  . 
water  .  .  . 

109 

2,39° 

22,041 

52 

1,091 

545 

287 

574 

92 

Essex  .... 

43 

1,237 

1,398 

14,558 

27 

495 

247 

127 

254 

7° 

Georgetown  .  . 

76 

20,462 

75 

958 

479 

16 

Granville .  .  . 

15 

345 

9,418 

14 

351 

175 

62 

124 

80 

Hadley  .  .  . 

54 

1,322 

23,061 

869 

434 

22 

Heath  .... 

9 

87 

5,55i 

15 

221 

no 

19 

38 

47 

Holliston .  .  . 

86 

1,860 

3i,o59 

76 

1,114 

557 

438 

876 

24 

Littleton  .  .  . 

5° 

577 

9,627 

21 

43i 

215 

68 

136 

64 

Marion  .  .  . 

23 

353 

8,252 

16 

294 

147 

64 

128 

14 

Natick  .  .  . 

hi 

3, 124 

59,9” 

2,868 

x,434 

62 

Northfield  .  . 

48 

688 

9,612 

*38 

386 

193 

93 

186 

33 

Oakham  .  .  . 

19 

188 

8,107 

30 

348 

174 

54 

108 

Plympton  .  . 

16 

198 

4,oS4 

22 

176 

88 

37 

74 

23 

Prescott  .  .  . 

13 

206 

4,853 

12 

188 

94 

24 

48 

9 

Revere  .  .  . 

22 

754 

26,539 

25 

929 

464 

282 

564 

5i 

Rockport .  .  . 

27 

831 

38,886 

33 

1,382 

691 

301 

602 

381 

Somerset .  .  . 

36 

665 

14,000 

26 

684 

342 

247 

494 

Sudbury  .  .  . 

45 

607 

16,129 

24 

730 

365 

108 

216 

9 

Tyngsboro’  .  . 

13 

258 

4»472 

18 

186 

93 

72 

144 

6 

Wellfleet .  .  . 

28 

905 

14,550 

20 

539 

269 

116 

232 

102 

Westford .  .  . 

58 

894 

17,117 

3i 

.  687 

343 

254 

508 

66 

Westport .  .  . 

72 

95i 

23,835 

63 

8S8 

444 

202 

404 

208 

Wilbraham  .  . 

66 

948 

i8,455 

43 

810 

4°5 

170 

340 

9 

$606,867 

ij°°7 

$25,043 

12,521 

5»i72 

$io,344 

1,962 

Table  VI.  Of  Places  where  the  Women  pay  from  -fa  to  ^  of  the  Taxes. 


1871. 

1873. 

1874. 

Towns. 

Women  taxed. 

Paid  by  them. 

Whole  Tax. 

Women  taxed. 

Paid  by  them. 

Equal  in  Polls. 

Men  who  pay 

only 

a  Poll-tax. 

Amount. 

Plurality  for 

Governor. 

About  -jV 

Ashfield  .  .  . 

33 

$667 

$14,35° 

33 

$777 

388 

46 

$92 

55 

Lakeville .  .  . 

4i 

742 

6,305 

33 

330 

165 

68 

136 

7 

Scituate  .  .  . 

83 

2,022 

26,583 

i,332 

666 

63 

Spencer  .  .  . 

47 

1,280 

4,196 

42,275 

35 

2,121 

1,060 

620 

1,240 

61 

Webster  .  .  . 

54 

32,116 

1,621 

810 

107 

About  iV 

Blackstone  .  . 

2,471 

32,173 

89 

1,764 

882 

780 

1,560 

179 

Brookfield  .  . 

63 

2,622 

24,855 

38 

i,399 

699 

66 

#  Harvard  .  .  . 

84 

r,338 

12,994 

33 

728 

364 

107 

214 

16 

Sheffield  .  .  . 

35 

813 

14,736 

36 

786 

393 

40 

Sunderland  .  . 

14 

59° 

9,39i 

17 

535 

267 

56 

1 12 

67 

About  iV 

Framingham  . 

155 

4,217 

59,102 

107 

3,574 

1,787 

761 

1,522 

14 

Foxboro’  .  .  . 

74 

1,914 

27,414 

.  .  . 

1,638 

819 

3i5 

630 

84 

Harwich  .  .  . 

32 

722 

20,707 

58 

1,190 

595 

190 

380 

62 

Holden  .  .  . 

33 

838 

23,196 

45 

1,324 

662 

220 

440 

21 

Lynn  .... 

59° 

29,229 

53r,925 

526 

30,249 

*5»I24 

4,982 

9,964 

28 

*  Sandisfield  .  . 

24 

448 

ii,536 

30 

698 

349 

73 

146 

131 

Springfield  .  . 

564 

21,821 

609,206 

485 

35,315 

17,657 

5,486 

10,972 

1,411 

Stoughton  .  . 

187 

3,166 

45,974 

125 

2,747 

i,373 

464 

928 

147 

Swanzey  .  .  . 

30 

723 

10, 163 

45 

562 

281 

78 

156 

About  yq 

Amherst  .  .  . 

151 

4,327 

50,845 

81 

3,i72 

1,586 

275 

550 

87 

Andover  .  .  . 

268 

4,609 

40,562 

102 

2,584 

1,292 

491 

982 

141 

*  Hancock  .  .  . 

13 

197 

4,377 

.  .  . 

268 

134 

36 

*  Hubbardston  . 

53 

1,125 

16,435 

54 

999 

499 

108 

216 

2 

Northampton  . 

184 

6,968 

172,618 

140 

10,920 

5,46o 

1,080 

2,160 

43i 

Shrewsbury  .  . 

37 

788 

16,579 

40 

981 

49° 

116 

232 

61 

Somerville  .  . 

242 

13,047 

388,914 

268 

23,649 

11,824 

2,735 

5,470 

48 

So.  Scituate  .  . 

5i 

2,433 

14,329 

3i 

859 

429 

98 

196 

67 

*  Uxbridge .  .  . 

116 

2,266 

22,236 

107 

i,353 

676 

284 

568 

2 

Westfield.  . 

122 

4,321 

102,827 

146 

6,419 

3,209 

1,223 

2,446 

750 

About 

Ashby  .... 

48 

1, on 

10,947 

27 

742 

37i 

39 

78 

42 

t  Deerfield .  .  . 

70 

2,412 

28,322 

54 

1,854 

927 

295 

590 

88 

Greenfield  .  . 

79 

3,55i 

56,327 

69 

3,735 

1,867 

411 

822 

82 

Lynnfield  .  . 

39 

539 

6,177 

109,647 

4i 

414 

207 

202 

404 

28 

Pittsfield  .  .  . 

169 

11,070 

148 

7,476 

3,738 

1,516 

3,032 

603 

Sharon  .  .  . 

75 

1,269 

15,749 

38 

1,005 

502 

107 

214 

13 

Stow  .... 

48 

620 

7,213 

37 

486 

243 

99 

19$ 

17 

$2,619,105 

3,n8 

$155,606 

77,803 

23,325 

$46,650 

5,056 

69 


Table  VII.  Of  Places  where  the  Women  pay  from  ^  to  T\-  of  the  Taxe 


1871. 

1873* 

1874. 

Towns. 

Women  taxed. 

Paid  by  them. 

Whole  Tax. 

Women  taxed. 

Paid  by  them. 

1 

j  Squal  in  Polls.  | 

Men  who  pay 

only 

a  Poll-tax. 

a 

3 

c 

a 

< 

Plurality  for 

Governor. 

About 

Belmont  .  • 

66 

#4>328 

$37,686 

.  .  . 

$2,664 

i,332 

49 

*  Chelmsford  . 

79 

1.723 

26,371 

46 

1,875 

9.’7 

310 

$620 

8 

*  Leicester .  . 

101 

2,316 

22,658 

64 

1,628 

814 

322 

644 

26 

Sherborn .  . 

39 

1,074 

11,688 

4i 

809 

404 

■79 

158 

59 

Taunton  .  . 

392 

18,164 

261,821 

17,583 

283 

18,265 

9,i32 

3, 24^ 

6,482 

204 

Wayland  .  . 

49 

1,085 

38 

1,242 

621 

224 

448 

40 

Worcester  . 

780 

67,033 

833,218 

745 

63,283 

31,641 

8,980 

17,960 

524 

About  xV 

Dartmouth  . 

76 

2,511 

30,159 

53 

2,333 

1,666 

163 

326 

75 

Fairhaven  . 

66 

1,171 

23,034 

.  .  . 

i,799 

899 

4i 

Kingston  .  . 

104 

2,714 

7,256 

5i 

549 

274 

129 

258 

21 

*  Leominster  . 

120 

2,953 

1,568 

52,649 

112 

3,837 

1,918 

628 

1,256 

320 

Marshfield  . 

85 

18,235 

87 

i,398 

699 

121 

242 

53 

Princeton .  . 

3i 

373 

14,411 

32 

1,136 

568 

79 

158 

30 

Salem  .  .  . 

963 

50,108 

490,041 

399 

36,964 

18,482 

948 

3,983 

7,966 

113 

*t  Templeton . 

104 

2,719 

2,841 

26,671 

81 

1,897 

312 

624 

21 

*  Wakefield  . 

127 

79,676 

108 

5,5i7 

2,758 

1,215 

2,430 

24 

Waltham .  . 

187 

8,943 

125,118 

218 

8,935 

4,467 

1,730 

3,460 

200 

Wilmington  . 

26 

641 

8,357 

25 

658 

320 

86 

172 

3 

About 

*  Barre  .  .  . 

xog 

2,251 

29,026 

102 

2,264 

1,132 

249 

498 

4i 

Bellingham  . 

4i 

567 

8,816 

54 

735 

367 

no 

220 

Chelsea  .  . 

289 

16,045 

318,641 

399 

25,725 

12,862 

3,330 

6,660 

304 

Greenwich  . 

20 

600 

6,366 

!7 

538 

269 

63 

126 

15 

Marshfield  . 

Si 

778 

16,989 

72 

i,433 

716 

265 

530 

87 

Milford  .  . 

199 

7,598 

106,940 

244 

8,871 

4,435 

i,5i3 

3,026 

1 16 

North  Andover 

143 

4,888 

34,068 

30,078 

.  .  . 

2,985 

1,492 

11 

Swampscott  . 

23 

1,321 

5i 

2,444 

1,222 

274 

548 

4 

Townsend  . 

49 

1, on 

25,897 

68 

2,019 

1,009 

34 

68 

40 

Tyringham  . 

5 

197 

3,9n 

15 

337 

168 

25 

50 

1 

West  Springfield 

58 

1,831 

44,966 

74 

3,705 

1,852 

544 

1,088 

83 

About  u 

Boxford  •  . 

30 

601 

10,237 

24 

924 

462 

64 

128 

33 

Hingham .  . 

168 

5,497 

44,502 

145 

3,952 

1,976 

5°9 

1,018 

106 

Manchester  . 
Marblehead  . 

56 

197 

1,566 

7,47° 

18,108 

85,777 

221 

1,684 

7,950 

842 

3,975 

1,214 

2,428 

151 

Medway  .  . 

94 

2,811 

36,128 

no 

3,080 

!,54° 

387 

774 

2 

Peabody  .  . 

156 

8,383 

107,478 

•  •  V 

9,740 

4,870 

95 

Pepperell .  . 

75 

1,526 

11,608 

49 

1,034 

517 

166 

332 

6 

Westboro’  . 

107 

2,823 

38, 104 

115 

3,049 

1,524 

5°5 

1,010 

134 

*  Westminster 

46 

739 

21,243 

87 

1,978 

989 

141 

282 

67 

#3,085,515 

4,230 

$249,236 

124,618 

30,995 

#61,990 

3,107 

70 


Table  VIII.  Of  Places  where  the  Women  pay  from\  to  ^  of  the  Taxes . 


Towns. 

1871. 

1873* 

1874. 

Women  taxed. 

Paid  by  them. 

Whole  Tax. 

Women  taxed. 

Paid  by  them. 

Equal  in  Polls. 

Men  who  pay 

only 

a  Poll-tax. 

|  Amount. 

Plurality  for 

Governor. 

About 

1  Boston,  Ward  1 

547 

$30,030 

15,015 

6,077 

$12,154 

33o 

208 

29,019 

14,509 

4,959 

9,918 

1,785 

211 

27,507 

13,753 

3,695 

7,390 

642 

„  4 

272 

133,294 

66,647 

2,534 

5,068 

262 

•  •  • 

•  .  . 

. 

141 

82,218 

41,109 

1,268 

2,536 

380 

„  6 

591 

248,089 

124,044 

2,39° 

4,780 

t  480 

„  7 

369 

26,048 

13,024 

6,637 

13.274 

1,036 

,,  8 

208 

42,360 

21,180 

2,983 

5,966 

259 

„  9 

493 

127,441 

63,720 

3,290 

6,580 

93 

,,  10 

406 

73,229 

36,614 

3,156 

6,312 

254 

,,  n 

622 

117,053 

58,526 

2,986 

5,972 

39 

„  12 

620 

45,229 

27,614 

5,666 

n,332 

236 

,,  13 

129 

14,171 

7,085 

2,231 

4,462 

482 

„  14 

•  •  • 

488 

65,112 

32,556 

2,826 

5,652 

14 

,,  IS 

400 

64,265 

32,132 

4,232 

8,464 

708 

,»  16 

594 

78.706 

39  353 

2,684 

5,368 

i3 

W.Roxbury,  „  17 

329 

45,669 

22,834 

i,439 

2,878 

281 

Brighton,  „  19 

no 

12,734 

6,367 

972 

i,944 

1 12 

(•>  20 

116 

11,631 

5,8i5 

2,209 

4,418 

438 

Chariest’ n,  { ,,  21 

156 

13,200 

6,600 

2,i55 

4,3io 

167 

(,,  22 

204 

9,681 

4,840 

2,026 

4,052 

293 

Boston,  with  annex¬ 

ations  .... 

6,392 

$870,893 

$12,045,902 

7,214 

$1,296,693 

648,346 

66,415 

$132,830 

§  8,304 

Needham  .  .  . 

160 

4)463 

58,879 

182 

5,475 

2,737 

566 

1,132 

84 

Orleans .... 

42 

855 

9,426 

.  .  . 

904 

452 

96 

Petersham .  .  . 

40 

1, no 

9,699 

43 

942 

47i 

67 

134 

16 

About  ^ 

Enfield  .  .  .  - 

19 

1,482 

8,997 

27 

1,007 

503 

„3S 

Hull . 

7 

265 

5,i94 

13 

582 

291 

15 

30 

II  3 

*  Northboro’  .  . 

5i 

1)384 

22,126 

60 

2,129 

1,064 

1 14 

228 

53 

About 

Newburyport .  . 

481 

23)794 

159,421 

309 

19,761 

9,880 

M* 

00 

3,748 

27 

N.  Reading  .  . 

46 

1,142 

7,501 

37 

909 

454 

56 

Dedham  .  .  . 

307 

13,920 

83,581 

140 

11,024 

5,5i2 

872 

i,744 

66 

Mendon  .  .  . 

49 

1,074 

9,882 

42 

1,241 

620 

106 

212 

i5 

About  y 

Brookline  .  .  . 

254 

30,852 

330,804 

159 

49,028 

24,514 

921 

1,842 

22 

Watertown  .  . 

hi 

7,292 

94,177 

65 

13,164 

6,582 

840 

1,680 

103 

About  g- 

Berkley  .  .  . 

24 

220 

4,787 

16 

822 

4ii 

52 

104 

72 

Cohasset  .  .  . 

166 

5,446 

26,821 

143 

4,271 

2,i35 

167 

234 

74 

Stockbridge  .  . 

73 

4,393 

24,608 

78 

4,277 

2,138 

172 

344 

5i 

About 

*  Concord  ... 

150 

3,852 

30,401 

100 

5,9i6 

2,958 

318 

636 

62 

Cheshire  .  .  . 

25 

893 

16,396 

26 

3,433 

1,716 

152 

304 

78 

Falmouth  .  .  . 

46 

1,844 

20,995 

52 

4,296 

2,148 

268 

536 

120 

Newton  .  .  . 

720 

51,634 

384,089 

675 

77,033 

38,516 

2,034 

4,068 

366 

$13,353,686 

9,38i 

$1,502,907 

751,453 

74,953 

$149,906 

9,70.3 

$  The  vote  for  Governor  was  a  tie.  This  is  the  plurality  for  Lieut.  Governor. 

§  The  plurality  for  Lieut.  Governor  in  the  whole  city  was  4,229. 

||  There  was  a  tie  vote  for  Governor.  Harris,  member  of  Congress,  had  3  plurality. 


7i 


Recapitulation. 


Towns. 

1871. 

1873. 

1874. 

Women  taxed. 

Paid  by  them. 

Whole  Tax. 

Women  taxed. 

Paid  by  them. 

Equal  in  Polls. 

Men  who  pay 

only 

a  Poll-tax. 

Amount. 

Plurality  for 

Governor. 

Table  I.  .  .  . 

$37,620 

5 

$272 

136 

36 

$72 

92 

„  II.  .  .  . 

167,661 

124 

3,219 

1,609 

2,524 

5,048 

848 

„  III.  .  . 

773)079 

4i3 

17,339 

8,669 

8,128 

16,256 

1,025 

„  IV..  .  . 

445)876 

497 

12,979 

6,489 

2,300 

4,600 

1,037 

„  V.  .  .  . 

606,867 

1,007 

25,043 

12,521 

5,172 

io,344 

1,962 

„  VI..  .  . 

2,619,105 

3,n8 

155,606 

77,803 

23,325 

46,650 

5,056 

„  VII  .  . 

3)°8s,si5 

4,230 

249,236 

124,618 

30,995 

61,990 

3,107 

„  VIII..  . 

13,353)686 

9.38i 

1,502,907 

75i,453 

74,953 

149,906 

9,703 

Totals  163  Towns 

$21,089,409 

i8,775 

$1,966,601 

983,300 

147,433 

$294,866 

22,830 

Note  to  Page  20. 

House  Document  No.  428,  referred  to  on  this  page,  though  dated  May  8,  1871,  is  responsive  to  an  ordei 
passed  March  15,  1871 ;  and  was,  therefore,  very  probably  based  on  the  Assessors’  valuations  made  in  May, 
1870.  This  makes  no  difference,  however,  in  the  results  stated  in  the  text,  as  the  women  paid  more  than 
one-twelfth  of  all  the  sums  raised  by  taxation,  and  very  nearly  one-eleventh  of  the  entire  tax  on  property  in 
1870.  (Aggregate  Polls,  &c.,  1870,  p.  25.) 

The  principal  object  of  the  pamphlet  is  to  prove  that  the  taxation  of  women,  be  it  more  or  less,  is 
unconstitutional. 

The  exact  amount  of  taxes,  or  the  precise  number  of  women  taxed,  cannot  possibly  be  obtained  by  any 
one,  by  any  amount  of  labor ;  and  no  such  extreme  nicety  is  needed  for  the  purposes  of  the  argument.  I 
can,  for  example,  prove  how  much  is  received  in  Massachusetts  from  duties ;  but  how  many  of  the  dutiable 
articles  are  actually  consumed  in  Massachusetts,  or  "how  many  women  consume  them,  no  one  can  tell,  and  it 
is  of  no  real  importance  to  be  able  to  prove.  I  content  myself  with  showing  that  about  twenty  millions  are 
collected  here  every  year ;  and,  after  making  every  allowance  for  the  fact  that  Boston  is  one  of  the  great 
distributing  markets,  the  inference  seems  to  be  fair  that  the  women  alone  pay  millions  through  this 
channel. 

So  in  reference  to  the  taxation  under  our  State  laws.  It  is  very  clear  that  the  Assessors  in  different 
towns  have  made  up  their  returns  on  different  principles.  Some  have  given  me  only  the  number  of  women 
who  are  taxed  directly ;  others  have  included  those  who  are  taxed  through  Trustees,  the  trust  being  plainly 
declared  or  known  to  the  Assessors  to  be  for  women ;  but  all  reference  to  a  large  amount  of  property  really 
belonging  to  women,  and  which  is  taxed  to  Trustees,  is  omitted,  because  the  books  fail  to  show,  and 
the  Assessors  do  not  know,  for  whom  the  trust  really  is.  Exactness,  therefore,  either  in  the  number  of 
women  taxed  or  the  amount  paid  by  them,  is  unattainable  by  any  one,  and  it  is  of  no  real  importance  to  the 
argument.  I  have,  however,  diligently  tried  to  make  my  statements  and  estimates  within  the  truth;  and  I 
believe  such  will  prove  to  be  the  fact. 

It  may  be  well  to  add  that  throughout  my  tables  I  have  considered  the  poll-tax  as  $2,  —  the  highest 
sum  allowed  bylaw,  —  consequently,  the  figures  in  the  columns  marked  “Equal  in  Polls”  are  intended 
to  be  as  nearly  as  possible  one-half  the  amount  paid  by  the  women  as  taxes,  and  the  figures  in  the 
columns  marked  “  Amount  ”  are  intended  to  be  just  double  the  number  of  the  men  who  paid  only  a 
poll-tax. 


Woman  Suffrage  a  Right, 
not  a  Privilege. 


BY 

WILLIAM  I.  BOWDITCH. 


CAMBRIDGE: 

UNIVERSITY  PRESS:  JOHN  WILSON  &  SON. 
1882. 


Copyright , 

By  William  I.  Bowditch. 
1879. 


WOMAN  SUFFRAGE  A  RIGHT, 

NOT  A  PRIVILEGE. 


Speaking  in  reference  to  men,  Chief  Justice  Parker  says  : 
“  The  elective  franchise  ...  is  the  vital  principle  of  a 
republican  government/’  and  “the  right  of  voting  in  such 
a  government  as  ours  .  .  .  cannot  be  infringed  without  pro¬ 
ducing  an  injury  to  the  party.” 

But  if  suffrage  for  a  man  cannot  be  infringed  upon  even 
once  without  doing  him  an  injury,  can  we  deny  it  to  women 
altogether  and  yet  do  them  no  wrong  ? 

Why  are  we  men  sure  that  we  ought  to  have  the  right  of 
Suffrage  ? 

Is  it  because  the  Statute  of  1874,  the  General  Statutes  of 
i860,  or  the  Revised  Statutes  of  1836,  or  any  other  mere  law, 
defines  the  qualifications  of  age,  sex,  residence,  intelligence, 
taxation,  etc.,  which  we  possess,  and  which  we  are  required  to 
possess  before  we  can  vote  ?  No  !  we  do  not  admit  that  the 
right  has  been  given  to  us  by  any  Legislature.  We  have 
elected  the  Legislatures.  They  are  our  substitutes  or  agents. 
It  is  the  principal  who  confers  power,  not  the  agent. 

Is  it  because  the  amendments  to  the  Constitution  define 
the  qualifications  of  voters  to  be  those  which  we  now  possess, 
and  which  we  are  required  to  possess  before  we  can  vote  ? 
No!  Amendment  3  (1821)  and  Amendment  20  (1857)  now 
define  the  qualifications  of  voters  for  State  office.1  Neither 

1  The  same  qualifications  are  prescribed  by  law  (1874,  c.  376)  for  voters  for 
city,  town,  county,  and  national  officers 


4 


of  these  amendments  conferred  on  men  the  right  of  Suffrage. 
The  men  of  that  day  elected  the  delegates  to  the  Convention 
of  1820  which  framed  the  third  amendment,  and  the  amend¬ 
ment  itself  had  not  the  slightest  particle  of  binding  force 
or  vitality  until  it  had  been  submitted  to  a  popular  vote  and 
adopted.  The  men  of  1855  an^  1856  elected  the  two  Legis¬ 
latures  which  proposed  the  twentieth  amendment,  and  this 
amendment  had  not  the  slightest  particle  of  binding  force 
or  vitality  until  it  had  been  adopted  by  their  votes. 

The  men  of  the  last  century  did  not  get  the  right  of  Suf¬ 
frage  from  the  Constitution  of  1780.  On  the  contrary  they 
elected  the  delegates  to  the  Convention  which  framed  the 
Constitution,  and  the  Constitution  itself  had  not  the  slightest 
particle  of  binding  force  or  vitality  until  it  had  received  the 
assent  of  two  thirds  of  the  male  voters.  But  the  men  who 
elected  those  delegates,  and  who  thus  adopted  and  sanctioned 
their  work,  claimed  and  exercised  the  right  of  suffrage  before 
that  Convention  was  even  thought  of. 

Where  then  did  the  men  of  1780  get  the  right  to  vote  ? 

Did  they  get  the  right  from  the  Provincial  Charter  or  laws  ? 
No !  This  Charter  and  these  laws  conferred  on  them  the 
right  to  vote  in  reference  to  the  Province,  but  no  right  what¬ 
ever  to  overthrow  the  Provincial  government  or  set  up  the 
Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts!  Did  they  get  the  right 
from  the  grace  of  their  sovereign  lord  the  king  ?  No  !  The 
king  had  been  graciously  pleased  to  allow  them  to  vote 
supplies  for  his  government,  but  not  for  our  State  govern¬ 
ment,  —  this  was  treason.  Besides  this  our  fathers  had  already 
repudiated  the  notion  of  the  divine  right  of  kings  to  govern 
them  as  subjects.  The  idea  of  a  man  being  born  a  magistrate 
appeared  to  them  as  “  absurd  and  unnatural.”  (Declaration 
of  Rights,  Art.  6.) 

Where  then  did  the  right  of  the  men  of  1780  to  vote  in  the 
behalf  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts  come  from  ? 

If  it  came  neither  from  the  State  laws  nor  the  State  Consti¬ 
tution,  nor  from  the  Provincial  Charter  nor  laws,  nor  yet  from 
the  king’s  grant,  where  did  it  come  from  ? 


The  country,  of  course,  continued  to  be  governed.  The 
first  Provincial  Congress  of  Massachusetts  was  organized,  and 
dissolved  itself  in  1774.  It  was  composed  of  Representatives 
elected  to  a  General  Court  summoned  by  Governor  Gage  to 
meet  at  Salem,  Oct.  5,  1774,  and  whom  he  afterwards  directed 
not  to  meet,  and  refused  to  qualify.  The  second  and  third 
Congresses  met  and  dissolved  themselves  in  1775.  These 
bodies  were  chosen  by  men  qualified  according  to  the  Provin¬ 
cial  Charter  to  vote  for  Representatives  to  the  General  Court. 

Acting  under  a  resolve  of  the  Continental  Congress  (June  9, 
1 775,  Journals,  &c.,  p.  359),  the  third  Provincial  Congress  (June 
19)  issued  letters  to  the  several  places  in  Massachusetts  that 
were  entitled  to  representation,  requesting  them  to  choose 
Representatives  to  a  General  Court.  This  was  accordingly 
done,  and  the  assembly  thus  chosen  proceeded  to  elect  coun¬ 
sellors,  and  this  assembly  and  council  proceeded  to  confirm 
the  acts  and  doings  of  the  three  Congresses  (Anc.  Chart., 
1 775,  p.  687),  and  to  exercise  all  the  powers  of  government 
without  any  restriction  whatsoever.  This  was  considered  as 
conforming  “  as  near  as  may  be  to  the  spirit  and  substance  ” 
of  the  Provincial  Charter. 

These  Provincial  Congresses,  and  the  General  Court  called 
in  this  irregular  way,  and  its  successors,  assembled  from  time 
to  time,  passed  orders  and  enacted  laws,  repealing  some  of  the 
old  laws,  adopting  and  continuing  others,  and  making  new 
ones  at  pleasure,  even  so  far  as  to  remove  all  the  officers, 
civil  and  military,  appointed  by  the  king’s  governor  (1775, 
Anc.  Chart.,  p.  689),  and  disfranchising  the  noxious  conspir¬ 
ators  who  remained  loyal  to  the  king,  and  confiscating  their 
estates. 

They  could  not  possibly  get  the  right  to  do  these  things  by 
virtue  of  anything  in  the  Provincial  Charter  or  laws.  On 
the  contrary,  they  entirely  disregarded  both  the  Charter  and 
these  laws,  whenever  and  as  far  as  they  thought  best. 

In  other  words,  the  male  voters  of  that  day  —  the  men  who 
had  the  right  to  vote  under  the  Provincial  laws,  the  men  who 
were  in  the  actual  possession  of  power  —  claimed  that  they 


D 


had  an  inherent  right  to  govern  themselves  as  they  thought 
best,  anything  in  the  Charter  and  Provincial  laws  to  the  con¬ 
trary  notwithstanding,  and  they  did  in  fact  thus  govern  them¬ 
selves.  Now,  on  what  ground  did  they  think  they  had  this 
right  of  self-government  ? 

Listen  to  their  language :  “  The  people  of  this  Common¬ 
wealth  have  the  sole  and  exclusive  right  of  governing  them¬ 
selves,”  &c.  (Declaration  of  Rights,  Art.  4.) 

“All  power  residing  originally  in  the  people,  and  being 
derived  from  them,  the  several  magistrates  and  officers  of 
government  vested  with  authority  —  whether  legislative,  ex¬ 
ecutive,  or  judicial  — are  their  substitutes  and  agents,  and  are 
at  all  times  accountable  to  them.”  (Art.  5.) 

“  Government  is  instituted  for  the  common  good,  for  the 
protection,  safety,  prosperity,  and  happiness  of  the  people  ; 
and  not  for  the  profit,  honor,  or  private  interest  of  any  one 
man,  family,  or  class  of  men  :  therefore  the  people  alone  have 
an  incontestable,  unalienable,  and  indefeasible  right  to  insti 
tute  government,  and  to  reform,  alter,  or  totally  change  the 
same,  when  their  protection,  safety,  prosperity,  and  happiness 
require  it.”  (Art.  7.) 

The  delegates  to  the  Convention  which  framed  these  articles 
came  from  the  places  entitled  to  send  members  to  the  General 
Court.  In  the  election  of  delegates,  every  freeman  who  was 
an  inhabitant  of  the  town,  and  was  twenty-one  years  of  age, 
was  allowed  to  vote,  (Resolve  for  Convention,  June  17,  1779, 
Journal,  &c.,  p.  5,)  and  the  Constitution  itself  went  into  effect 
only  after  being  approved  by  the  votes  of  at  least  two  thirds 
of  the  same  adult  freemen  voting  in  open  meeting.  (Ibid.,  p.  6.) 

The  Declaration  of  the  Rights  of  the  People  which  we  have 
quoted  must,  therefore,  be  considered  to  be  the  language  of 
the  adult  freemen  of  1780. 

In  other  words,  these  articles  must  be  considered  to  be  the 
words  used  by,  and  to  express  the  ideas  of,  the  very  men  who 
then  governed  Massachusetts,  wholly  unrestrained  by  any 
charter,  constitution,  or  law,  and  just  as  they  thought  best. 

What  do  they  say  ? 


7 


Do  they  claim,  that  they  themselves,  the  adult  freemen, 
have  the  sole  and  exclusive  right  of  governing  Massachusetts  ? 
No !  On  the  contrary,  they  declare  that  the  People  of  this 
Commonwealth  have  the  sole  and  exclusive  right  of  governing 
themselves. 

Do  they  claim  that  all  power  resides  in  the  adult  male 
citizens  having  certain  property  qualifications,  and  is  derived 
from  them  ?  No  !  On  the  contrary,  they  assert  that  all  power 
resides  in  the  People,  and  is  derived  from  them. 

Do  they  assert  either  that  the  legal  voters,  the  adult 
freemen,  the  adult  male  citizens  possessing  a  certain  amount 
of  property,  or  that  even  adult  men  generally,  by  themselves 
alone,  have  a  just  right  to  institute  government  ?  No  !  On 
the  contrary,  they  maintain  that  the  People  alone  have  a  right 
to  institute  government,  and  to  reform  it  at  pleasure  ;  that 
government  is  not  instituted  for  the  profit,  honor,  or  private 
interest  of  any  one  man,  family,  or  class  of  men,  but,  on  the 
contrary,  is  instituted  for  the  protection  and  happiness  of  the 
People. 

Now,  if  the  People  alone  have  thus  the  right  to  institute 
government,  and  the  People  alone  are  the  source  of  all  the 
power  which  has  been  exercised  in  this  State,  when  the  male 
voters  or  adult  freemen  of  1779  elected  delegates  to  the  Con¬ 
stitutional  Convention,  and  in  1780  voted  for  or  against  the 
Constitution  proposed,  they  really  exercised  a  right  which 
inhered  in  them,  not  as  adult  freemen,  not  even  as  male  voters, 
not  even  as  men  in  whom  the  power  of  actual  government  was 
vested,  but  simply  and  solely  because  they  were  part  of  the 
people  of  Massachusetts. 

The  men  of  1780  had  the  right  of  suffrage,  not  because 
of  any  law  or  constitution  or  charter  or  grant  whatever, 
not  even  because  they  were  men,  or  men  who  were  actu¬ 
ally  in  possession  of  power,  but  solely  because  they  formed 
part  of  the  people,  in  whom  alone  the  power  of  sovereignty 
resided. 

In  like  manner,  the  men  of  to-day,  we  ourselves,  have  the 
right  of  suffrage,  not  because  of  any  law  or  constitution  what- 


8 


soever,  not  even  because  we  are  men,  or  men  in  the  actual 
possession  of  power,  but  solely  because  we  form  part  of  the 
people  of  the  State. 

From  October,  1774,  down  to  1780,  the  male  voters  were 
under  no  restraint  whatever  in  reference  to  the  exercise  of 
political  power,  except  only  such  as  was  imposed  by  their  own 
sense  of  what  was  right  or  expedient.1  But  having  adopted 
the  Constitution,  by  so  doing  they  consented  to  all  the  quali¬ 
fications  of  the  right  of  suffrage  imposed  by  it  and  the  laws 
to  be  passed  pursuant  thereto.  Since  1780,  the  male  voters 
have  from  time  to  time  changed  these  constitutional  and  legal 
qualifications,  and  added  others  as  have  from  time  to  time 
seemed  reasonable  (at  least  so  far  as  men  are  concerned) ;  but 
all  these  limitations  of  the  inherent  right  of  suffrage  have 
only  come  into  existence  because  either  our  fathers  or  we 
have  consented  to  their  creation  by  our  votes,  or  have  con¬ 
sented  to  their  continuance  until  such  time  as  they  shall  be 
constitutionally  changed,  by  claiming  and  exercising  the  right 
of  suffrage  as  it  in  fact  exists. 

And  if  at  any  future  time  it  should  by  any  possibility  so 
happen  that  the  existing  Constitution  should  obviously  fail  to 
accomplish  the  objects  for  which  it  was  designed,  the  inherent 
right  of  the  people  to  govern  themselves  would  revive  in  full 
force,  and  they  would  have  the  right  to  reform,  alter,  or  totally 
change  the  government,  as  their  protection,  safety,  prosperity, 
and  happiness  might  then  seem  to  require.  (Art.  7.  See  also 
6  Cush.  Rep.  574.) 

In  determining  the  true  grounds  of  our  own  right  to  suffrage 
there  is  still  another  point  to  be  considered. 

Our  Constitution  declares  that  “  the  body  politic  is  formed 
by  a  voluntary  association  of  individuals.  It  is  a  social  com¬ 
pact,  by  which  the  whole  people  covenants  with  each  citizen, 
and  each  citizen  with  the  whole  people,  that  all  shall  be  gov¬ 
erned  by  certain  laws  for  the  common  good.”  (Preamble.) 

1  The  Continental  Congress  had  no  power  over  the  domestic  policy  of  Mas¬ 
sachusetts,  except  so  far  as  our  fathers  consented  to  or  acquiesced  in  the 
exercise  of  such  power. 


9 


But  consent  is  essential  to  the  formation  of  any  voluntary 
association,  and  no  sort  of  compact  can  possibly  be  formed 
without  consent  between  the  parties  to  the  compact. 

So,  then,  the  rights  of  each  and  every  citizen  rest  upon 
the  consent  of  the  people.  In  the  very  words  of  our  Con¬ 
stitution,  “the  people”  did  “solemnly  and  mutually  agree 
with  each  other  to  form  themselves  into  .  .  .  the  Common¬ 
wealth  of  Massachusetts.”  (Frame  of  Government,  ist  para¬ 
graph.) 

There  are,  then,  two  great  fundamental  principles  on  which 
we  must  admit  that  our  own  rights  as  male  voters  depend. 

(i.)  The  people,  and  not  men  alone,  are  the  only  true  and 
just  source  of  power. 

(2.)  The  consent  of  the  people,  and  not  that  of  men  alone, 
forms  the  only  just  foundation  for  government. 

But  if  the  male  citizens  of  Massachusetts  thus  derive  their 
right  to  vote,  not  from  any  law  or  constitutional  provision 
whatsoever,  not  even  from  the  fact  that  they  are  men,  or  men 
in  the  actual  possession  of  power,  but  simply  and  solely  be¬ 
cause  they  form  part  of  the  people,  why  may  not  female 
citizens  do  the  same  ? 

It  is  true  the  Constitution  recognizes  the  right  of  men  to 
vote,  and  expressly  denies  the  same  right  to  women ;  but  if 
the  right  of  suffrage  for  men  does  not  really  depend  on  such 
recognition,  why  should  the  just  rights  of  women  be  any  more 
affected  by  such  denial  ? 

If  the  right  of  suffrage  inheres  in  men  simply  and  solely 
because  they  are  part  of  the  people,  the  same  rights  also 
inhere  in  women,  simply  and  solely  because  they  are  part  of 
the  people. 

If  all  power  really  resides  in  the  people,  it  surely  ought  to 
rest  in  the  majority  rather  than  in  the  minority.  Instead, 
therefore,  of  denying  suffrage  to  women,  ought  we  not  rather 
to  consider  their  claim  to  the  right  as  higher  and  stronger 
in  its  character  even  than  that  put  forward  by  ourselves,  and 
accordingly  make  haste  to  divest  ourselves  of  a  power  so 
plainly  usurped  ? 


IO 


It  will  no  doubt  be  objected,  that  these  articles  in  the  Dec¬ 
laration  of  Rights  cannot  mean  what  their  words  so  plainly 
express,  because  the  power  therein  declared  to  be  vested  in 
the  people  was  not  only  at  that  very  time  actually  exercised 
by  male  voters  only,  but  the  continuance  of  the  right  of  suf¬ 
frage  in  the  hands  of  men  exclusively  and  for  an  indefinite 
period  was  provided  for  by  the  express  terms  of  the  Consti¬ 
tution.  To  add  strength  to  this  objection,  it  must  also  be 
admitted  that  the  Convention  itself,  though  chosen  by  male 
voters,  resolved  that  it  had  “sufficient  authority  from  the 
people”  (Journal,  &c.,  p.  22)  ;  and,  when  the  qualification  of 
voters  came  up  for  discussion,  motions  were  made  to  strike 
out  the  word  “male”  and  were  defeated  (Journal,  &c.,  pp.  92, 
120,  1 2 1,  136);  so  that  really  woman  suffrage  for  members 
of  the  Legislature  was  actually  voted  down  in  the  Conven¬ 
tion. 

Did,  therefore,  our  fathers  really  mean  what  they  said  in 
the  Declaration  of  Rights,  notwithstanding  these  inconsist¬ 
encies  between  their  acts  and  their  principles  ? 

The  Convention  started  on  its  work  with  the  avowed  inten 
tion  (expressed  by  a  unanimous  vote)  “  that  the  government 
to  be  framed  by  this  Convention  shall  be  a  free  republic.” 
(Journal,  p.  24.)  The  Constitution  was  drafted  by  a  committee, 
of  whom  John  Adams  and  Samuel  Adams  were  members. 
The  articles  which  we  have  quoted  were  actually  written 
by  John  Adams,  and  were  adopted  by  the  committee  and 
Convention  without  amendment.  (See  Works  of  John  Adams, 
Vol.  IV.  pp.  223-225.)  Can  any  of  us  believe  that  John 
Adams  thought  only  of  male  voters  when  he  speaks  of  the 
rights  of  the  people  in  these  articles  ?  It  seems  almost  im¬ 
possible  to  believe  it,  or  that  any  one  can  really  doubt  as  to 
the  proper  meaning  and  force  of  these  articles,  or  that  they 
guard,  and  were  intended  to  guard,  the  rights  of  the  whole 
body  of  the  people,  so  clear  and  unmistakable  is  the  language 
used. 

It  cannot,  however,  be  denied  that  there  are  serious  incon¬ 
sistencies  between  some  of  the  principles  laid  down  in  the 


Declaration  of  Rights  and  the  rules  for  practical  affairs  laid 
down  in  the  frame  of  government. 

We  can  see  these  inconsistencies  very  clearly  now.  The 
Convention  itself  evidently  had  some  of  the  same  feeling.  In 
their  Address  to  the  People  they  say,  we  do  not  offer  for  your 
acceptance  “a  perfect  system  of  government,  this  is  not  the 
lot  of  mankind”  (Journal,  p.  217) ;  we  have  found  it,  they  said, 
“  exceedingly  difficult,  if  not  impracticable,  to  succeed  in  every 
part  of  it  to  the  full  satisfaction  of  all.  Could  the  whole  body 
of  the  people  have  convened  for  the  same  purpose,  there  might 
have  been  equal  reason  to  conclude  a  perfect  unanimity  of 
sentiment  would  have  been  an  object  not  to  be  obtained.” 
(Journal,  p.  216.) 

It  is,  however,  beyond  all  controversy,  that  in  some  of  the 
clauses  of  the  Declaration  of  Rights  the  word  “people”  is 
not,  and  cannot  possibly  be,  treated  as  synonymous  with  male 
voters. 

Thus,  in  the  Preamble  (1st  paragraph)  the  body  politic  is 
described  to  be  a  compact  between  the  “  whole  people  ”  and 
“  each  citizen.”  Government,  it  is  said,  enables  “  the  individu¬ 
als”  who  compose  the  body  politic  to  enjoy  their  natural 
rights,  &c. ;  and  it  is  declared  that  “  the  people  ”  have  a  right 
to  alter  the  government,  &c.  By  no  possible  construction  of 
this  preamble  can  the  word  “  people  ”  be  fairly  or  honestly  in¬ 
terpreted  to  mean  only  male  voters.  It  most  plainly  includes, 
not  only  the  whole  body  of  the  people,  but  every  individual 
member  and  each  citizen. 

The  Declaration  of  Rights  purports,  in  so  many  words,  to 
be  a  statement  of  the  right  of  “  the  inhabitants  ”  of  the  Com¬ 
monwealth  :  not  the  rights  of  men  alone,  or  male  voters,  but 
of  all  the  inhabitants  ;  therefore,  of  all  women  as  well  as 
men ;  and  the  clauses  in  behalf  of  personal  freedom,  religious 
liberty,  trial  by  jury,  &c.,  most  plainly  secure,  and  were  in¬ 
tended  to  secure,  the  rights  of  women  just  the  same  as  those 
of  men.  Art.  29  declares  it  to  be  “for  the  security  of  the 
rights  of  the  people  and  of  every  citizen”  that  the  judges  of 
the  Supreme  Judicial  Court  should  hold  office  during  good 


behavior,  &c. ;  we  cannot  possibly  understand  the  word  “  peo¬ 
ple,”  as  here  used,  to  mean  only  male  voters,  without  making 
the  article  absurd. 

Our  conclusion,  therefore,  is,  that  John  Adams  and  Samuel 
Adams  and  the  men  of  1780  really  meant  what  they  said  in 
these  articles ;  and  this,  although  the  actual  powers  of  gov¬ 
ernment  were  then  exercised  only  by  male  voters. 

Does  any  one  still  object,  that,  as  male  voters  have  been 
allowed  to  represent  the  people  for  a  hundred  years,  it  is  now 
too  late  to  disturb  this  practical  interpretation  of  the  true 
meaning  of  these  articles,  or  to  hold  that  male  voters  have  no 
just  right  to  represent  any  persons  but  themselves  ? 

We  reply,  a  question  of  human  rights  can  never  be  out¬ 
lawed.  We  remember  the  noble  words  of  Chief  Justice 
Parker  (2  Pick.  557):  “Neither  will  any  course  of  years  or 
legislative  acts  or  judicial  decisions  sanction  any  apparent 
violation  of  the  fundamental  law  clearly  expressed  or  neces¬ 
sarily  understood.” 

We  call  to  mind  the  words  of  our  fathers  and  say,  “  A  fre¬ 
quent  recurrence  to  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  Consti¬ 
tution,  and  a  constant  adherence  to  those  of  .  .  .  justice,  .  .  . 
are  absolutely  necessary  to  preserve  the  advantages  of  liberty, 
and  to  maintain  a  free  government.”  (Decl.  of  Rights,  art.  18.) 

Now,  we  shall  probably  all  admit  that  our  fathers  were  of 
Burke’s  opinion  when  he  said,  that  “  government  was  a  prac¬ 
tical  thing,  made  for  the  happiness  of  mankind,  and  not  to 
furnish  out  a  spectacle  of  uniformity  to  gratify  the  schemes 
of  visionary  politicians.”  (Letter  to  the  Sheriffs  of  Bristol, 

1 777) 

Our  fathers  were  real  and  true  lovers  of  liberty,  and  also 
practical  men  of  affairs.  As  lovers  of  liberty  it  was  impossible 
for  them  to  frame  a  declaration  of  rights  which  did  not  lay 
down  the  true  principles  on  which  a  republic  ought  to  rest, 
and  in  the  clearest  possible  manner,  and  this  is  just  what  they 
did  in  fact  do. 

Being  also  practical  men,  not  caring  only  for  the  enunciation 
of  principles,  but  being  also,  and  perhaps  chiefly,  desirous  to 


i3 


set  on  foot  a  great  Commonwealth,  it  was  equally  impossible 
for  them  not  to  regard  and  defer  not  only  to  the  opinions,  but 
even  to  the  prejudices,  of  the  people  then  living.  It  would 
have  been  ridiculous  for  them  to  present  for  acceptance  a 
scheme  of  government  which  ran  counter  to  the  settled  opin¬ 
ions,  or  even  the  prejudices,  of  the  people  of  1780,  on  any  very 
essential  point.  Such  a  scheme  would  be  sure  to  fail  on  trial, 
even  if  it  were  not  at  once  rejected.  The  problem  before  the 
Convention  was  to  make  as  free  a  Republic  as  was  consistent 
with  the  opinions  then  prevailing.  The  question  for  them  to 
solve  was  not  what  form  of  government  the  people  of  1820  or 
1879  will  probably  be  willing  to  support,  not  even  what  the 
people  of  1780  ought  to  support,  or  would  support  if  they 
were  far  wiser  and  better  than  they  really  were,  but  what 
was  the  best  frame  of  government  which  the  people  of  1780, 
with  all  their  prejudices  and  opinions,  would  cheerfully  sup¬ 
port  and  acquiesce  in,  because  these  were  the  people,  and 
these  were  the  only  people,  who  could  make  the  government 
a  success  or  a  failure. 

Having  regard  to  these  opinions  and  prejudices,  the  Con¬ 
vention  actually  went  so  far  as  to  limit  the  right  of  suffrage 
even  for  men.  To  entitle  a  man  to  vote  for  or  against  the  adop¬ 
tion  of  the  Constitution,  he  was  only  required  to  be  an  adult 
freeman  ;  but  to  be  able  to  vote  under  the  Constitution,  a  man 
was  required  to  have  a  certain  amount  of  property.  There 
can  be  no  doubt  that  fewer  men  were  able  to  vote  for  members 
of  the  General  Court  under  the  Constitution  than  were  able 
to  do  so  under  the  Provincial  Charter.  Under  the  Charter 
the  owner  of  a  freehold  having  an  annual  income  of  only  forty 
shillings,  or  the  owner  of  other  estate  worth  ,£50,  could  vote 
for  Representatives  ;  but  to  be  able  to  do  this  under  our  Con¬ 
stitution,  a  man  was  required  to  own  a  freehold  estate  of  the 
annual  income  of  £3,  or  other  estate  of  the  value  of  £ 60 . 

Our  fathers  were,  therefore,  inconsistent  with  their  own 
principles  in  the  treatment  of  their  own  sex.  Even  this  did 
not  satisfy  their  notions  as  practical  men.  They  also  saw 
that  education  had  been  systematically  denied  to  women,  and 


i4 


that  women  were  then  in  a  state  of  legal  subjection  to  men 
in  regard  to  almost  every  personal  and  property  right.  Hav¬ 
ing  due  regard  to  this  state  of  facts,  they  therefore  intrusted 
the  actual  powers  of  government  to  only  a  portion  even  of  the 
men.  To  have  done  otherwise  would  no  doubt  have  insured 
the  rejection  of  the  Constitution. 

That  the  women  in  1780  were  wholly  uneducated  is  plain. 
Charles  Francis  Adams,  in  the  memoir  of  his  grandmother, 
Abigail  Adams,  says  :  “  The  cultivation  of  the  female  mind  was 
regarded  with  utter  indifference.”  (Memoir,  pp.  xxiii,  xxiv.) 

In  a  letter  to  her  husband,  dated  June  30,  1770,  she  says : 

I  regret  the  trifling,  narrow,  contracted  education  of  the  fe¬ 
males  of  my  own  country.  .  .  .  But  you  need  not  be  told  how 
much  female  education  is  neglected,  nor  how  fashionable  it  has 
become  to  ridicule  female  learning  ;  though  I  acknowledge  it 
my  happiness  to  be  connected  with  a  person  of  a  more  gener¬ 
ous  mind  and  liberal  sentiments,  I  cannot  forbear  transcribing 
a  few  generous  sentiments  which  I  lately  met  with  upon  this 
subject.  If  women,  says  the  writer,  are  to  be  esteemed  our 
enemies,  methinks  it  is  an  ignoble  cowardice  thus  to  disarm 
them,  and  not  allow  them  the  same  weapons  we  use  our¬ 
selves  ;  but  if  they  deserve  the  title  of  our  friends,  it  is  an 
inhuman  tyranny  to  debar  them  of  the  privileges  of  ingenuous 
education,  which  would  also  render  their  friendship  so  much 
the  more  delightful  to  themselves  and  us.”  (Letters,  p.  99.) 
Mrs.  Adams  never  was  sent  to  school,  and  in  another  let¬ 
ter,  written  only  a  year  before  her  death,  in  1817,  she  says: 
“Female  education  in  the  best  families  went  no  further  than 
writing  and  arithmetic  ;  in  some  few  and  rare  instances,  mu¬ 
sic  and  dancing.” 

In  reference  to  the  subjection  of  women,  Mrs.  Adams,  under 
date  May  7,  1776,  writes  to  her  husband  :  “  I  cannot  say  that 
I  think  you  are  very  generous  to  the  ladies  ;  for  whilst  you 
are  proclaiming  peace  and  good-will  to  men,  emancipating  all 
nations,  you  insist  upon  retaining  an  absolute  power  over 
wives.”  (Letters,  p.  75.) 

No  woman,  married  or  single,  had,  up  to  that  time,  ever 


l5 


voted  even  in  parish  matters.  At  that  time  husband  and  wife 
were  one  person  in  estimation  of  law,  and  that  one  was  the 
husband.  A  woman’s  personal  property  by  marriage  then 
became  absolutely  her  husband’s  ;  and  at  his  death  he  could 
leave  it  entirely  away  from  her.  If  he  left  no  will,  one  third 
came  back  to  her,  and  two  thirds  went  to  the  children.  If  he 
left  no  children,  one  half  came  back  to  her  and  the  other 
half  went  to  his  relations.  By  marriage,  the  husband  became 
absolutely  master  of  the  profits  of  his  wife’s  real  estate  during 
marriage.  If  he  had  a  living  child,  and  survived  his  wife,  he 
held  all  her  lands  during  his  life.  She  could  make  no  convey¬ 
ance  or  mortgage  of  her  real  estate  without  his  consent,  and 
no  will  at  all,  either  with  or  without  his  consent.  He  could 
appoint  an  entire  stranger  guardian  of  her  children. 

It  was  not  until  seven  years  after  the  adoption  of  the  Con¬ 
stitution  that  a  married  woman  whose  husband  had  abandoned 
her,  and  did  nothing  for  her  support,  could  be  authorized  by 
the  Supreme  Court  to  convey  her  own  real  estate.  (Stat. 
1787,  c.  32.)  No  matter  if  she  were  really  starving,  prior  to 
1787,  no  married  woman  could  sell  or  mortgage  her  own  lands 
to  procure  food  with,  and  no  court  could  give  her  such  power ! 
This  was  the  first  law  ameliorating  the  condition  of  married 
women. 

Not  until  sixty-two  years  after  the  adoption  of  the  Consti¬ 
tution  was  she  allowed  to  make  a  will  even  with  her  husband’s 
consent,  (Stat.  1842,  c.  74,)  so  fearful  were  husbands  of  losing 
grasp  on  the  property  of  their  wives. 

As  lately  as  1845  the  first  radical  change  was  made  in  our 
law,  by  allowing  married  women  to  hold  separate  property 
without  the  intervention  of  a  trustee,  and  to  sue  and  be  sued 
on  contracts  made  with  reference  to  such  property  as  if  un¬ 
married.  (Stat.  1845,  c-  208.)  The  next  year  they  were 
allowed  to  give  a  valid  receipt  for  their  own  wages,  and  it 
was  not  until  1874  (ninety-four  years  after  the  adoption  of 
the  Constitution)  that  the  rights  of  married  women  to  con¬ 
tract,  to  make  notes  or  mortgages,  to  sell  real  estate,  to 
sue  and  be  sued,  were  put  on  substantially  the  same  ground 


i6 


with  similar  rights  on  the  part  of  the  husband.  (Stat.  1874, 
c.  184.) 

Down  to  this  very  year,  1879,  with  all  our  supposed  en¬ 
lightenment  and  liberality,  and  when  women  are  declared  to 
have  all  the  rights  they  really  need  for  their  protection,  the 
husband  has  legally  owned  his  wife’s  clothing,  although  that 
clothing  was  bought  with  money  earned  partly  by  her ! 
(1876;  1 19  Mass.  596.)  I  could  no  doubt  point  out  some 
husbands  whose  clothing  has  been  bought  wholly  with  the 
money  of  their  wives  ;  but  these  wives  have  never  had  any 
similar  right  of  ownership  in  their  husbands’  wardrobe.  Why  ? 
Because  men  alone  have  had  the  ballot ;  men  alone  have  had 
the  making,  expounding,  and  executing  of  the  laws.  If  women 
had  had  the  ballot,  no  court  could  have  been  found  to  deny 
them  the  ownership  of  their  own  clothes.1 

Such  having  been  the  subjection  of  women,  and  their  almost 
entire  want  of  education  in  1780,  is  it  strange  that  our  fathers 
intrusted  the  administration  of  affairs  to  men  only  ?  On  the 
contrary,  it  would,  I  think,  have  been  far  stranger  if  they  had 
given  Suffrage  to  women. 

To  have  done  so  would  have  shown  them  to  be  visionary 
politicians  rather  than  practical  men,  and  would  have  gone 
far  to  demonstrate  their  unfitness  to  start  a  great  Common¬ 
wealth.  They  were,  however,  great  and  noble-minded  enough 
to  proclaim  the  true  ideas  or  principles  upon  which  a  republic 
ought  to  rest.  They  made  the  most  ample  provision  for  the 
amendment  of  those  parts  of  the  actual  Frame  of  Government, 
which  were  inconsistent  with  these  ideas  of  the  Declaration, 
and  then  trusted  serenely  to  time  and  the  gradual  develop¬ 
ment  of  the  ideas  to  finally  bring  affairs  on  to  a  just  basis. 
As  if  to  help  on  this  result,  they  called  upon  us  frequently  to 
recur  to  fundamental  principles,  and  to  adhere  to  justice  in 
our  legislation  if  we  wished  the  blessings  of  a  free  government 
to  be  maintained. 

1  This  decision  of  our  court  has  been  modified  by  act  of  the  Legislature  so  far 
as  to  allow  a  wife  to  receive  dresses,  by  gift  from  her  husband,  not  exceeding 
$2,000  in  value.  (Stat.  1879,  c.  133.) 


i7 


And  with  all  its  short-comings  and  inconsistencies  our 
fathers  offered  to  the  world  a  very  noble  illustration  of  the 
most  fundamental  principle  of  our  Declaration  of  Rights. 
They  did  not  seek  to  place  their  government  in  the  hands  of 
men  who  were  powerful  enough  to  compel  obedience  to  their 
wishes,  for  this  would  have  been  to  establish  slavery,  pure  and 
simple.  Though  they  sedulously  guarded  the  rights  of  prop¬ 
erty,  they  nevertheless  did  not  place  their  government  in  the 
hands  of  those  who  were  wealthy  enough  to  purchase  com¬ 
pliance  with  their  wishes,  for  this  would  have  been  to  secure 
the  triumph  of  selfishness  of  the  most  odious  kind.  Though 
education  had  been  favored  from  the  very  first  settlement  of 
the  country,  they  did  not  place  their  government  in  the  hands 
of  educated  or  learned  men.  This  would  have  resulted  only 
in  a  more  refined  form  of  selfishness,  for  educated  or  learned 
men  have  in  all  ages  been  found  willing  enough  to  legislate 
for  their  own  interests.  Everybody  knows  that  one  of  the 
greatest  and  wisest  was  also  the  meanest  of  mankind.  Though 
anciently  only  church  members  could  vote,  and  the  men  of 
1780  expressly  commanded  the  support  of  public  worship, 
they  nevertheless  did  not  place  their  government  in  the  hands 
of  the  so-called  religious  people,  for  all  history  had  taught 
them  that  the  greatest  sufferings  which  have  been  inflicted 
on  the  human  race  have  been  inflicted  by  conscientious  men 
in  the  name  of  religion. 

Our  fathers  sought  rather  to  frame  a  government  which 
should  command  the  support  of  the  strong  and  the  weak,  the 
wealthy  and  the  poor,  the  wise  and  the  unlearned,  —  the  sup¬ 
port  of  the  whole  people,  men  and  women.  In  their  opinion, 
the  true  strength  and  greatness  of  a  free  people  is  to  be  found, 
not  in  its  politicians,  orators,  poets,  and  historians,  noble  men 
and  women  though  they  may  be ;  but  in  the  faithful  courage 
and  intelligence  of  its  unnamed  and  unnamable  millions. 
Our  fathers  sought  to  frame  a  government  which  should  bring 
about  the  gradual  lifting  up,  not  of  man  as  an  individual,  but 
of  human  nature  itself.  They  wished  to  create  a  government 
that  the  people  should  love,  should  be  willing  to  work  for,  and, 


2 


i8 


if  need  be,  to  die  for.  And  how  strongly  has  the  govern¬ 
ment  proved  itself  to  be  intrenched  in  the  hearts  of  the 
people !  How  nobly  the  people,  men  and  women,  struggled 
in  its  defence,  in  the  darkest  hours  of  the  war !  Our  fa¬ 
thers  really  and  truly  thought  that  government  was  insti¬ 
tuted  for  the  common  good,  for  the  protection,  safety,  pros¬ 
perity,  and  happiness  of  the  people,  and  not  for  the  profit, 
honor,  or  private  interests  of  any  one  man,  family,  or  class 
of  men. 

This  was  their  ideal !  Neither  they  nor  we  have  lived  up 
to  it ;  but  will  not  our  Presidents  compare  favorably  with  the 
rulers  of  any  other  country  during  the  last  hundred  years  ? 
Abraham  Lincoln  was  pre-eminently  a  man  of  the  people. 
He  was  born  of  poor  parents,  and  enjoyed  none  of  the  ad¬ 
vantages  which  wealth  or  culture  could  give  ;  but  he  was 
wealthy  enough  to  give  a  noble  life  to  his  country.  No  man 
ever  gave  a  nobler.  If  he  was  too  unlearned  to  be  able  to 
read  Napoleon’s  Life  of  Caesar,  he  was  yet,  by  the  grace  of 
the  Almighty,  orator  and  poet  enough  to  give  an  address  at 
Gettysburg  which  no  one  of  our  orators  has  been  able  to  sur¬ 
pass,  and  few  of  them  can  ever  hope  to  equal. 

In  morals,  “  Whatsoever  ye  would  that  men  should  do  to 
you,  do  ye  even  so  to  them,”  constitutes  our  ideal  of  a  noble 
life.  How  few  persons  have  ever  lived  up  to  it !  and  yet  does 
any  one  doubt  the  nobility  of  the  ideal,  or  our  duty  to  strive 
our  utmost  to  realize  it  ? 

Because  our  fathers  and  we  have  failed  for  a  hundred  years 
to  realize  their  and  our  ideal  as  to  what  constitutes  a  just 
government,  is  that  any  reason  whatever  why  we  should 
doubt  the  truth  of  the  ideal,  or  should  not  continue  to  strug¬ 
gle  more  and  more  towards  that  ideal  ? 

Because  the  human  race  have  failed  for  more  than  twenty 
centuries  to  realize  the  ideal  of  what  constitutes  a  noble  life, 
is  that  any  reason  whatever  why  we  should  not  continue  to 
struggle  more  and  more  to  do  unto  others  as  we  would  have 
them  do  unto  us  ?  Without  ideals  life  would  not  be  worth 
having,  —  there  could  be  no  progress. 


19 


“  The  fiend  that  man  harries 
Is  love  of  the  best,” 

and  the  best  is  always  receding  and  advancing. 

The  Declaration  of  Rights  embodies  ideals  on  various  sub¬ 
jects,  all  directly  calculated,  if  not  actually  intended,  to  incite 
us  to  the  more  and  more  perfect  realization  of  a  government 
based  on  liberty  and  justice.  Though  the  Constitution  acts 
as  a  restraint  against  improper  legislation,  it  is  a  very  inade¬ 
quate  notion  to  consider  it  merely  as  a  fetter.  On  the  con¬ 
trary,  its  great  truths  ought  to  make  us  regard  it  rather  as  a 
beacon  light  for  progress. 

The  history  of  the  last  hundred  years  is  the  record  of  a 
continual  struggle  on  the  part  of  the  people  to  conform  more 
and  more  perfectly  to  their  ideals,  and  a  constant  progress 
towards  that  end. 

In  1780  our  fathers  thought  people  might  very  properly  be 
compelled  by  law  to  support  some  sort  of  public  worship,  and 
to  go  somewhere  to  church,  and  it  was  only  after  fifty-three 
years  of  struggle  and  growth  that  all  such  laws  were  deemed 
infringements  of  personal  rights,  and  the  voluntary  system  in 
matters  of  religion  was  adopted. 

Now,  to  what  cause  has  this  been  owing,  unless  it  be  to 
the  gradual  unfolding  of  the  ideal  of  our  Bill  of  Rights,  that 
each  one  should  be  allowed  to  worship  God  “in  the  manner 
and  season  most  agreeable  to  the  dictates  of  his  own  con¬ 
science,”  provided  only  he  does  “  not  disturb  the  public  peace 
or  obstruct  others  in  their  religious  worship.”  (Deck  of 
Rights,  Articles  2  and  3,  Amendment  11,  1833.) 

In  1780  the  rights  of  property  were  especially  protected. 
No  person  could  be  a  Representative  who  did  not  own  a  free¬ 
hold  estate  worth  ;£ioo,  or  other  ratable  estate  of  the  value 
of  .£200 ;  and  no  person  could  be  a  Senator  who  did  not  own 
a  freehold  estate  of  the  value  of  £300,  or  personal  estate  of 
the  value  of  £600 ;  and  the  Governor  was  required  to  own  a 
freehold  of  the  value  of  <£1,000 ;  so  that,  in  point  of  fact,  the 
law-making  power  was  placed  in  the  hands  of  property-holders. 
Although  the  House  of  Representatives  was  apportioned 


20 


through  the  State  on  the  basis  of  ratable  polls,  or  with  some 
sort  of  reference  to  population,  the  Senate  was  distinctly  and 
in  terms  apportioned  according  to  the  public  taxes  paid  by 
the  different  districts.  In  other  words,  the  Senate  was  in¬ 
tended  to,  and  did,  represent  property  in  1780.  (Address  of 
the  Convention,  Journal,  p.  218.) 

It  is  plain  enough  to  us  now  how  contrary  these  provisions 
in  our  frame  of  government  were  to  the  ideal  contained  in 
our  Declaration,  that  all  power  resides  in  the  people.  Never¬ 
theless,  sixty  years  elapsed  before  the  Senate  was  based  upon 
population  (Amendment  13,  1840),  and  ceased  to  represent 
property  ;  and  sixty  years  of  effort  had  to  be  made  before 
we  thought  it  safe  to  declare  that  “  no  possession  of  a  free¬ 
hold  or  of  any  other  estate  shall  be  required  as  a  qualification 
for  holding  a  seat  in  either  branch  of  the  General  Court.” 
(Amendment  13,  1840.) 

In  1780  voters  for  members  of  the  General  Court  were 
required  to  own  a  freehold  estate  of  the  annual  income  of  £3, 
or  an  estate  of  the  value  of  £60.  It  took  forty-one  years 
before  we  realized  the  inconsistency  of  this  requirement  fully 
enough  to  abandon  it.  The  Convention  of  1820  proposed 
what  is  now  the  present  rule  on  this  subject.  To  be  a  voter 
a  man  must,  among  other  things,  have  paid  a  State  or  county 
tax  within  two  years  before  the  date  of  voting,  and  now,  in 
1879,  after  the  lapse  of  fifty-nine  years  more,  we  are  trying  to 
realize  that  even  this  small  amount  of  taxation  is  inconsistent 
with  our  ideal,  and  efforts  are  making  by  distinguished  citizens 
to  do  away  wholly  and  for  ever  with  this  last  vestige  of  a 
property  qualification  for  voting. 

To  what  possible  cause  can  we  attribute  the  great  changes 
made  in  1821,  and  that  which  is  now  in  prospect,  unless  it  be 
the  gradual  unfolding  more  and  more  clearly  of  the  idea  of 
our  Declaration  of  Rights,  that  a  government  to  be  just  must 
rest  on  the  consent  of  the  governed,  and  not  merely  on  the 
consent  of  those  who  pay  taxes  ?  Our  fathers  were  satisfied 
with  giving  the  ballot  to  men  who  possessed  very  little  prop¬ 
erty  even  for  those  days.  We  reduced  the  amount  to  almost 


a  nominal  sum  in  1821,  and  now  talk  of  removing  it  entirely, 
as  being  of  little  pecuniary  benefit  to  the  State,  but  rather  a 
source  of  corruption.  The  State  is  beginning  to  think  to-day 
that  every  man  needs  the  ballot  for  his  protection,  and  that 
the  poorer  a  man  is,  the  more  he  needs  the  protection.  In 
like  manner,  we  think  every  woman  needs  the  ballot  for  her 
protection,  and  the  poorer  she  is,  the  more  sadly  she  needs  it. 

Now  if  it  has  taken  us  men,  and  the  cause  of  religious 
liberty,  fifty-three  years  of  struggle  before  we  were  able  to 
enjoy  the  measure  of  freedom  from  personal  annoyance  and 
property  spoliation  which  we  now  enjoy,  — if  it  took  us  men 
forty-one  years  to  do  away  with  the  original  property  quali¬ 
fication  for  voters,  and  sixty-one  years  to  do  away  with  a 
similar  qualification  for  our  legislators,  —  why  should  we  feel 
discouraged  that  hitherto  the  State  has  disregarded  the  rights 
of  women  to  a  proper  share  in  their  own  government  ? 

In  1780,  in  general,  education  was  denied  women.  Now  the 
State  trusts  mainly  to  women  for  the  education  of  our  future 
voters.  We  do  not  trust  these  women,  as  has  been  asserted 
by  honorable  Senators,  because  they  can  be  had  cheaper  than 
men.  On  the  contrary,  we  know  very  well  that  they  are  fully 
competent  to  do  the  work  asked  from  them.  It  is  nevertheless 
true,  that  a  woman,  although  she  may  really  do  the  same  good 
work  as  a  man,  almost  never  receives  the  same  wages.  This 
very  common  fact,  however,  only  shows  how  unworthily  men 
have  exercised  uncontrolled  power,  and  how  much  woman 
needs  the  ballot  for  her  protection. 

We  are  able  to  see  to-day,  even  more  clearly  than  our 
fathers,  the  true  meaning  and  force  of  their  ideals,  and,  taking 
heart  from  their  struggles  and  successes,  we  are  content  to 
struggle  on,  until  all  shall  be  willing  to  admit  that  a  govern¬ 
ment  which  is  declared  to  rest  upon  the  consent  of  the  people 
cannot,  and  ought  not,  longer  to  remain  in  the  hands  of  less 
than  one  quarter  of  the  people. 

Massachusetts  governs  more  than  a  million  and  a  half  of 
people,  a  majority  of  whom  are  females.  Every  year  she  taxes 
nearly  a  hundred  thousand  men  who  have  no  right  of  suffrage. 


22 


Only  a  little  over  forty-four  per  cent  of  the  whole  male  popu¬ 
lation  are  voters.1  (Census,  1875,  p.  34.) 

Now  if  we  can  find  no  just  ground  for  the  right  of  the  State 
to  govern  us  men,  except  only  that  we  are  part  of  the  people, 
and  have  consented  to  be  thus  governed,  where  does  the  State 
get  the  right  to  govern  women  ?  When,  where,  and  how  have 
they  ever  consented  to  be  governed  ? 

Some  of  us  used  to  argue  in  antislavery  days  that  South 
Carolina  had  not  a  republican  form  of  government,  because 
more  than  half  the  population  of  the  State  were  slaves.  What 
form  of  government  shall  we  say  Massachusetts  has  in  1879? 
Shall  we  say  it  is  an  aristocracy  founded  on  birth  ? 

Does  any  one  say  that  the  government,  though  administered 
by  only  a  portion  of  the  men,  really  represents  the  women  ? 
The  answer  is  ready  :  It  is  not  true. 

Since  1857  the  Senate  and  House  have  been  apportioned 
according  to  the  number  of  legal  voters.  (Amendments  21, 
22.)  So  that  the  Legislature  as  now  constituted  is  based 
upon,  and  only  represents,  legal  voters. 

We  have  seen  that  down  to  1840  (Amendment  13)  the 
House  was  apportipned  according  to  the  number  of  ratable 
polls,  and  the  Senate  according  to  the  amount  of  public  taxes 
paid.  From  1840  to  1857  the  Senate  and  House  were  ap¬ 
portioned  according  to  the  number  of  inhabitants,  or  popula¬ 
tion.  During  these  years,  therefore,  the  women  had  the  same 
sort  of  representation  as  the  slaves  used  to  have  in  Congress. 
The  white  men  in  the  slave  States  used  to  have  greater  politi¬ 
cal  power  in  Congress  in  consequence  of  the  existence  of 
slaves.  So  in  Massachusetts,  between  1840  and  1857  the 
men  had  more  of  representative  power  in  the  Legislature 
according  as  the  number  of  women  was  larger  or  smaller  in 
the  different  towns  and  cities.  If  we  think  that  the  slaves 
consented  to  the  passage  of  the  amended  Fugitive  Slave  Bill 
(1850)  because  by  their  numbers  they  had  given  the  white 

1  Population,  1,651,912.  794,383  males,  857,529  females,  63,146  more  females 
than  males,  449,686  ratable  polls,  351,113  legal  voters,  98,573  men  who  are  taxed, 
and  who  have  no  right  of  suffrage. 


23 


members  from  the  South  the  eighteen  votes  which  sufficed  to 
carry  the  measure  (Taxation  of  Women,  &c.,  revised  edition, 
pp.  13,  14),  then  we  may  consider  that  between  1840  and  1857 
the  women  of  Massachusetts  were  represented  by  the  men  in 
those  years,  and  not  otherwise. 

But  if  the  government  of  the  State  is  thus  based  upon  legal 
voters  only ;  if,  politically  speaking,  the  existence  of  women  is 
wholly  ignored  as  a  factor  in  government  ;  if  they  really  have 
no  voice  whatever  in  reference  to  the  Constitution  or  the  laws 
under  which  they  live,  are  governed,  taxed,  and  punished,  — 
what  can  every  fair-minded  man  say  or  do,  except  agree  with 
Governor  Talbot  in  thinking  that  the  claims  of  women  to  the 
right  of  Suffrage  have  too  firm  a  basis  in  natural  justice  to  be 
any  longer  thrust  lightly  aside  ? 

Let  us  then  follow  the  advice  of  Governor  Talbot  given 
to-day,  rather  than  the  practice  of  our  fathers  a  hundred  years 
ago.  Let  us  look  at  their  ideal,  and  not  their  short-comings. 
Let  us  amend  the  frame  of  government  so  as  to  fully  carry  out 
the  ideal  of  the  Declaration  of  Rights,  to  the  end  that  the  People 
of  the  State,  and  not  a  meagre  fraction  of  them,  may  really 
and  truly  be  the  source  of  all  the  power,  executive,  legislative, 
and  judicial,  which  is  now  exercised,  by  conferring  upon  all 
adult  citizens,  who  are  able  to  contract,  the  right  of  Suffrage, 
and  prescribe  the  same  qualifications  for  men  and  women. 
Let  us  in  the  light  of  facts  as  they  now  exist,  not  as  they 
were  in  1780,  determine  what  qualifications  for  voting  will 
secure  the  best  results  of  the  wisdom  and  the  virtue  of  the  peo¬ 
ple,  and  apply  the  same  rules  impartially  to  men  and  women. 
Only  by  so  doing  can  we  establish  justice.  In  no  other  way 
can  we  preserve  the  advantages  of  liberty  and  maintain  a  free 
government. 

In  the  government  of  a  human  being  personal  rights  are 
of  vastly  more  importance  than  rights  of  property ;  and  yet 
among  English  people  and  their  descendants  the  most  strenu¬ 
ous  fights  for  liberty  have  been  made  on  questions  affecting 
the  right  of  taxation.  With  this  idea  in  their  minds,  “  The 
Colonists  said,  if  Parliament  could  tax  us,  they  could  establish 


24 


the  Church  of  England,  with  its  creeds,  titles,  and  ceremonies, 
and  prohibit  all  other  churches  as  conventicles  and  schism 
shops.”  (J.  Wingate  Thornton,  &c.,  as  quoted,  Taxation  of 
Women,  p.  17.) 

The  Colonists  evidently  thought,  and  with  good  reason,  that 
the  power  to  tax  them  involved  also  the  power  to  destroy  their 
religious  liberty. 

“  The  feelings  of  the  Colonies,”  said  Edmund  Burke  in  1774, 
“were  formerly  the  feelings  of  Great  Britain.  Theirs  were 
formerly  the  feelings  of  Mr.  Hampden  when  called  upon  for 
the  payment  of  twenty  shillings.  Would  twenty  shillings 
have  ruined  Mr.  Hampden’s  fortune  ?  No  !  but  the  payment 
of  half  twenty  shillings  on  the  principle  it  was  demanded 
would  have  made  him  a  slave!”  (Speech  on  American 
Taxation.) 

In  the  same  spirit  of  resistance  to  all  encroachments  on 
liberty,  our  Bill  of  Rights  (Art.  23)  declares  that  “  No  subsidy, 
charge,  tax,  impost,  or  duties  ought  to  be  established,  fixed, 
laid,  or  levied,  under  any  pretext  whatsoever,  without  the  con¬ 
sent  of  the  people  or  their  representatives  in  the  Legislature.” 

Only  legal  voters  being  represented  in  the  Legislature, 
women  have  no  representatives  there  who  can  consent  to 
their  taxation,  and  yet  every  year  we  tax  them  about  two 
millions  of  dollars  !  Under  what  pretext  do  we  justify  these 
acts  of  spoliation  ?  Solely,  because  we  have  constantly  taxed 
them,  and  they  have  never  actually  rebelled  ! 

Thousands  of  them  have,  however,  each  and  every  year, 
and  for  many  years  past,  protested  against  this  great  wrong, 
and  have  asked,  as  the  only  real  remedy  for  the  injustice,  that 
suffrage  may  be  extended  to  them  on  the  same  terms  as  such 
right  is  now  enjoyed  by  men.  Thus  far,  however,  they  have 
had  leave  to  withdraw  their  petitions. 

Last  year  some  hundreds  of  women,  many  of  them  well 
known  and  honored  in  the  community,  asked  for  the  passage 
of  a  law  conferring  upon  them  and  other  women  “  who  pay 
taxes  on  property  the  rights  to  vote  for  town  and  city  officers, 
and  to  take  part  in  the  management  of  town  and  city  affairs, 


25 


on  the  same  terms  on  which  such  rights  are  now  held  by  men 
who  are  tax-payers.” 

These,  and  all  the  other  petitions  for  suffrage,  were  referred 
to  the  same  committee.  Hon.  Albert  Palmer,  of  the  Senate, 
and  five  Representatives,  constituting  the  majority  of  the  com¬ 
mittee,  were  in  favor  of  giving  suffrage  to  women  on  the  same 
terms  as  men,  and  so  reported.  Hon.  Robert  R.  Bishop  and 
Plon.  Amos  J.  Saunders,  of  the  Senate,  and  two  Representa¬ 
tives,  constituting  the  minority  of  the  committee,  reported 
adversely  on  both  classes  of  petitions.  One  Representative, 
being  willing  to  have  the  subject  referred  to  the  people,  signed 
both  reports. 

The  minority  of  the  committee  declared  their  opposition  to 
woman  suffrage  in  every  form,  and  argued  strenuously  against 
it.  In  special  reference  to  the  claim  of  women  tax-payers, 
they  said :  “  If  suffrage  should  be  accorded  to  women,  it 
should  not  be  to  a  portion  of  women,  on  the  ground  of  their 
property  qualification.”  (Sen.  Doc.  1878,  No.  122,  p.  4.)  On 
this  particular  point,  objection  to  a  property  qualification,  the 
committee  were  declared  to  be  substantially  of  one  mind. 

We  agree  with  them  in  objecting,  upon  principle,  to  a  prop¬ 
erty  qualification  for  voting,  whether  the  voters  be  men  or 
women  ;  but  so  long  as  suffrage  is  made  dependent,  as  now, 
upon  the  payment  of  a  tax,  citizens  of  both  sexes  should  be 
treated  alike.  We  allow  a  man  to  vote  who  pays  a  tax  of 
two  dollars,  and  never  think  of  inquiring  whether  he  has 
earned  his  money  by  the  work  of  his  hands,  or  has  received  it 
from  the  income  of  fifty  dollars  invested  in  United  States  four 
per  cent  bonds.  Ought  we  not  to  treat  women  in  the  same 
way?  It  was  admitted  at  the  hearing  that  the  Legislature 
had  full  power  to  confer  municipal  suffrage  on  women.  If, 
therefore,  opposition  to  a  property  qualification  had  really 
been  the  ground  of  the  refusal  to  grant  this  petition,  there 
was  nothing,  as  we  suggested,  to  prevent  the  passage  of  a 
law  for  assessing  those  women  who  felt  the  injustice  of  their 
treatment,  and  who  desired  to  vote,  a  poll-tax  (this  has  already 


26 


been  done  in  Massachusetts),  and  also  a  tax  on  property  (if 
any),  just  the  same  as  men  are  now  treated.  This  would  have 
met  the  whole  difficulty. 

The  committee  did  not  even  attempt  to  prove  any  right  to 
tax  women  for  property  if  the  ballot  was  denied  them,  although 
this  objection  was  most  strongly  urged  before  them.  In  our 
argument  we  wholly  denied  the  right  to  tax  women  a  single 
dollar  so  long  as  suffrage  was  denied  them.  We  presume, 
from  their  silence,  that  the  committee  failed  to  find  any  de¬ 
cent  “pretext,”  to  use  the  words  of  our  Constitution,  for 
taxing  women  without  their  consent,  or  the  consent  of  their 
representatives.  We  do  not  wonder  at  their  silence.  Why 
did  they  not,  however,  advise  the  Legislature  to  pass  a  law 
releasing  women  from  taxation  until  such  time  as  we  shall 
enable  them,  in  a  constitutional  and  legal  manner,  to  consent 
to  such  taxation  ?  This  is  the  very  least  thing  that  we  men 
can  do,  and  this  it  would  have  been  right  and  proper  for  us  to 
do.  But  this  the  committee  did  not  advise.  Did  they  realize 
that  any  such  legislation  would  be  equivalent  to  voting  to 
increase  the  taxes  of  every  man  in  the  State  about  one  tenth, 
and  shrink,  as  men,  from  doing  this  ?  Possibly  not.  But, 
whatever  may  have  been  the  reason  for  their  silence,  or  their 
neglect  of  the  opportunity  to  do  justice  to  women,  in  point  of 
fact,  they  contented  themselves  with  dismissing  the  women 
tax-payers  with  a  discourse  on  the  unrepublican  character  of 
a  property  qualification  for  voting,  with  which  everybody 
agrees,  and  still  leaving  women  to  continue  to  be  despoiled  of 
two  millions  of  dollars  every  year,  although  we  men  are 
obliged  to  trample  Article  23  of  our  Declaration  of  Rights 
under  foot  in  order  to  be  able  to  do  it. 

Some  one  will,  no  doubt,  raise  the  same  objection  which 
was  urged  by  the  minority  of  this  same  committee,  that  suf¬ 
frage  is  a  civil,  and  not  a  natural  right,  and  each  State  has  a 
perfect  right  to  decide  for  itself  who  shall  and  who  shall  not 
vote,  and  that  therefore  suffrage  may  be  conferred  exclu¬ 
sively  on  men  without  infringing  the  just  rights  of  women. 

We  maintain,  on  the  contrary,  that  if  the  adult  male  citizens 


27 


of  Massachusetts  have  any  sort  of  right,  call  it  or  be  it  what 
you  please,  civil,  natural,  inherent,  or  just,  in  reference  to 
their  own  government,  the  adult  female  citizens  having  the 
same  qualifications  as  men  ought  to  have  precisely  the  same 
sort  of  right,  civil,  natural,  inherent,  or  just,  to  a  vote  in  ref¬ 
erence  to  their  government. 

This  committee  say :  “  Natural  rights  are  such  that,  if  their 
exercise  is  denied  by  government,  this  lays  the  foundation 
for  a  justifiable  revolution.  It  will  hardly  be  contended  .  .  . 
that  an  attempt  to  overturn  the  existing  government  in  Mas¬ 
sachusetts  by  force,  would  be  justifiable  in  case  the  right  of 
suffrage  is  not  accorded  to  women.  This  is  the  test  of  the 
correctness  of  the  proposition.” 

Among  the  natural  rights,  the  denial  of  which  will  justify 
forcible  revolution,  in  the  opinion  of  this  committee,  are  “the 
right  to  life,  liberty,  and  the  acquisition  of  property ;  but  such 
is  not  the  right  to  the  ballot.”  (Sen.  Doc.,  No.  122,  p.  5.) 

We  prefer  the  definition  of  natural  rights  which  our  fathers 
have  left  us.  They  say  (Decl.,  Art.  1) :  “  All  men  are  born  free 
and  equal,  and  have  certain  natural,  essential,  and  unalienable 
rights ;  among  which  may  be  reckoned  the  right  of  enjoying 
and  defending  their  lives  and  liberties  ;  that  of  acquiring,  pos¬ 
sessing,  and  protecting  property ;  in  fine,  that  of  seeking 
and  obtaining  their  safety  and  happiness.” 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  under  this  article  the  natural 
rights  of  women  are  intended  to  be  protected  just  as  fully  and 
perfectly  as  the  natural  rights  of  men.  And  notwithstanding 
the  fact  that  the  property  rights  of  women  have  not  been  as 
fully  protected  as  those  of  men,  and  that  women  have  not 
been  allowed  the  same  freedom  as  men  in  seeking  their  safety 
and  happiness,  still,  speaking  generally,  it  is  nevertheless 
true,  that  the  State  engages  to  protect  the  natural  rights  of 
all  citizens  of  both  sexes  alike. 

Now,  the  minority  of  this  committee  argue  that  women 
can  have  no  natural  right  to  vote,  because  they  have  no  right 
to  overturn  the  present  government  of  Massachusetts  by 
force. 


28 


Our  fathers  neither  declare  nor  deny  suffrage  to  be  a  nat¬ 
ural  right.  They  do  not,  to  be  sure,  profess  to  enumerate  all 
the  rights  which  may  fairly  be  considered  natural.  Still,  as 
they  deny  suffrage  to  women,  there  is  ground  for  the  objec¬ 
tion  that  suffrage  was  not,  in  their  opinion,  a  natural  right. 

What,  however,  does  this  objection  and  argument  really 
amount  to  ? 

Let  us  suppose  that  men  and  women  have  changed  places 
in  Massachusetts.  This  change  will  not  affect  the  natural 
rights  of  persons  of  either  sex  in  the  slightest  degree.  All 
the  natural  rights  which  government  engages  to  support  and 
protect  will  remain,  and  will  be  supported  and  protected  pre¬ 
cisely  as  they  now  are.  The  change  having  been  effected, 
less  than  one  quarter  of  the  People,  composed  of  women,  will 
exercise  all  the  powers  of  government,  and  the  large  majority 
of  the  People,  although  men,  will  have  no  political  rights  what¬ 
soever  in  reference  either  to  themselves  or  women.  Does  any 
one  doubt,  would  this  committee  contend  for  a  single  mo¬ 
ment,  that  under  any  such  circumstances  the  men  would  have 
no  right  to  overturn  the  government  by  force  ?  Every  man 
of  us,  the  committee  included,  would  admit  the  right.  But 
if,  under  such  circumstances,  men  would  have  the  right  to 
overturn  the  government  by  force  unless  suffrage  was  ex¬ 
tended  to  them,  the  committee,  on  theft  theory,  must  admit 
that  suffrage  for  men  is  a  natural  right.  If  so,  then  as  nat¬ 
ural  rights  know  no  sex,  the  committee  are  also  compelled  to 
admit  that  suffrage  for  women  is  a  natural  right.  Women 
must  be  fully  justified  in  seeking  to  overturn  the  government 
to-day,  because  the  men  would  be  justified  in  so  acting  if  they 
were  in  the  subordinate  place  now  held  by  women. 

This  objection  or  argument  of  the  minority  of  the  commit¬ 
tee  has,  therefore,  no  real  weight  whatsoever.  At  first,  men 
will  use  argument  to  obtain  any  right  which  is  denied  them, 
and,  if  argument  fails,  they  will  use  force,  if  the  occasion 
seems  to  justify  it.  And  this  method  has  frequently  worked 
out  good  results.  On  the  other  hand,  women  will  pursue  a 
better  course.  They  will  seek  to  obtain  their  rights  by  per- 


29 


suasion  and  argument,  and,  we  hope,  never  by  force.  We 
have  already  had  too  many  appeals  to  force  in  the  government 
of  the  world ;  the  less  we  have  of  them ,  in  future  the  better. 
Women  seek  to  obtain  their  rights  by  appeals  to  reason,  and 
the  sense  of  justice  in  men  ;  and  when  the  right  of  suffrage 
shall  be  finally  granted  to  women  for  these  reasons,  as  it  can¬ 
not  fail  to  be,  the  community,  being  ready  to  receive  it,  will 
work  out  a  nobler  Free  Republic  than  the  world  has  ever 
seen. 

May  we  not  hope  that  the  next  time  the  men  composing  the 
minority  of  this  committee  shall  be  called  upon  to  consider 
this  subject,  they  will  say  that,  according  to  the  true  test,  suf¬ 
frage  must  be  considered  to  be  a  natural  right  under  our  form 
of  government;  —  because  women,  being  largely  in  the  major 
ity,  have  an  undoubted  right  (just  as  undoubted  as  men  would 
have  if  situated  as  women  now  are),  by  arguments  and  appeals 
to  reason,  and,  if  these  shall  fail,  by  the  use  of  force,  to  resist 
a  government  which  takes  their  property  by  taxation  without 
representation,  and  governs  them  without  their  consent,  for 
taxation  without  representation,  and  government  not  based  on 
consent  is  tyranny,  and  never  can  be  anything  else,  and 
tyranny  fully  justifies  revolution,  whether  the  governing 
power  be  in  the  hands  of  men  or  women. 

In  further  support  of  fheir  objection,  the  minority  of  this 
committee  quote  Judge  Story  as  saying,  “  The  truth  seems 
to  me  that  the  right  of  voting,  like  many  other  rights,  is  one 
which,  whether  it  has  a  fixed  foundation  in  natural  law  or  not, 
has  always  been  treated  in  the  practice  of  nations  as  a  strictly 
civil  right,  derived  from  and  regulated  by  each  society  accord¬ 
ing  to  its  own  circumstances  and  interests.  It  is  difficult, 
even  in  the  abstract,  to  conceive  how  it  could  have  otherwise 
been  treated/’ 

They  also  refer  to  what  they  describe  as  “  a  recent  and  very 
thoroughly  considered  case  in  one  of  the  most  respected  State 
courts  ”  (23  Maryland  Rep.  531),  where  the  court  say  that  the 
elective  franchise  “  is  a  privilege  conferred  on  the  citizen  by 
the  sovereign  power  of  the  State  to  subserve  a  general  public 


30 

purpose,  and  not  for  private  or  individual  advantage ;  that, 
as  against  the  power  conferring  it,  the  citizen  acquires  no  in¬ 
defeasible  right  to  its  continuance  or  enjoyment ;  and  that 
the  people  of  the  State,  in  the  exercise  of  their  sovereign 
power,  may  qualify,  suspend,  or  entirely  withdraw  it  from  any 
citizen,  or  class  of  them,  providing,  always,  that  representa¬ 
tion  of  the  people,  the  essential  characteristic  of  a  republican 
government,  be  not  disregarded  or  abandoned.” 

These  committee-men  also  refer  to  a  decision  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  (21  Wal.  162),  to  the 
effect  “  that  suffrage  was  not,  and  never  had  been,  one  of  the 
necessary  rights  of  citizenship  ;  and  that,  therefore,  a  pro¬ 
vision  in  the  constitution  and  laws  of  a  State  denying  its 
exercise  to  women  was  valid.” 

Doubtless  other  decisions  of  courts  and  quotations  from 
text-books  of  the  same  kind  can  be  produced,  for  the  fact  is 
plain  enough  that,  though  all  the  States  claim  to  have  a  repub¬ 
lican  form  of  government,  they  all,  including  Massachusetts, 
unite  in  denying  suffrage  to  women  by  their  constitutions, 
except,  possibly,  in  some  few  of  them  where  the  women  enjoy 
the  right  of  suffrage  as  to  school  matters. 

Our  Constitution  denies  suffrage  to  women  ;  and  as  our 
Supreme  Judicial  Court  cannot  declare  this  or  any  other 
clause  in  the  Constitution  to  be  invalid,  it  must  necessarily 
decide  that  the  denial  of  suffrage  to  women  is  constitutional, 
and  therefore  that  suffrage  is  a  mere  privilege  which  may 
legally  be  withheld. 

We  are,  however,  now  discussing  the  nature  of  suffrage  on 
what  should  be  considered  as  the  fundamental  principles  of  a 
republic.  We  admit  readily  enough  that  women  have  not 
got  the  right  of  suffrage  now.  We  admit  readily  enough  that 
the  courts  will  unite  in  deciding  that  women  may  be  denied 
the  ballot  by  a  constitutional  provision  in  the  State  where 
they  reside,  and  so  of  course  all  writers  of  text-books  will  say. 

Our  question,  however,  is,  What  right  have  we  men  to  im¬ 
pose  such  a  constitutional  restriction  on  women  ? 

And  we  seek  to  answer  this  question  on  what  we  ourselves 


3i 


admit  to  be  fundamental  grounds,  not  so  much  on  what 
exists  as  on  what  ought  to  exist ;  not  on  what  the  courts  feel 
obliged  to  support,  but  on  what  they  ought  to  support ;  and  if 
it  be,  as  this  court  in  Maryland  says,  the  truth,  that  repre¬ 
sentation  of  the  People  is  the  essential  characteristic  of  a 
republic,  and  cannot  be  disregarded,  we  must  ask  whether 
the  People  are  really  and  truly  represented  in  this  sense  when 
only  about  one  quarter  of  them  have  any  power  whatever  in 
relation  to  government. 

What  just  right,  therefore,  have  the  male  voters  of  Massa¬ 
chusetts  by  their  Constitution  to  deny  suffrage  to  those 
women  who  are  qualified  to  vote  in  all  respects  as  themselves, 
merely  because  they  are  born  women  ? 

If  we  male  voters  have  any  such  right  it  must  come  from,  — 

(i.)  The  consent  of  the  women  to  be  governed  by  us; 
or,— 

(2.)  The  right  of  men  to  govern  women,  whether  they  con¬ 
sent  or  not  ;  or,  — 

(3.)  The  actual  possession  of  the  power  by  men  without 
regard  to  right. 

If  women  had  ever  consented  to  be  governed  by  us,  our 
rule  over  them  would  of  course  be  just.  But  women  have 
never  given  any  such  consent.  On  the  contrary,  it  has  only 
been  after  long  years  of  effort  and  struggle  on  their  part 
against  all  sorts  of  ridicule  and  opposition  on  the  part  of  men, 
that  the  women  of  the  State  have  finally  wrung  from  our  un¬ 
willing  hands  the  measure  of  property  right  which  they  now 
possess.  The  existing  subjection  of  women  is  merely  what 
remains  of  the  former  universal  slavery  of  women,  and  the 
slavery  of  women  at  the  time  of  its  existence  was  deemed  by 
the  very  best  and  noblest  of  men  to  be  as  natural  a  state  for 
women  as  their  present  state  of  subjection  is  now  deemed  by 
any  of  us  men  to  be  their  natural  condition. 

We  male  voters  can  therefore  claim  no  right  to  govern 
women  on  the  ground  that  they  consent. 

Have  we  a  right  to  govern  women  whether  they  consent  or 
not  ?  It  is  true  enough  that  men  have  so  governed  women  in 


32 


all  ages,  and  now  do  so  in  Massachusetts  ;  but  have  we  any 
right  to  do  so  merely  because  we  are  men  ? 

The  idea  of  a  single  man  being  “  born  a  magistrate,  law¬ 
giver,  or  judge,”  appears  to  us  to  be,  and  is  most  manifestly, 
“absurd  and  unnatural.”  (Decl.  of  Rights,  Art.  6.)  Is  it  any 
less  absurd  or  unnatural  to  hold,  as  these  objectors  and  the 
minority  of  this  committee  must  do,  that  no  one  can  be  a 
magistrate,  lawgiver,  or  judge  in  this  State  who  is  not  born 
a  man  ?  According  to  our  Bill  of  Rights,  “  all  men  are  born 
.  .  .  equal”;  and  our  Supreme  Judicial  Court  having  decided 
that  the  word  “  men  ”  as  here  used  is  equivalent  to  mankind, 
and  therefore  includes  both  men  and  women,  we  must  hold 
that  men  and  women  are  born  equal,  that  is,  with  equal  rights 
before  the  law.  (Decl.  of  Rights,  Art.  i  ;  4  Mass.  Rep.  128  ; 
Taxation  of  Women,  revised  ed.,  p.  5.)  Therefore  men 
have  no  more  just  right  than  women  to  be  born  magistrates, 
lawgivers,  and  judges.  We  men  cannot  therefore  claim  any 
just  right  to  govern  women  in  this  State,  as  we  do,  in  the 
character  of  magistrates,  lawgivers,  and  judges,  simply  because 
we  are  born  men. 

We  are  therefore  driven  to  rest  our  claim  of  right  to  govern 
women  merely  on  the  fact  that  we  hold  the  reins  of  govern¬ 
ment,  and  have  control  of  the  physical  power  of  the  State.  In 
a  recent  debate  in  our  State-House,  Hon.  Senator  Winn  admits 
this,  when  he  professes  to  answer  the  question  which  he  said 
was  often  asked  by  women  :  “  Who  gave  you  (i.  e.  men)  the 
power  to  decide  for  women  ?  ”  His  answer  was,  “  No  matter 
who  gave  it,  we  have  it”  !  (Woman’s  Journal,  April  5,  1879.) 
King  George  and  his  adherents  also  held  the  reins  of  govern¬ 
ment  and  controlled  the  physical  power  of  Great  Britain.  Did 
our  fathers  think  that  these  facts  gave  him  or  Parliament  any 
right  to  govern  them  without  their  consent  ? 

The  persons  who  bring  forward  this  objection,  the  Hon. 
Senator  Winn  and  the  minority  of  the  legislative  commit¬ 
tee,  are  therefore  really  disbelievers  in  the  true  idea  of  a 
republican  form  of  government.  They  may  cover  up  their 
real  meaning  so  that  this  disbelief  shall  not  be  very  apparent 


33 


perhaps  even  to  themselves  ;  but  nevertheless  a  free  republic 
can  only  rest  on  consent,  it  can  never  tolerate  an  aristocracy  of 
birth,  and  must  resist  until  death  a  government  supported  only 
on  force,  especially  when,  as  in  Massachusetts,  this  aristocracy 
and  this  force  rest  only  with  one  quarter  part  of  the  people. 

We  have  had  great  and  learned  discussions  about  the  repre¬ 
sentation  of  minorities,  as  if  now  the  majority  had  any  voice 
whatever.  Let  us  rather  seek  to  found  a  republic  where  the 
majority  shall  be  represented.  It  never  yet  has  been  done. 

Does  any  one  say  Suffrage  is  a  manly  right,  and  is  not 
exercised  except  by  those  who  can  fight,  —  that  behind  every 
ballot  stands  a  bullet  ? 

We  deny  the  fact. 

We  have  48,436  young  men  in  Massachusetts  between  the 
ages  of  eighteen  and  twenty-one.  They  constitute  the  best  of 
our  fighting  material,  and  they  are  not  allowed  to  vote  because 
they  are  minors. 

Of  those  who  possess  the  ballot,  97,136  are  over  forty-five 
years  of  age  and  are  incapable  of  fighting. 

248,977,'if  “able-bodied,”  (Gen.  Stat.,  c.  13,  §§  1,4,  14,)  are 
enrolled  in  the  militia,  and  may  possibly  be  called  on  to  fight, 
though  they  never  have  been  ;  but  they  all  vote,  and  it  makes 
no  sort  of  difference  in  their  right  to  vote  whether  they  are 
able-bodied  or  sickly. 

Not  more  than  5,000  are  allowed  to  volunteer  to  do  all  the 
fighting  needed,  and  they  have  no  more  rights  at  the  ballot- 
box  than  those  who  are  incapable  of  holding  a  gun.1 

Now,  if  the  best  fighters  are  not  allowed  to  vote,  and  the 
best  class  of  voters  are  incapable  of  fighting,  and  not  more 
than  one  fiftieth  of  the  voters  who  are  even  liable  to  be  en¬ 
rolled  are  allowed  to  volunteer  to  fight,  or  to  be  in  readiness 
if  necessary,  and  no  difference  whatever  is  made  in  the  right 
of  the  forty-nine  fiftieths  to  vote,  whether  they  are  able-bodied 
or  not,  it  cannot  be  said  with  truth  that  Suffrage  depends  at 
all  on  the  ability  to  fight. 

Who  would  propose  to  disfranchise  the  gallant  color-ser- 
1  Compendium  of  Census,  1875,  P*  39- 


l 


34 


geant  who  lost  both  arms  in  supporting  the  flag  ?  Where  is 
to  be  found  the  man  with  soul  so  dead  as  to  dream  of  dis¬ 
franchising  General  Bartlett,  even  when  he  lay  on  the  bed  of 
death  ? 

But  if  it  were  true,  as  it  is  not,  that  the  right  of  Suffrage 
depends  at  all  on  the  ability  to  fight,  the  Constitution  ex¬ 
pressly  recognizes  that  an  equivalent  may  be  given  for  per¬ 
sonal  service.  Government  engages  to  protect  the  people  in 
the  enjoyment  of  life,  liberty,  and  property,  and  each  individual 
is  required  “to  give  his  personal  services  or  an  equivalent 
when  necessary.”  (Decl.,  Art.  io.)  Quakers  are  not  called 
upon  to  fight,  and  yet  they  are  allowed  to  vote.  They  are 
exempted  on  moral  grounds,  and  are  allowed  to  furnish  an 
equivalent  for  personal  services.  Why  cannot  we  place 
women  on  the  same  ground  as  men  over  forty-five,  and  deem 
them  incapable  of  fighting  ?  or  treat  them  as  Quakers,  and 
allow  them  to  furnish  an  equivalent  for  personal  service,  or 
require  them  to  furnish  substitutes,  as  we  begged  them  to  do 
in  the  war,  or  oblige  them  to  do  as  they  volunteered  to  do  in 
the  war,  —  serve  on  Sanitary  Commissions,  and  in  hospitals 
as  superintendents,  or  doctors,  or  nurses  ? 

Few  of  us  realize  how  much  the  women  of  the  country  did, 
by  real  hard  physical  work,  to  secure  the  efficiency  of  our 
army  as  a  fighting  body.  Abraham  Lincoln  said,  at  the  open¬ 
ing  of  the  Sanitary  Fair  in  Washington:  “I  am  not  accus¬ 
tomed  to  the  use  of  language  of  eulogy.  I  have  never  studied 
the  art  of  paying  compliments  to  women  ;  but  I  must  say, 
that  if  all  that  has  been  said  by  orators  and  poets  since  the 
creation  of  the  world  in  praise  of  women  were  applied  to  the 
women  of  America,  it  would  not  do  them  justice  for  their 
conduct  during  this  war.”  (U.  S.  San.  Com.,  p.  282.) 

Government  does  not,  however,  rest  on  physical,  but  on 
moral  force.  In  the  language  of  the  Constitution,  it  rests  on 
the  “  wisdom  and  knowledge,  as  well  as  virtue,  diffused  gen¬ 
erally  among  the  body  of  the  people.”  (Frame  of  Government, 
c.  5,  §  2.)  The  army  and  navy,  the  police  and  constables,  all 
have  their  use,  but  it  is  the  people  of  the  country  who  sup- 


35 


port  them,  not  they  the  people,  —  for  a  law  cannot  be  long 
enforced  by  all  of  them  combined,  unless  sustained  by  the 
moral  sense  of  the  people. 

It  requires  the  services  of  about  four  millions  and  a  half  of 
men,  and  costs  about  a  thousand  millions  of  dollars,  every  year, 
for  the  so-called  Christian  nations  of  the  world  to  support 
their  armies  and  navies  even  on  a  peace  footing !  This  is  the 
best  result  of  civilization  carried  on  by  men  alone,  for  now 
nearly  nineteen  centuries.  Must  the  human  race  forever  go 
on  in  this  blundering,  wasteful,  and  brutal  way,  or  cannot  some 
better  way  be  found  ?  What  would  be  the  effect  if  the  Chris¬ 
tian  world  should  spend  every  year  a  thousand  million  of  dol¬ 
lars  in  helping  people  to  live  happy  and  useful  lives,  instead  of 
throwing  it  away  in  organizing  means  of  destruction  ?  May 
we  not  reasonably  hope  that  the  influence  of  women,  as  voters, 
will  tend  to  lessen  this  enormous  sacrifice  of  life  and  the 
means  of  happiness  ? 

Finally,  does  any  one  say  suffrage  is  not  a  womanly  act  ? 
This  seems  to  be  the  opinion  of  the  minority  of  the  legislative 
committee,  and  to  be  a  great,  if  not  the  greatest,  objection  to 
our  claim,  for  they  say,  woman  suffrage  proposes  “  a  revolu¬ 
tion  contrary  to  the  order  of  nature,  in  which  the  household 
and  the  family  would,  to  a  great  extent,  be  sacrificed  to  public 
duties  and  political  life.”  Cannot  we  safely  leave  to  the 
women  themselves  the  determination  of  what  is  and  what  is 
not  womanly,  —  what  will  and  what  will  not  sacrifice  families  ? 
Formerly,  when  men  met  together  by  themselves  for  feas.ting 
and  pleasure,  drunkenness  and  debauch  were  the  invariable 
results  ;  and  to  this  day  all  such  gatherings  of  men  alone  are 
not  apt  to  be  favorable  to  the  highest  and  best  purity  in  con¬ 
versation.  The  mere  presence  of  women  at  these  scenes  has 
been  sufficient  to  change  all  this  disgusting  excess.  No 
longer  can  men  in  the  best  society  be  seen  crawling  down  the 
door-steps  of  a  private  house  too  drunk  to  walk  upright ! 
Have  women  become  any  less  womanly  in  consequence  of 
doing  away  with  these  things,  or  have  they  only  succeeded  in 
making  men  more  human  by  their  mere  presence  ? 


36 


“  The  study  of  political  questions,  the  forming  an  estimate 
of  the  character  of  public  men  or  measures,  the  casting  a  vote 
which  is  the  result  of  that  study  and  estimate,  certainly  have 
in  themselves  nothing  to  degrade  the  most  delicate  and  refined 
nature,”  as  Senators  Hoar,  Mitchell,  and  Cameron  well  say. 
If  men  now  frequently  conduct  themselves  at  the  polls  as  they 
used  formerly  to  do  at  social  gatherings,  and  exhibit  coarse¬ 
ness  and  brutality,  and  thus  show,  if  anything,  their  own  un¬ 
fitness  to  vote,  why  may  not  the  mere  presence  of  women  at 
the  polls  have  as  purifying  an  effect  there  as  it  has  already 
had  over  social  entertainments  ?  Such  has  been  the  actual 
result  in  Wyoming. 

\  The  object  of  voting  is  to  give  voice  and  practical  effect  to 
the  wisdom,  knowledge,  and  virtue  diffused  among  the  people. 
Do  we  men  possess  all  the  wisdom,  knowledge,  and  virtue 
which  is  worth  making  use  of  ?  Women  now  vote  in  parishes 
and  religious  societies,  and  in  corporation  meetings.  They 
now  act  as  overseers  of  the  poor,  serve  on  school  committees, 
and  as  school  supervisors.  They  act  as  executors,  adminis¬ 
trators,  trustees,  guardians,  accountants,  book-keepers,  &c., 
and  in  all  these  relations  they  are  constantly  called  upon  to 
act  with  men.  We  find  women  among  the  clergy.  Dr. 
Collyer  has  just  publicly  thanked  Miss  Eastman  for  the  help¬ 
ful  words  she  had  just  uttered  from  his  pulpit.  Women  act 
as  physicians  and  surgeons,  as  authors  and  artists. 

More  than  six  times  as  many  women  as  men  are  teachers, 
and  those  in  our  High  Schools  are  qualified  to  teach  young 
men  about  “  the  civil  policy  of  this  Commonwealth  and  of  the 
United  States.”  (General  Statutes,  c.  38,  §  2.) 

More  women  than  men  are  engaged  in  the  manufacture 
of  carpetings,  cotton  goods,  and  paper;  twice  as  many  in 
the  manufacture  of  worsted  goods,  three  times  as  many 
in  the  manufacture  of  silk  goods,  and  five  times  as  many  in 
the  manufacture  of  clothing. 

On  the  other  hand,  five  times  as  many  boys  as  girls  are  in 
reformatories.  More  than  five  times  as  many  men  as  women 
are  convicts.  More  than  twice  as  many  men  as  women  are 


37 


paupers,  and  about  seventy  times  as  many  men  as  women  are 
engaged  in  the  manufacture  of  liquor,  —  the  nurse  of  pauper 
ism  and  crime ! 

Is  it  not  clear  that  the  average  woman,  with  equal  opportu¬ 
nities  for  education  and  development,  will  show  about  as  much 
wisdom,  knowledge,  and  virtue  as  the  average  man  ? 

If  general  Woman  Suffrage  has  been  proved  by  the  very 
best  witnesses,  and  beyond  all  possible  doubt  and  cavil,  to  be 
a  success  in  Wyoming,  as  it  has,  why  cannot  we  safely  and 
wisely  try  it  here  ? 

If  limited  municipal  and  school  suffrage  is  actually  exer¬ 
cised  in  England  by  some  of  the  best  and  noblest  women 
there,  without  impairing  in  the  slightest  degree  their  womanly 
character,  our  women  can  do  the  same  here. 

Suffrage  in  reference  to  school  matters,  thank  God,  is 
already  in  actual  use  in  Minnesota,  Iowa,  Kansas,  and  New 
Hampshire,  and  we  propose  to  try  it  here  also.  Half  the 
school-children  are  girls,  more  than  six  sevenths  of  the 
teachers  are  women.  What  possible  ground  can  there  be, 
except  mere  prejudice,  for  denying  them  the  right  to  vote  for 
school  appropriations,  and  about  school  studies  and  govern¬ 
ment,  in  any  of  the  States  ? 1 

Men  drink,  and  women  suffer.  With  manhood  suffrage, 
according  to  Judge  Pitman,  we  spend  for  drink  six  times  as 
much  as  we  do  for  education  every  year.  Cannot  we  pru¬ 
dently  call  on  the  women  to  help  us  by  their  votes,  so  that  we 
may  at  least  expend  as  much  for  the  education  as  we  do  for 
the  brutalization  of  the  race  ? 

Does  any  one  object  that  woman  suffrage  exists  in  Utah  ? 

It  is  difficult  to  say  what  vagaries,  and  even  immoralities, 
men  and  women  may  not  be  led  into  from  religious  teachings 
or  enthusiasm.  A  generation  or  more  ago  there  was  a  great 
revival  of  religion  in  the  Orthodox  Church  in  New  England, 
the  outcome  of  which  was  the  establishment  of  a  sect  of 
Christians,  called  Perfectionists,  made  up  of  earnest  men  and 
women  who  believed  it  was  possible  for  them  to  live  here  on 
earth  perfectly  sinless  lives. 


3§ 


These  Orthodox  Christians,  though  breaking  no  law  of  the 
State  of  New  York,  have  a  system  of  complex  marriage,  really 
no  marriage  at  all,  as  the  world  commonly  understands  that 
term.  The  Mormons,  in  defiance  of  the  law  of  the  land,  have 
what  they  call  plural  marriage,  —  really  polygamy. 

Now  when  it  is  objected  that  woman  suffrage  exists  in 
Utah,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  it  exists  only  in  con¬ 
nection  with  a  government  which,  until  very  lately,  has  been 
wholly  in  the  hands  of  the  Mormon  Church.  Wherever  the 
supreme  power  of  the  state  is  in  the  hands  of  a  church,  no 
matter  what,  whether  Christian  or  Mormon,  the  government 
can  hardly  fail  to  be  bad.  No  suffrage  can  save  such  a  gov¬ 
ernment  from  producing  evil  results. 

I  have  nothing  to  say  in  defence  of  these  systems  in  refer¬ 
ence  to  marriage,  except  this,  that  even  plural  marriage,  where, 
as  in  Utah,  the  man  feels  it  to  be  a  religious  duty  to  support 
all  his  children  and  their  mothers,  or  even  the  system  of  com¬ 
plex  marriage,  where,  as  at  Oneida,  the  person  of  a  woman  is 
declared  to  be  sacred,  and  all  the  men  profess  to  feel  under 
a  sacred  religious  obligation  to  support  and  protect  all  the 
women  and  save  them  from  compulsory  or  undesired  child¬ 
bearing,  bad  as  they  may  seem  to  be,  are  both  of  them,  to  say 
the  least,  as  favorable  to  the  women  and  children  as  the  sub¬ 
stantial  toleration  of  the  social  evil,  which  now  exists  in  this 
community  governed  only  by  male  voters,  and  infinitely  better 
than  that  still  more  wicked  and  cruel  outrage  on  women  called 
the  State  Regulation  of  Vice,  one  or  the  other  or  both  of* 
which  methods  of  treating  this  evil  are  the  only  ways  thus  far 
devised  by  men. 

May  we  not  reasonably  hope  that,  with  Woman  Suffrage, 
uncontrolled  by  misguided  or  perverted  religious  enthusiasm, 
we  may  be  able  to  find  out  some  better  way  than  either  of 
these,  —  some  way  that  shall  really  protect  the  purity  both  of 
men  and  women  ?  As  matters  now  stand  in  the  world  at 
large,  instead  of  seeking  to  protect  or  strengthen  their  own 
purity,  men  seek  rather  to  protect  themselves  in  sinning,  even 
though  in  so  doing  they  crush  women. 


39 


There  is  not  a  good  or  beautiful  feature  of  the  prevailing 
social  life  which  Woman  Suffrage  will  not  expand  and  cherish. 
There  is  not  a  bad  feature  which  it  will  not  frown  upon  and 
finally  extirpate. 

We  have  endeavored  to  show  that  we  men  rest  our  claim 
of  right  to  the  ballot,  not  on  any  State  law  or  Constitution, 
not  on  any  Provincial  law  or  Charter  ;  not  on  any  grant  from 
the  King ;  not  even  on  the  fact  that  we  are  men,  or  men  in 
possession  of  power,  but  simply  because  the  right  to  govern 
ourselves  inheres  in  us  as  part  of  the  people,  and  women  as 
part  of  the  people  may  make  the  same  claim,  and,  as  the  ma¬ 
jority,  they  ought  to  have  a  better  right  than  we. 

Our  fathers  proclaimed  the  only  true  ideal  of  a  republic  to 
be  power  based  on  the  consent  of  the  people.  We  may 
excuse  their  inconsistency  in  intrusting  the  actual  government 
to  men,  because  at  that  time  women  were  wholly  uneducated, 
and  in  a  state  of  legal  subjection  to  men  in  almost  everything. 
But  as  this  subjection,  so  far  as  property  rights  are  concerned, 
is  now  mainly  done  away  with,  and  the  State,  instead  of  dis¬ 
regarding  women  as  wholly  uneducated,  now  relies  mainly  on 
them  to  educate  the  future  voters  ;  we  cannot  longer  excuse 
ourselves  for  not  living  up  to  our  ideal :  — 

That,  the  government  of  the  State  now  being  in  the  hands 
of  less  than  one  fourth  of  the  people,  we  have  hardly  any 
more  right  or  claim  to  be  called  a  republic  than  South  Caro 
lina  had  when  a  majority  of  the  people  of  that  State  were 
actually  slaves. 

That  the  government  of  this  State  only  represents  legal 
voters ;  the  taxation  of  women  therefore  ought  not  to  be  con¬ 
tinued  by  us  “  under  any  pretext  whatsoever,”  until  we  give 
them  representation.  Whatever  other  principles  we  may  for¬ 
get  or  ignore,  let  us  never  forget  that  taxation  without  repre¬ 
sentation  is  tyranny,  even  if  the  persons  taxed  be  women. 

That  Suffrage  is  a  right  which  belongs  to,  and  inheres  in, 
the  people  governed  ;  that  is,  in  all  the  adult  citizens,  men 
and  women,  subject  only  to  such  reasonable  qualifications 
of  the  right  (capable  of  attainment  by  both  sexes)  as  shall 


40 


secure  to  the  State  the  best  results  of  the  wisdom,  knowledge, 
and  virtue  in  the  people. 

That  Suffrage  does  not  depend  in  the  slightest  degree  on 
the  ability  of  the  voter  to  fight.  Those  who  are  best  able  to 
fight  cannot  vote,  and  the  best  voters  are  unable  to  fight.  On 
the  contrary,  the  right  is  in  fact  enjoyed  by  any  man  who  is 
physically  incapable  just  as  freely  as  it  is  by  the  young  man 
who  volunteers  to  shoulder  his  musket.  And  finally,  — 

That  Suffrage  is  neither  a  manly  act  nor  yet  a  womanly 
act,  but  the  act  of  a  human  being,  who,  as  part  of  the  people, 
has  an  inherent  right  to  express  or  refuse  consent  to  the  form 
of  government  under  which  he  or  she  lives,  because  it  is,  and 
ever  must  continue  to  be,  a  self-evident  truth,  that  gov¬ 
ernment  derives  its  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the 
governed,  men  and  women,  and  from  no  other  source  under 
heaven. 


